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MORAL THEOLOGY

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

BY

FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D.

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MORAL THEOLOGY

BY THE

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PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK CITY

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WILLIAM WALTER WEBB, D.D.

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PREFACE

I HAD intended, after finishing the production of my series of ten volumes in *Dogmatic Theology*, to add as sequel thereto a work on *Moral Theology*, a subject which I taught in the Western Theological Seminary for some twenty years. Various reasons, however, threatened greatly to delay my completion of this work, when my scholarly friend and former pupil, Dr. Frank H. Hallock, offered to help me in preparing existing material of mine for immediate publication. I was the more ready to accept his kind offer because of the numerous letters which I was receiving, urging the present need of some kind of handbook of Moral Theology.

Accordingly, Dr. Hallock has taken my Western Seminary Syllabus, has slightly enlarged it, amended it, and brought it up to date, and has filled in the footnotes—an arduous undertaking. I have in turn gone over the footnotes and, with occasional slight amendments of both text and notes, have added to the bibliographical matter. I am also responsible for the opening chapter on "The Study of Moral Theology."

With grateful thanks to Dr. Hallock for his most valuable help, I express my earnest hope that our

book may help on the revival so much needed of the study of Moral Theology. It is, of course, a mere handbook, and does not remove the need of more adequate treatises.

F. J. H.

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MORAL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY

I. *Introductory*

§ 1. One of the most encouraging incidents of the catholic revival in the Anglican communion is the renewal of interest in Moral Theology which is gradually extending among the Anglican clergy. This interest, however, is far from being as yet what it should be, and its development is retarded by a very serious lack of literature in the subject adapted to Anglican conditions and needs. Quite a few contributory productions of value have appeared in recent years; but constructive manuals of systematic and comprehensive nature, suitable for the general guidance of priests in dealing with souls, are not in evidence. They are greatly needed; and the immediate urgency of this need explains our publication of this comparatively brief handbook, without the long delay that would be required for its full elaboration.

§ 2. The general tendency of moral writers outside the Roman Communion has been to deal almost exclusively with the more pressing problems of industrial and social life, and beyond that field to confine their attention to ethical theory. Moreover, in ethical manuals of to-day the claim of supernatural religion to be the true organizing principle of life and character in this world is very generally ignored. This is a very serious omission. Its natural result is that current practical ideals are largely of exclusively humanitarian and utilitarian types—as if man were his own end, and general human welfare in this world the organizing aim of all human duty. The larger Christian meaning and purpose of human effort, whenever it is sought to be reënforced, is stigmatized as an *interimsethic*, or as "other-worldiness"; and is lightly put aside as antiquated and unhelpful to those who would face the problem of this twentieth century—the problem, that is, of making this a better world to live in, here and now. The supreme duty towards God, if discussed at all, is re-defined as consisting in helping our neighbours, in promoting their earthly well-being.

That to do earthly good to our neighbours, or to serve them as opportunities occur in matters of temporal welfare, is an integral and vital part of Christian duty cannot rightly be denied, of course. Christ Himself has set us an example in going about doing good, and so far as modern practical idealism represents in this direction a recovery of Christian sense

of responsibility to do physical works of mercy, and a call to promote the present welfare of all classes of society with the aid of improved social science, it ought to obtain our entire approval and enlist our earnest practice.

§ 3. None the less, the swing of the pendulum has been excessive, and the central and organizing principle of Christian ethic has been driven out of sight in the utilitarian idealism referred to. Doing present good, healing the sick and so forth, was certainly an inevitable adjunct and promotive factor in what Christ came to do. But the purpose which brought Him into the world was to bring men to eternal life—into living touch with God forever. His immediate good works were undertaken as revelations of His love and as adjuncts of His main design—to facilitate the turning of men to God. The Gospel evidence of this is abundant, and while the Catholic Church has never ceased to include temporal beneficence among Christian duties, it has consistently retained Christ's standpoint and aim as the organizing principle of its ethical teaching.

This world is our school for the life which is to be enjoyed hereafter. It is the sphere of probation and discipline; and present happiness, even of the greatest number, cannot be made the controlling aim of all earthly endeavour, the supreme standard of reference in determining duty, without shifting the moral centre from where God has placed it, and consequently altering in fatal ways the righteousness

which we are set to cultivate. It dethrones God and reduces Him to a mere agent for human purposes and human comfort.

A true moral science places God at the centre, as our chief end. Whatever we are and for whatever end we came to be are determined wholly by God's will and purpose in making us; and He made us for Himself, to be His friends forever. Accordingly, He has so made us that no temporal good, no purely human fellowship, can satisfy us in the long run. God does indeed will that we should attain to happiness; but He has so determined our nature that no abiding happiness is possible if we seek it otherwise than through life with Him. This means that our chief end does not lie unqualifiedly in seeking and promoting happiness, but in making the happiness which we seek and promote to consist in the life with God and His saints for which we are made.

So it is that religion, or the cultivation of true relations with God, is no mere aid to natural goodness, but is the central element of righteousness, the element that organizes all obligations and ideals whatsoever around our chief end. Apart from its practice the natural virtues—virtues though they truly are—fail to be linked up with their higher and heavenly complements, with the way to life and the light that reveals that way. Problems of present distress are treated as if they were the ultimate ones; and the remedies sought to be applied serve as concealments of the real situation instead of means of

recovery for the journey to God. It is idle to set over against this the widespread neglect by catholic Christians of the utilitarian branch of their duties, as if this justified giving such duties the paramount place. A reformation of this neglect is rightly demanded, but to make this world's social welfare the controlling standard of moral obligation is to subvert the teaching of Christ and to revert to paganism. Moral Theology should measure all obligations in the light of their bearing on eternal life; and when this is done practically the true and abiding welfare of mankind will be promoted effectively and in the manner that God wills.

§ 4. An adequate and justly proportioned moral science, suitable for the conditions under which Anglican priests have to labour, has yet to be developed—a development that will make no important headway so long as our moral writers postpone experimental effort in producing really constructive treatises. The ideal treatise of which we dream cannot come except as the sequel of pioneer efforts and numerous imperfect manuals.

In the meantime, our clergy are under obligation to study Moral Theology, if they are to serve as intelligent pastors and guides in and out of the confessional, and not to be reckless exploiters of individualistic judgments, judgments unrelated to the cumulative experience and consentient opinions of their predecessors from the beginning. Where shall they turn?

First of all they need to study Holy Scripture, especially the New Testament, as a storehouse of determinative data—the moral teaching of Christ and His Apostles, the cases in which their teaching received significant application, and the ideal of Christian conduct and character there exhibited.

Then they need to study the post-apostolic moral teaching, precepts and discipline of the Catholic Church, tracing it carefully through the ages to the present day. This study, along with the biblical, will provide the materials of Moral Theology and afford many determinative hints both for constructive ordering of moral science and for pastoral judgment. Above all it will go far to save the student from one-sidedness, whether of ecclesiastical provincialism or of modern utilitarianism.

The great ethical classics should receive attention, especially Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* and St. Thomas' *Summa Theologica*, Part II, which more than any other ethical treatises have created the terminology of moral science. To St. Thomas we owe the accepted definition of many moral concepts, and to leave him out is like leaving Hamlet out of Shakespeare's drama of that title.

Again, we cannot pass over the study of Roman Catholic treatises. In them alone do we find large and constructive treatments of the whole subject. These treatises have defects, and are adjusted to ecclesiastical conditions other than ours; and some of their defects will be indicated in these pages. But

nowhere else can we find complete handling of many questions which we have to face somehow in dealing with souls.

Finally, an adequate study of moral science must include a reckoning with modern ethical literature of the contributory type, both Anglican and other—the modern manuals of Ethics (mostly theoretical) and Anglican contributions from such writers as Bishop Gore, T. B. Strong, K. E. Kirk, F. G. Belton and others mentioned in our footnotes. In particular, the modern industrial situation has to be faced, and some knowledge needs to be gained of law, economics, sociology and psychology. Surely the subject of moral science is large; but its largeness ought not to conceal the imperative need of mastering it as well as we can.

II. *Survey of Moral Science*

§ 5. The several branches of Moral Theology in general are as follows: (*a*) Moral Philosophy, the principal content of modern ethical manuals, concerned with ethical theory and the definition of the fundamental ethical concepts; (*b*) Moral Theology Proper, giving a logically connected account of all Christian obligations, in the light of the law of both God and man and of the terms of the Christian covenant; (*c*) Casuistry, concerned with problematical cases of conduct, and with the principles which should guide a priest in dealing with individual souls; (*d*)

Ascetic Theology, or the science of Christian progress towards perfection; (*e*) Mystical Theology, concerned with the supernatural experiences of those who in this life attain to occasional enjoyments of union with God approximating that which is pledged to the faithful in Heaven.

It is to be noticed that the study of moral science has a practical aim, an aim which cannot be fulfilled by concerning ourselves exclusively or chiefly with ethical theory. Sound ethical theory, which means theory that reckons seriously with the supernaturally revealed Christian faith and covenant, is indeed indispensable; but it should be regarded as introductory only, and should be applied in a coherent treatment of the whole range of Christian obligations, Godward and manward, of supernatural religion and of good morals in the usual sense of that phrase. The widespread assumption that no such science is needed, even for Christian pastors, is hopelessly mistaken. Without it the range of duty is inadequately understood by the clergy; and the problems that continually arise in the guidance of souls are apt to be handled crudely and determined badly, with obliviousness of established principles and precedents in the Church of God. Moral Theology Proper, its supplement of Casuistry, and its complement of Ascetic Theology are plainly necessary, therefore, for the equipment of priests.

§ 6. I have called Ascetic Theology the "complement" of Moral Theology Proper. The realization

of this is needed if we are to avoid a serious danger, one not wholly escaped in Roman moral treatises. I mean the danger of setting up two standards of Christian vocation and duty, the legalistic and the ascetic. The distinction between sinlessness and positive perfection is indeed real and important; and therefore the separate treatment of Moral Theology Proper, concerned mainly with distinguishing between the sinful and the non-sinful, and of Ascetic Theology, concerned with growth in heavenly virtue, is justifiable and convenient. The former science, coupled with Casuistry, is for the judicial equipment of priests in the tribunal of Penance; while the latter is for their equipment in guiding souls in the way to God that has still to be travelled by those whose sins are being forgiven and forsaken.

But no penitents, however backward in spiritual culture, should be allowed without corrective enlightenment to acquiesce finally in the notion that the avoidance of sin is the only obligation imposed upon them by their Christian vocation. All Christians are called of God to positive perfection—not indeed as immediately attainable, but as the appointed goal towards which they are under obligation by God's grace to direct their efforts. In saying this I do not forget that backward souls have to be dealt with very patiently, and that in a vast number of cases they cannot be expected in this worldly stage of progress wholly to escape from the legalistic conception of Christian duty. My point is that their ulti-

mate escape from it is a *sine qua non* of their entrance into the joy of God. A merely sinless creature is not fit for full divine communion and fellowship until perfected in the positive graces of character which Christ has exhibited for our attainment. So it is that, limited in scope though it be, no Moral Theology Proper is rightly studied and applied except from the background of the fuller conception of Christian obligation which is unfolded in Ascetic Theology. For this reason, brief as this manual is, we have given our seventh chapter to a short summary of the higher side of Christian responsibility.

§ 7. The work of the Holy Spirit and His operations of supernatural grace in the hearts of Christians are necessarily presupposed and allowed for in Moral Theology. But the work of grace is not subversive of human nature and freedom and of the natural laws of human conduct. The purpose of grace is to assist and uplift human nature on its own lines and to sanctify it. But in those aspects of conduct and development of character which are susceptible of observation the laws of human nature hold their own, and their investigation is a useful adjunct of Moral and Ascetic Theology.

This means that the Psychology of behaviour and of sainthood is a legitimate and fruitful line of study; and works like those of Joly, on the one hand, and James, on the other, furnish important contributions to our science. But in admitting this we ought not to forget an important limitation of psychological

science. Like other natural sciences it is concerned exclusively with natural factors; and the self-coherence and apparent self-sufficiency of its description of the laws that control the natural functioning of our spirits should not blind us to the evidences that the higher level of sanctity in which such functioning occasionally results is not explained by natural factors alone. Psychology describes the course of nature that is involved in saintly development; but that it should pursue such a course, and with such a result, is due to supernatural grace and to lines of self-discipline which such grace alone makes possible and successful. Valuable as knowledge of the natural or psychological factors of moral behaviour is to a priest, Psychology for his purpose is a handmaid rather than the mistress of his moral science.

III *Some Snares*

§ 8. The danger of acquiescing in a double standard of Christian obligation, above referred to, is not the only one that attends the study and application of moral science. The distinction between venial and mortal sin is plainly made in Scripture, and is very necessary for practically judging the gravity of sins both in the tribunal of Penance and in self-examination. A momentary loss of temper is not to be treated as having the degree of guilt which is to be ascribed to deliberate and wilful murder; and if we would not drive men to despair, we ought not to deal

with their lighter sins as if immediately fatal to the spiritual life.

But serious danger, none the less, attends the rather common habit of making the technicalities of venial and mortal sin take the place of careful and discriminating judgment. The distinction referred to is qualitative, and in its application requires consideration not only of the gravity of matter or the act as such, but also the degree of knowledge, deliberation and wilfulness of the sinner. Sins of invincible ignorance, of sudden impulse, and of weakness in unusually severe temptation, are not invariably to be reckoned as mortal because of the gravity of their matter; nor are the small sins, materially considered, to be treated as venial when they are committed and clung to with deliberate, malicious and obstinately impenitent wilfulness. To forget this, and to neglect careful consideration of the subjective as well as the objective elements of sins, invites one or other of two serious consequences: (*a*) of driving struggling souls to despair by undue severity of judgment, treating sins as mortal when they are really venial; and (*b*) of lightly estimating sins of relatively light matter, as if necessarily and invariably venial, when perhaps they are forms of deadly malice and guilt.

The distinction between venial and mortal sin is often set forth before simple folk in a way that encourages the notion that one need not worry at all about venial sins—a very dangerous notion indeed, and one very apt to be encouraged by unqualified assurances

that venial sins need not be recalled and mentioned in the confessional. It is of course true that an exact enumeration of all one's sins, however minute, is neither possible nor necessary. But the inference frequently made by simple minds that venial sins need not be repented of, and therefore are not necessary matters of contrite self-examination and confession *in genere*, is hopelessly false and apt to be fatal in its consequences. All sins of every degree need to be repented of by implication at least, and to suppose that besetting sins, even though venial, can safely be forgotten in confession is a very precarious opinion.

§ 9. Another snare that needs careful avoidance is that of an undiscriminating judgment as to the state of those who fail wholly to abandon, or even visibly to reduce the frequency of, sins that have been ostensibly repented of. Besetting sins by long continuance modify the subjective aptitudes of the mind and will, and seriously reduce the power of avoiding their repetition; and this is as true of the graver forms of sin as of lighter ones. The power of grace is limited after all, and the entire removal of the danger of relapse into previously well-established habits of sin is not to be looked for in this world. Such relapses may indeed reveal the insincerity of repentance, or a malignant carelessness that is very serious indeed. But they may be due entirely to weakness, and may leave unaltered a growing dissociation of the penitent's fundamental aim and attitude from the

habits not yet overcome. The genuineness of repentance may indeed be brought under just suspicion by the lack of visible amendment of sinful habits, but the suspicion should be abandoned if there is evidence of the sinner's growing detestation of his sinful habit, grounded in increasing love of God.

Of course, relapses have to be attended to with great care; and the penitent should be urged to avoid the occasions which his previous habits make dangerous, and to cultivate by every means in his power the growth of his love of God and of his hatred of his sin. Never should a case be abandoned as hopeless, so long as opportunities of spiritual care remain.

§ 10. A further snare is encountered in hasty conclusions as to the necessity and obligation of resorting to the sacrament of Penance. The conventional teaching that this sacrament is necessary for salvation in case of mortal sin is too precise and sweeping to be accepted without qualifications, and is not primitive. Obviously the necessary conditions of salvation are not more numerous to-day than in the apostolic age. The most that can be said unqualifiedly is that, when adequate contrition and repentance are practically impossible without resort to Penance, that sacrament is necessary; and the Church's experience justifies the further teaching that this impossibility is apt to exist when the soul has been hardened by the graver degrees of deliberate and wilful sin.

Furthermore, the Church has authority to impose such disciplinary rules in this direction as its experience dictates.

But the doctrine that adequate contrition secures divine forgiveness in any case is undoubtedly biblical and ecumenical, and the disciplinary requirements referred to have not been precisely set forth except provincially and variously. Anglicans are bound only by the requirements of Anglican discipline, which leave the determination of personal need and obligation in this matter to individual judgment. Whatever may be our opinions as to the merits of this peculiarity of Anglican discipline, it should be clear that Anglican priests may not impose disciplinary requirements upon their people which the Anglican province does not impose. What they both may and ought to do is to make clear to those under their spiritual care the great value of sacramental confession, and the grave danger that failure to make use of it may in many instances mean failure truly to repent.

Summing up what has here been said on the snares that beset the study and application of moral science, these snares arise mainly from the careless use of the technicalities of Moral Theology. These are necessary for scientific purposes, and are true when taken with the important proviso that moral principles are larger than the rules which are deduced from them, and are insusceptible of exclusively technical consideration. Similarly, moral states of the soul are not

rightly estimated and judged unless their qualitative nature is carefully borne in mind. Rules are helpful, but they do not obviate the need of exercising a discriminating judgment in each case.

CHAPTER II

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

§ 1. "Ethics is the science of Conduct. It considers the actions of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or to evil." [1] It concerns itself largely with the attempt to define the meaning and content of such terms as "good," "right and wrong," "obligation," "duty," "conscience." While Ethics, or Moral Philosophy,[2] is often confused with Moral Theology, there is a distinction between them. The latter is the science of the Will of God with relation to the conduct of men; and is distinguished from Moral Philosophy in that one rests upon divine revelation, the other upon the processes of human reason. In a wide sense Moral Theology is the science of human duty and conduct considered in the light both of nature and of supernatural revelation. As Ethics usually deals only with the former of these factors, it is comparable to Natural Theology; while Moral

[1] J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 1. But it is often treated philosophically, and is then the philosophy of conduct and of duty, rather than the science of them.

[2] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 237–248.

Theology, including both, may be compared to Dogmatic Theology. Moreover, as usually handled, Ethics is theoretical, philosophical rather than scientific, so as to be distinguished from Moral Theology proper as the philosophy of a thing is from its science, and is, therefore, properly called Moral Philosophy.[1] A science is described as theological in so far as it treats of its subject-matter in relation to God, and moral science is called Moral Theology because it treats of conduct and character in relation to divine purpose and government. No moral science can be adequate, or even sound, which fails to reckon with the revealed will of God and with true religion. This will appear in the historical sketch of ethical systems which will occupy the greater part of the present chapter.

The term "moral" comes from the Latin *mos*, *moris*, which means custom, or practice.[2] The cor-

[1] They are thus distinguished in this treatise. See ch. iii, *init.*

[2] Cf. the German term *Sittenlehre*. "Customs were not merely habitual ways of acting; they were ways approved by the group or society." Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 1. Their origins appear when men first begin to live in groups, the earliest being the family. Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. ii; F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*. Sometimes the clan takes the place of the family, as when husband and wife are of different clans and the wife and children remain with the wife's clan, to which the husband is only a visitor. Custom, taboo (the thing to be avoided) or ritual (the way the thing prescribed is to be done) gradually, but slowly, emerge to the point where conscience becomes a deciding factor. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, chh. iv–v. The earlier state is that of customary morality, when dress and the manner of wearing the hair are on a par with marriage regulations and laws regarding murder. This customary

responding term "ethics" comes from the Greek ἦθος, which means custom, or character, and ἠθικός, which means that which pertains to conduct or character, and is closely related to ἔθος, signifying custom.

As has been said, the data of Moral Theology are taken from both natural and revealed sources—in particular from our general experience of human nature and conduct, and from that which is made known to us of the character, operations, will, and purpose of God. A sound and adequate moral science assumes that the catholic faith and religion are true, and that it is man's duty to be guided by the light which that religion affords.[1]

stage gradually passes over to the reflective, but a great mass of custom always remains.

See H. Rashdall, *Is Conscience an Emotion?*, Lec. ii, on the transition from emotional to rational ethical judgments. While allowing for the predominance of the emotional, which E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, thinks wholly explanatory, Rashdall holds that far down in the social life we may find glimmerings of the rational. But conduct never advances to the state where it is based upon rational motives alone, where there is no impelling desire to be reckoned with, nor is it desirable that it should. There is room for both. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–119, "The practical morality of a man like Kant was as defective on one side as that of St. Francis was on another. A more rational morality would perhaps have induced St. Francis to recognize that he had no right to give away his father's property to the poor, that cleanliness is not necessarily inconsistent with godliness, and that it is better to take care of one's health and live to the age of seventy than to neglect it and die at forty-five. A more emotional morality might have led Kant to visit his crazy sister as well as to support her pecuniarily out of respect for the Categorical Imperative."

[1] On Ethics as related to other branches of philosophy, see J. S. Mackenzie, *op. cii.*, pp. 23–24; A. Alexander, *Christianity and Ethics*,

I. *Ancient Pagan Ethics*

§ 2. An historical survey of the more important types of ethical theories is desirable before undertaking a more systematic treatment of our subject.[1] The most significant of the ancient gentilic systems are Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Græco-Roman.[2]

Buddhism was taught by Gautama, born in India about 560 B.C. Impelled by pity for human sorrows he sought to show a way of escape from them. This way consists of knowledge of the cause and of the remedy. Ignorance brings desire, which induces clinging to existence and involves pain. Suffering

pp. 14–21; Geo. H. Palmer, *The Field of Ethics, passim.* Profound metaphysical problems lie back of the study of Ethics and appear from time to time in its course. Limitations of space, and of the purpose of this work, have obliged us almost entirely to neglect them. J. G. Hibben, *The Problems of Philosophy, ad rem*, may be read with profit.

[1] On the hist. of Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, *Hist. of Ethics;* Hastings, *E.R.E., s. vv.* "Ethics," "Ethics, Rudimentary," "Ethics and Morality" (series), and for the various systems; A. B. Bruce, *The Moral Order in Anc. and Modern Thought;* J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory;* W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals;* W. Wundt, *Ethical Systems;* H. H. Scullard, *Early Christian Ethics in the West; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s. v.* "Ethics," II (with fuller bibliog.); and the Histories of Philosophy, esp. F. Ueberweg.

[2] For still earlier beliefs and practices, see S. A. B. Mercer, *Religious and Moral Ideas in Babylonia and Assyria; Growth of Religious and Moral Ideas in Egypt;* also a series of articles by the same author in the *Journal of the Society of Oriental Research*, vols. I–V. These articles contain matter dating from as early as 3850 B.C., and show much more advanced standards than would generally be expected.

is remedied by the final destruction of desire, and, in the meantime, by the acceptance of the eight-fold way of right as a guide for life: (*a*) insight; (*b*) thoughts; (*c*) words; (*d*) deeds; (*e*) behaviour; (*f*) striving; (*g*) remembering; (*h*) self-suppression.[1] Five prohibitions are given: (*a*) not to kill any living thing; (*b*) not to seize the property of another; (*c*) not to touch another man's wife (monks not to touch any woman); (*d*) not to speak untruth; (*e*) not to drink anything intoxicating. The ideal man is the wise man who practices apathy. These ways and prohibitions are for those who have not entered the higher way of abandonment of home and of all desire. The goal is Nirvana—the state of salvation, in which no re-births occur, and which merges in an impersonal blessedness. Buddhism has no god, no sacrifice, and no sense of sin or need of salvation therefrom; but in popular practice Buddhists are polytheists.

The defects are: (*a*) an erroneous account of pain, which, in fact, does not come from desire but from natural causes and from perverted desire; (*b*) lack of sense of sin; (*c*) absence of a genuine religion and of dependence upon God; (*d*) denial of personal immortality, and consequent lack of a goal of development; (*e*) pessimistic inertia, nullifying progress; (*f*) an aristocratic confinement of its higher blessings to the few; (*g*) intellectual pride. In practice Bud-

[1] These are interpreted by Prof. Rhys Davids, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. II, p. 144 (abridgement in J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 286).

dhism has gendered immorality. Even its boasted altruism has reference to humanity at large considered in the abstract. The Western systems of Theosophy and Christian Science contain Buddhistic elements with Christian additions; they are hybrid systems, vitiated by the Pantheism which underlies Indian thought, and are really non-moral; they foster a pseudo-spirituality and a blinding self-satisfaction.[1]

§ 3. *Confucianism*[2] was founded by Confucius (551–478 B.C.). It presupposes a state religion and one which has no determinative creed. Propriety, convention, and precedent rule. Virtue is described as consisting of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour. Worship is directed towards (*a*) heaven; (*b*) non-human spirits; (*c*) dead ancestors; especially the last.

Confucius eschewed dogmatism about the super-human, tolerating and ignoring popular superstitions. He based all upon the law of human nature and upon duties to men. The worship of heaven was reserved for the emperor, as representing the people, who are to worship their ancestors. The family is the centre of his religion, and filial piety is the essence of virtue.

[1] H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*, pp. 264–271, has a good criticism of the attempts sometimes made to equate Buddhistic and Christian theology and ethics.

[2] See P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, ch. v; J. Legge, *Religions of China*. Curious correspondences between early Chinese and Greek thought in ethics and in metaphysics are shown by Aubrey L. Moore, *Essays Scientific and Philosophical*, ch. ix.

Taoism and Buddhism are tolerated, subject to ancestor worship and filial piety. Human nature is good and, if followed, will lead men aright. This involves social relations and functions between: (*a*) sovereign and subject; (*b*) husband and wife; (*c*) parent and child; (*d*) elder and younger brother; (*e*) friend and friend. These are natural relations and involve four rules: (*a*) serve the sovereign; (*b*) serve parents; (*c*) serve elder brothers; (*d*) set an example to friends. "The sum is reciprocity," but it is shown by observing rules of propriety. These were elaborated and were fixed by convention and by precedent. The result was a purely legalistic and external system which could not reform mankind. It cultivated conceit, a low morality, and stagnation.[1] The inspiration of Chinese morality comes rather from Buddhism than from Confucianism.

Lao-Tse, born about 604 B.C., met Confucius in 517 B.C. He saw the futility of Confucian ethics and sought to remedy it by urging a revolt from civilized conventions in favour of the virtues of primitive simplicity and the cultivation of mystical wisdom, but his effort was abortive.

[1] Ethics, as everything else in China, has been stationary. P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 7, "It is largely because Europe has been constantly getting a new conscience that its history has been so disturbed and so progressive, just as it is largely because China has had the same Confucian conscience for two thousand years and more, that her history has been so uneventful and unchanging." Taoism is pantheistic and may be compared to Nietzscheism, see P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 57, note 3.

§ 4. *Greek ethical developments*[1] properly began with Socrates, who may be called the "father of moral philosophy." Previous to his career we have only the fragmentary sayings of the so-called "wise men of Greece." Physical and metaphysical ideas had predominated. The Sophists had thrown all fundamental principles into confusion and, in fact, made virtue the same as self-interest.[2]

Socrates, 470–399 B.C., was the noblest of pagan prophets, and rose to as high a level as was possible apart from revelation.[3] It is noteworthy that he

[1] A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–44; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. vii; T. B. Strong, *Christ. Ethics*, pp. 26–34.

[2] H. Sidgwick, *Hist. of Ethics*, pp. 13–22; R. A. P. Rogers, *A Short Hist. of Ethics, Greek and Modern*, pp. 31–34. The leaders of the Sophists were Protagoras of Abdera (nat. c. 480 B.C.) and Gorgias of Leontini (nat. c. 483 B.C). The first of these made ethics subjective. Carried to its conclusion his system was anarchical, implying that each may do what he likes without reference to the good of others. The teaching of the second leads to skepticism, as there is no objective standard of truth and goodness.

[3] H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–34; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–36; B. Rand, *The Classical Moralists*, ch. i. He ignored metaphysics, natural science and mathematics, and made the study of moral man and his duties as a citizen central in education. He was skeptical as to the possibilities of knowledge in other fields. He is certain that the one thing that man can know is himself. Hence his motto "Know thyself," which does not refer to physiological or psychological knowledge but to ethical. His chief claim to fame lies in the emphasis he puts upon the authority of conscience; but his teaching must be carefully distinguished from that of Kant on the categorical imperative. The latter leads one to do his duty without inclination for it; whereas according to Socrates the desire for happiness is fundamental, and coincides with duty; for only the fulfilment of duty brings happiness and is worth striving for. His end

thought himself to be inspired by a good demon. He undertook the mission: (*a*) of establishing the objective value of truth, goodness, and beauty; (*b*) of making men see their ignorance; (*c*) of turning them to self-knowledge. His method was a critical definition of accepted ideas and their amendment by induction.

His chief principles are: (*a*) there is a God, a future life of the soul, future responsibility, and absolute good; (*b*) virtue and happiness coincide and are based upon wisdom and knowledge, especially self-knowledge.[1] These emancipate the will by turning it towards the good.[2]

Plato, 427–347 B.C., introduced metaphysical and psychological additions to the thought of Socrates and may be described as the flower of his teaching, while Aristotle was its fruit.[3] As with Socrates, knowl-

was practical. "The quest of Socrates was for the true art of conduct for an ordinary member of the human society, a man living a practical life among his fellows." Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 39. His system contains the germ of all the chief Greek ethical systems. The difficulty of interpreting him fully is shown by the variety of schools that profess to follow him, the most important of these ethically being the Cynics, founded by Antithenes, and the Cyrenaics, founded by Aristippus. He wrote no books on ethics. The outcome of his speculations was the stimulation of thought, and the attempt to give exact expression to this thought begat the several schools from which, broadly speaking, the Stoics and Epicureans later on developed.

[1] "Knowledge is virtue," cf. Plato's *Protagoras*. This involves practice rather than mere intellectual knowledge, and rests upon the hypothesis that "no man is knowingly vicious."

[2] H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–32.

[3] H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–50; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. I,

edge is the essence of virtue, especially knowledge of pure reason, of ideas, of principles intuitively seen in their internal sense. Ideas are the true realities, and are the eternal types of which mundane things are passing impressions.[1]

Pleasures are to be distinguished because they are often contrary. The true ideal is to know and attain to the *summum bonum*, which is likeness to God who is the absolute good. As this cannot be embraced in its unity, it is to be sought in the manifold by rational understanding of truth, beauty, and virtue. Man's perfection lies in resemblance to God. Virtue is the harmony of the soul, vice its deformity. Virtue is essentially one, but may be distinguished under

ch. ii; Wm. De W. Hyde, *Five Great Philosophies of Life*, ch. iii; B. Rand, *op. cit.*, ch. ii (a very useful source book). Among modern writers who have felt in an especial degree the influence of Plato, Carlyle represents the stronger side, Emerson (in whom the Neo-Platonic predominates) the weaker. Plato's chief ethical work is the *Republic*. It seeks to determine the nature and worth of justice and the means whereby it is to be realized in the State. The *Philebus* should also be read for the sake of its inquiry into the nature of good to the individual.

[1] W. Wundt, *Ethical Systems*, vol. II, p. 10, says, "Plato's philosophy rests wholly and entirely on an ethical basis." Also p. 11, "When Plato, perhaps influenced more by the Socratic life than by the Socratic doctrine, rises to the principle that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong, he can no longer avoid the conviction that the good and the pleasurable do not necessarily coincide. It would, however, be intolerable to suppose a permanent conflict between pleasure and good. There is thus no way out of the difficulty save by the opposition of permanent to transitory pleasure; and, since the former is unattainable in the life of sense, it must be sought in a supersensuous existence."

four heads in relation to the faculties of the soul: (*a*) of the reason, prudence or wisdom; (*b*) of the passions, fortitude or courage; (*c*) of the appetites, temperance; (*d*) of the harmony of all, justice.[1] These are the so-called Cardinal Virtues[2] of Christian Ethics, and are found in the later Jewish writers, in the works of St. Ambrose, who first applied the term "Cardinal," of St. Augustine, and of all moral writers since.

He argued at length for the immortality of the soul;[3] but the Christian idea of the immortality of the entire man, resurrection from the dead, lay outside of all pagan thought. In common with all Greek writers Plato treated ethics as political, and regarded the individual as subordinate to the state.

There are certain defects in his system: (*a*) knowledge and theory is elaborate, but power is wanting; (*b*) it is an ethic for philosophers, not for men in general; (*c*) the problem of evil was not faced, but was

[1] He attempts a psychological distinction of the faculties of the soul, λόγος, θυμάς, ἐπιθυμία, reason, emotion (not an accurate translation as we have no equivalent word), and desire. The proper fulfilment of the function of each leads to virtue.

[2] Of the Cardinal Virtues Justice is fundamental. "For the intelligence it consists in the correctness of thought (σοφία, φιλοσοφία); for the will, in courage (ἀνδρία); for the sensibility, in temperance (σωφροσύνη). Wisdom is the justice of the mind; courage, the justice of the heart; temperance, the justice of the senses. Piety (ὁσιότης), is justice in our relation with the Deity. It is synonymous with justice in general." A. Weber, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 99. Cicero terms justice "the mistress and queen of all virtues."

[3] See especially the *Phædo*.

thought to reside in the corporeal, in that which was *becoming*, and was thought to be without remedy.

Aristotle, 384–322 B.C.,[1] separated ethics from other sciences and began his work with a discussion of the *summum bonum*, which he found in man's welfare, not in God, and regarded as political, this resting upon his well-known description of man as a political animal. The end of conduct is the welfare of the state, not of the individual. The Greek has no more duties to the barbarian than he has to the wild beast.[2] The *summum bonum* consists in happiness, which is defined as a perfect practical activity of soul in a perfect life. Mere pleasure, as such, is neutral, depending for its relation to happiness upon the use made of it. Virtue is founded in natural sentiments and in habits which issue in ἦθος, a moral character.[3] These are of two kinds: (*a*) moral virtues, which are developed by acts and the habits caused by them; (*b*) intellectual virtues, which perfect the moral. Practically speaking, the essence of virtue is moderation or a mean between two ex-

[1] H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–71; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. I. ch. iii; J. E. C. Welldon, *Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle;* B. Rand, *op. cit.*, ch. iii.

[2] P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 169, "The relationships and activities of the Greek as a citizen, and not his relationships and activities as a husband or father or business man, determined his chief duties. Conscience was very little involved in that part of his life which lay outside the civic sphere. It was solely as a member of a city community—that he could live the truly moral life and attain the highest virtue."

[3] He was the first to use the term "ethics."

tremes, the *via media*.[1] The importance of the will is emphasized as contrasted with knowledge.[2] The evolutionary view of sin may be traced back to Aristotle, for he regarded sin as a necessary stage on the way to goodness, or as goodness itself in so far as it had not yet proceeded from potency to act. Therefore it was a mere imperfection, or a less good.[3]

In general, in Greek ethics human nature was conceived as essentially good; and morality was mainly secular as contrasted with that of the Hebrews. Hence it advanced beyond the static religion.[4] Greek ethical theories gave form and system to those of the Church, but Christianity itself gave the spirit which

[1] A. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 132, "Courage, for example, is a virtue, and as such the mean between timidity and foolhardiness; liberality is the mean between avarice and prodigality." R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 72, has a good illustration of this important point of Aristotle's teaching:

Excess	*Mean*	*Defect*
Rashness	Courage	Cowardice
Licentiousness	Temperance	Apathy
Extravagance	Generosity	Miserliness
Bad temper	Good temper	Servility
Flattery	Courtesy	Rudeness

The middle column is printed so as to suggest that the mean is often nearer one extreme than the other.

[2] W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 19–20, "Aristotle was the first to recognize the *will* as the specifically ethical function within the general domain of reason; and for him, accordingly, moral virtue consists, not in *right knowledge*, but in the *good will*, which is indeed dependent upon reason, but not identical with it."

[3] Metaphysics, XIX, 4, *τὸ κακὸν αὐτὸ τὸ δυνάμει ἀγαθόν*.

[4] Cf. Aubrey Moore, in *Lux Mundi*, Essay ii.

made them living and realizable. This is often overlooked when the debt of Christianity to Greek ethics is magnified, or the statement made that Ambrose is Cicero with a Christian veneer. Christianity brought a new motive power into morality, united the virtues in the spirit of love, and attached a new value to personality.

§ 5. *In Græco-Roman Ethics*, Platonic and Aristotelic efforts brought to birth two opposed systems, the Stoic and the Epicurean, emphasizing respectively virtue and happiness.[1]

The Stoic system[2] was founded by Zeno, 340–260 B.C. Among his followers, more or less consistent, were Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panætius, Posidonius, Pompey, Cicero, Seneca,[3] Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. From the standpoint of the pious heathen the Stoics were men of lofty virtue. They held that virtue is the only true good, the *summum bonum* and the ultimate source of all happiness; but even virtue must be sought in a disinterested manner, for its own sake, not for that of consequent happiness. The rule of virtue is to live according to nature, which means according to enlightened reason. Hence only philosophers can follow this way. Indifference is the proper attitude to observe towards the circumstances

[1] On the Roman moral systems in general, see P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, ch. xi; H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 ff.

[2] Wm. De W. Hyde, *op. cit.*, ch. ii; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, ch. v; Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 25–28.

[3] On the relation of Seneca to St. Paul, see Bp. Lightfoot, *Ep. to the Philippians*, App. 2.

of life—health, fortune, honours, pleasures. All these are parts of the system of things, *adiaphora*, that is, indifferent to the wise man. Fortitude under all circumstances is the sovereign rule; and all human passions are regarded as the sources of evil. They are not merely to be restrained, as Aristotle taught, but to be eradicated entirely. The chief defects of the system are: (*a*) arrogant self-sufficiency; (*b*) aristocratic indifference to the common people; (*c*) apathy, which is fatal to genuine moral progress; (*d*) immorality, growing out of the principle of *adiaphora;* (*e*) inevitable resort to suicide when the evils of this life become unbearable.[1] On the good side it emphasized the power of the soul to live its own life, rising superior to misfortune and suffering, and the authoritativeness of duty.

Epicureanism [2] had for its chief promoters Epicurus, 342–271 B.C., and Lucretius, a Roman poet of the second century B.C., and, later on, it was popularized by Horace. The *summum bonum* was happiness,[3]

[1] Cf. the terse advice of Marcus Aurelius to one who found life hard, "If the house smokes, go out of it."

[2] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, ch. iv; Wm. De W. Hyde, *op. cit.*, ch. i. It is based upon an atomistic materialism, and has regard to physical and psychical, rather than moral or spiritual, well-being. It is best exemplified in Toto Melema of Geo. Eliot's *Romola.* J. S. Mill bases his system upon it, but incorporates elements from all other systems, so that his presentation becomes a hodge-podge of contradictory elements.

[3] W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*, vol. I, p. 14, gives the Epicurean canons, "The pleasure which produces no pain is to be embraced. The pain which produces no pleasure is to be avoided.

which was interpreted to mean pleasure in action and in repose, the latter being the more complete. The Epicureans found no standard higher or more authoritative than the agreeable; but it is to be noted that pleasure of the soul is placed above that of the body. Virtue means wisdom (φρόνησις, or insight) in seeking the forms of happiness which will not end in disappointment.

Both systems inculcate the cardinal virtues of Plato, although the Stoics interpreted them ideally and the Epicureans from a purely hedonistic standpoint; but both lack power and adequate motive. The Epicureans inevitably gravitate towards Hedonism, or pleasure of the moment, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

II. *Christian Ethics*

§ 6. The Holy Spirit alone enables men to arrive at a sound moral philosophy.[1] He does this through

The pleasure is to be avoided which prevents a greater pleasure, or produces a greater pain. The pain is to be endured which averts a greater pain, or secures a greater pleasure." Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II. p. 29, "While, like the Stoics, they emphasize repose of mind as an essential condition of happiness, the evil to be avoided is not, as with the Stoics, *passion*, but *pain*. Not apathy, but *ataraxia*, painlessness, is extolled as the blessed state. Thus, while, for the Stoics, virtue, since it consists in control of the passions, is a good to be sought for its own sake, and from whose possession true happiness first arises; for the Epicureans the relation is reversed. The goal of all effort is happiness, and virtue is only a means to this end."

[1] Ethical theories are not evidential as to the moral state of a

both natural and supernatural means. To Him is due the dispensation of paganism, which represents His work through the natural reason alone, in preparation for supernatural revelation. In the earlier dispensations moral truth is developed in fragmentary forms and a definite philosophy cannot be developed without caricature. The Mosaic and Christian dispensations represent a gradual development of authentic relations with God;[1] and this development makes possible a true knowledge of righteousness and a dispensation of saving grace. The outcome is a moral philosophy which is both sound and capable of application.

Judaism, or the system which resulted from the Mosaic dispensation, supplied what paganism lacked, that is, authentic relations with God; but righteousness was conceived externally as the fulfilment of God's will by God's people, that is, as obedience to the law, for moral obligations were identified with divine

people, for their embodiment in actual practice is very limited. P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 4, "The facts for a history of morals must be sought chiefly outside the literature of ethical theory and speculation. They must be looked for in the customs, laws, institutions, mythologies, literatures, maxims, and religions of the different races, peoples, and ages of history." Cf. H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*, lec. vi; and, for the moral conditions when these systems were fully developed, Sir S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, *passim*.

[1] J. R. Illingworth, *Christian Character*, starts with theses which correctly describe the guiding principle of revealed ethic: that life is the goal of truly guided human effort, and that sin, being destructive of life, is man's chief enemy.

commands. Thus was developed; (*a*) a sense of sin and of need of salvation from above; (*b*) the messianic hope, that the law would some day be written on men's hearts, and become effective among all peoples in a kingdom of righteousness.[1]

In relation to Judaism Chrisitanity[2] translated divine and moral perfection into human terms in the life and conversation of God-incarnate. Thus was unfolded the deeper implications of the older dispensation: (*a*) the philosophy of love, which at once

[1] On Old Test. ethics, see A. B. Bruce, *Ethics of the Old Test.;* T. B. Strong, *Christ. Ethics*, pp. 12–20, 35–46; C. E. Luthardt, *Hist. of Christ. Ethics*, pp. 33 ff; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–52; P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, ch. ix; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible, s. v.* "Ethics." On Jewish ethics in our Lord's time, C. E. Luthardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, as cited; H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*, pp. 77–94. Special attention is called to S. A. B. Mercer on O. T. Morals, in *Angl. Theol. Rev.*, May and Dec, 1918, Oct., 1919. With refreshing honesty he shows that the Old Test. morals are less elevated than usually represented.

[2] On Christ's ethical teaching, and the distinctive elements of Christian ethic, see Chas. Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 335–356; Chas. Gore, *The Sermon on the Mount;* T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, Lec. ii; W. L. Davidson, *Christ. Ethics*, pp. 4–10; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, and *Dic. of Ap. Church, s. vv.* "Ethics." The crude *interimsethic* theory, set forth by A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the Hist'l Jesus*, that Christ believed the end of the world to be immediately impending and therefore disregarded men's responsibilities for this world, is met by E. D. La Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 163–167; C. W. Emmet, in *Expositor*, Nov. 1912; A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, ch. viii. The paradoxical commands of Christ are to be taken as heightened illustrations of principles; e.g. Have love enough to turn the other cheek also, if that is expedient. And the virtues exemplified by his example are of abiding value for this world. They have the note of universality.

explains the law and emancipates from it. Duty is no longer constraint, for its principle is love; (*b*) the new external rule of the imitation of Christ; (*c*) the working power which pagan systems lacked; (*d*) a clear revelation of man's chief end and destiny, which is to become the friend of God in life eternal.

In relation to paganism[1] Christianity achieved three results: (*a*) it absorbed whatever was true in pagan systems; (*b*) it supplied the principles which enabled men to bring the fragmentary truths of paganism into harmonious relation and to apprehend their ultimate meaning: (*i*) that we were made for God and for His fellowship; (*ii*) the whole conception of Christian immortality; (*iii*) the true meaning of sin and evil; (*iv*) the gospel of redemption and grace; (*v*) a complete manifestation in human terms of what man is intended to become in the example of Christ; (*c*) It transformed what it assimilated from paganism, e.g., the pagan cardinal virtues took on a transfigured meaning when brought into relation with the heavenly virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Some of the more obvious innovations[2] which emerged were: (*a*) Monotheism and the consequent

[1] W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 33, says the chief points of difference between pagan and Christian ethics are: (*a*) the latter substitutes love for fear; (*b*) the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man for the limits of nationality and rank; (*c*) gives an adequate view of the origin and future destiny of man. Christianity also effected certain changes in terminology: "virtue" was replaced by "righteousness," "happiness" by "blessedness," "evil" by "sin."

[2] W. L. Davidson, *op. cit.*, ch. ii.

unification of practical ideals by relating them to one God; (*b*) Catholicity of appeal to all men in behalf of a common brotherhood; (*c*) Certain new virtues,[1] such as humility and self-judgment, purity and self-discipline, as distinguished from destructive forms of asceticism; (*d*) The putting of a new valuation on individual lives. Christ did not teach a moral philosophy or science, but: (*a*) taught and exemplified certain fundamental principles which made the development of a satisfactory ethical system possible; and (*b*) established a concrete society or Church wherein the conditions of ethical development are afforded. Considered in its scientific aspects, however, every ethical system is the work of human thinkers, fallible and progressive.

The Christian Church was intended by Christ to become a leavening force in a larger world. In it are supplied: (*a*) what the New Testament calls the "Way" of Life, and that in concrete and social form; (*b*) effectual relations with God as man's chief end; (*c*) means of supernatural grace which are the immediate sources of the power that pagan society lacks; (*d*) an effective propaganda. In this manner was established a twofold process: (*a*) of applying the principles gained through apostolic experience of Christ to an ever-widening and varying experience of the world; (*b*) of growth of articulate ethical conceptions and of a systematic Christian ethic. But this growth was necessarily conditioned and hindered

[1] W. L. Davidson, *op. cit.*, ch. x.

by certain accidents of the Christian propaganda. In order to leaven the wider world-society, imperfectly converted men of the world had to be received within the Church, and they brought with them many pagan notions. The progress of moral development which is involved in this may be summarily described as having three stages: (*a*) the revelation of Christian principles to the Church in terms of apostolic experience of Christ; (*b*) progressive application of these principles to wider and more varied experience under the handicap of the invasion of pagan ideas; (*c*) a slow development of ethical definitions and, finally, of a scientific ethic. The definitive stage culminated in the scholastic period, but began in the patristic. Systematic schemes, developed in the scholastic period, have been given a more truly inductive and scientific form in modern days.

§ 7. The patristic period was one of tentative exposition and definition of particular ethical ideas, called forth, and also hampered, by the Church's contact with classical paganism[1] and with the northern barbarism. This contact involved many centuries of struggle with pagan ideas, which entered the Church in two general forms: (*a*) an exaggerated asceticism, which makes invidious distinctions between religious and secular and between the flesh and the spirit, as if the secular and the flesh were

[1] See T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*; Chas. Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*; T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, Lec. IV; C. E. Luthardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff.

intrinsically evil; (*b*) naturalism, or treatment of Christianity as designed simply to improve natural morality.[1] The patristic age under these circumstances saw the accumulation of material for moral science and the determination of certain preliminary issues with paganism. The battle with false asceticism emerged in the rise and condemnation of Montanism and Novatianism, which represented recoil from pagan social life, and were coloured by belief in the inherent evil of flesh and its pleasures. This belief was embodied openly in the Gnostic and Manichæan systems. Incidental manifestations within the Church were due to the exaggerated emphasis placed upon monastic life and celibacy. The Church came to the position that these are vocational, and that true spiritual development is possible in the world and in married life. The conflict between Christian ideals and the purely natural conception of morality came to the surface in the Pelagian controversy of the fifth century, which drew pointed attention to the subject of the will's capacity and responsibility, and to the doctrines of grace and predestination.

It was St. Augustine's task in this connection to vindicate the dependence of human wills upon supernatural grace for power to choose and to follow the

[1] This error still explains much indifference to supernatural religion and to its embodiment in the Church. Religion's claim has reference to the cultivation of those relations with God wherein eternal life consists. Natural morality, indispensable for this Christian purpose though it be, cannot of itself bring men to God and to the enjoyment of their chief end hereafter.

good. *Pro forma*, he made the will the basis of responsibility, but his definition of divine predestination threatened to overthrow the doctrine of human freedom. However, he was a prolific writer and is not to be regarded as merely the founder of what is called Augustinianism. By his improved classification of the virtues, as well as by his treatment of free will and grace, he marks a period in the history of Christian ethics. He connected the cardinal virtues with the theological;[1] and laid the foundation for the Calvinistic view that the virtues of the heathen are "splendid vices," being apart from the love of God in which all true virtue is grounded. Among his contributions to moral science are the following: (*a*) The *summum bonum* is the vision and love of God, and the means of attainment is growth in virtue by which all man's faculties reach their highest perfection and the complete satisfaction of all his desires. (*b*) Love is the sum of virtue and is threefold in its object, namely, of God, of self, of neighbour. Its manward branches are the so-called cardinal virtues.

[1] C. E. Luthardt, *op. cit.*, p. 225, "The four cardinal virtues become virtues in so far as they are manifestations of love to God (*de Mor. Eccl. Cath.*, I, xxv, 15): *temperantia*, in opposition to love of the world; *fortitudo*, as the overcoming of suffering and pain by love; *justitia*, as service to God; and *prudentia*, as the right distinction between what is to be avoided and what is to be chosen (*de Mor.*, I, xxxv–xlv)." St. Augustine defines virtue: "*Definitio brevis et vera virtutis: ordo est amoris*," *de Civ. Dei*, XV. 22. On his ethical teaching in general, see T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–199, 245–251, 258–259.

(*c*) The essence of moral evil is the privation of good by choice of inferior good.

The patristic age saw the beginning of what is called "Canon Law," which is based upon the principle that Christians owe obedience in practice to the Church because of the charge of Christ, "Make disciples of all nations." The Canon Law, in its larger sense, includes: (*a*) divine law, as interpreted by the Church; (*b*) the Faith, as supplying the light by which we ought to live; (*c*) liturgical requirements, including the so-called *jus liturgicum* of bishops; (*d*) canons, strictly so-called, or the laws enacted by councils and the decrees of competent ecclesiastics, especially of the Papal See; (*e*) ecclesiastical customs and traditions, which are reckoned to outweigh individualistic private judgment; (*f*) decisions of competent ecclesiastical courts, which constitute much of the so-called common law; (*g*) Church laws enacted by the state, in so far as they have been accepted by the Church; (*h*) digests, collections, penitentiaries, which have gained recognition by ecclesiastical authority.

The penitentials[1] were originally lists of sins with their appropriate penances, compiled from patristic literature for the guidance of the clergy in dealing with penitents. They began to appear in the sixth century and developed into collections of miscellaneous rules calculated to assist in the administration

[1] C. E. Luthardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 288–297; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Penitential Canons."

of public penances. With the decline of public penances these manuals dropped out of use, but their materials were incorporated into later moral treatises.

§ 8. During the middle ages[1] and subsequently the line of opposition between rival systems of ethics was determined by the emphasis, on the one hand, and rejection on the other, of those elements in Christian ethics which are distinctively Christian and supernatural.

Abelard (1079–1142 A.D.) treated Christian ethics as simply a reformation of natural ethics, and made intention, or intellectual motive, the subject matter of moral distinctions, rather than the actions which follow.

The mystics of the twelfth century represented a reaction from the ethics of Abelard, and over-emphasized the supernatural side. The chief original promoters of this development were St. Bernard (1091–1153 A.D.), and Hugo of St. Victor (1097–1141 A.D.). They made union with God the proper business of human life, and said that this was to be gained through withdrawal from the sensuous, illumination, and ecstatic contemplation, resulting in union with God based upon love. They anticipated the later division of the spiritual life into the purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways or stages. Their

[1] On mediæval Ethics, see C. E. Luthardt, *op. cit.*, §§ 50 ff.; H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-151; Extracts in Benj. Rand, *The Classical Moralists*, ch. xi–xii.

one-sidedness appears in their ascetic disparagement of the normal conditions in the world, to which Christians in general are bound to adjust themselves, and of the practical virtues of everyday life.

The main lines of ethical development were carried on by Peter Lombard and by St. Thomas Aquinas. The former laid the foundation for scholastic development by collecting in systematic order the opinions of the ancients in four books of *Sentences*. This work became a universally employed text-book for several centuries, and every scholastic writer of eminence wrote commentaries upon it. The scholastics were too profound and too restless to be satisfied with mere reproductions of patristic opinions, and the commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* contained much original thought and prepared the way for the great *Summae*. The flower and most representative product was the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274 A.D.). The second part of this work not only finished the coördination and systematic presentation of moral science up to his time, but crystallized the science on lines that have been followed ever since in the Roman Church. It also contains many of the elements of modern Protestant systems. St. Thomas combined the Christian standpoint with a free use of Aristotelic and Platonic elements and forms of thought. God is the chief end. Good and being are the same in fact or reality, and evil is defect or falling short. Considered in the abstract the good is the desirable, whether morally

desirable, useful, or simply pleasurable. The moral good constitutes the determinative end of Christian conduct. It pertains to voluntary actions, and these are *formally* good according to their end or intention, *materially* according to their own nature. This distinction appears in speaking of sin. We are formally guilty when we sin knowingly and wilfully, but our guilt is only material when we sin ignorantly or involuntarily. Every human act has good for its end, positively speaking. The sinfulness of a sinful act lies in the substitution of a lower good for one that is higher and ought to be pursued. The intellect, when acting in the moral sphere, consists of: (*a*) synderesis, or the theoretical faculty; (*b*) conscience, which applies moral principles to conduct. All virtues fall under seven heads, the four cardinal virtues and the three theological. The former are natural and lead to natural happiness, while the latter are fruits of supernatural grace and lead to supernatural beatitude; but the fall makes God's help necessary for the acquisition even of the natural. So God becomes the source of all virtues. The divine law is grounded in the reason of things as seated in the divine nature, and the divine will is what it is because of the divine nature, not *vice versa*.

After St. Thomas a decay of scholasticism set in and moral ideas degenerated. Two factors hastened this decay; namely, the theory of works of supererogation, with its mechanical and commercial scheme of merits and indulgences, and, in the seventeenth

century, that form of probabilism which is called laxism.

§ 9. Modern Roman Moral Theology is largely based upon St. Thomas, but is influenced negatively by the indulgence system, and is elaborated with reference to the conditions of modern life. In most moral treatises the principal heads adopted are: (*a*) Virtues; (*b*) the Decalogue; (*c*) Precepts of the Church; (*d*) Sacramental Obligations; (*e*) Contracts and Civil Obligations of all kinds.

Certain special departments of moral science have also been developed: (*a*) Casuistry, the chief promoters of which have been the Jesuits; (*b*) Ascetic Theology; (*c*) Mystical Theology.

During the reformation period the chief influences at work were a partial reform of the system of indulgences by the Council of Trent, and the development of Probabilism.[1] The pioneer in this last-mentioned

[1] On Probabilism, see C. J. Shebbeare, in *Ch. Qly. Rev.*, July, 1912; K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–197; Koch-Preuss, *Moral Theology*, vol. I, pp. 218–235; J. P. Gury, S.J., *Compend. Theol. Moralis*, §§ 51–80; *Cath. Encyc.* and *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, *q.vv.* There are six theories: (*i*) Rigorism, that the safest course should always be followed, even when the less safe is more probable. This would often result in a negation of action, and it was condemned by Alexander VIII, *Prop. dam.* 3, Dec. 7, 1690. (*ii*) Tutiorism, that the safe side must be taken unless the preponderance of probabilities for liberty is very great. (*iii*) Probabiliorism, which does not require more than a perceptible preponderance of evidence for liberty. (*iv*) Equi-probabilism, that we are at liberty when the balance of arguments is equal; the view of St. Alphonsus Liguori, whose writings have had great influence. (*v*) Probabilism, which concedes liberty if there are solid reasons for it, even though the reasons against

development was Bartholomew a Medina (d. 1581). Starting with the thought that a doubtful law cannot impose indisputable obligations, the question arises between the safer and the more rigid course and the apparently less safe but probably permissible one. The various systems of probabilism are distinguished by their attitude towards this issue. The rigorist school makes the safer course obligatory. At the other extreme was laxism, which maintained the permissibility of any course that had any probability in its favour. The ultimate form which probabilism took in Roman moral science makes a freer or less safe course permissible, if it is based on "*solid*" probabilities and upon due enquiry. The less safe course may never be resorted to by a conscience which is subjectively certain that the safer course ought to be pursued, nor is a doubting conscience free to choose the less safe course until enquiry has been made as to whether "solid" probabilities make it permissible. In this form the system is crystallized in the more mature writings of St. Alphonsus Liguori.

Current moral science of the Roman type differs from mediæval literature in its adjustment to changed ecclesiastical and civil conditions. The independence which the state has gained in modern days, although not fully recognized by the Roman See, is to some

it are stronger. This and the preceding are the theories generally followed. (*vi*) Laxism, which justifies liberty when any arguments can be advanced for it. It was condemned by Innocent XI, *Prop. dam.* 3, March 2, 1679. Laxism was ridiculed with terrible power by Pascal, *Provincial Letters*.

extent recognized in moral science. Modern sociological questions are also reckoned with, although under the handicap of a terminology which is not wholly intelligible to the modern mind. One rather important illustration of development is the treatment of usury, or receiving interest on money loans. Down to quite recent times surplus money was regarded in the light of a means for moral service, and it was considered wrong to charge for such service. The progress of the science of political economy has made it clear that money is also a commodity, and that to charge for its use is in line with rentals of real estate. Therefore usury is now sanctioned, or, rather, the word usury is applied only to excessive interest.

Among the standard manuals of Roman moral theology are those by Gury, Lehmkuhl, Liguori, Thomas Slater, and Koch-Preuss, the two latter being written in English.

§ 10. The Protestant movement of the sixteenth century, ethically considered,[1] was a revolt against: (*a*) excessive ecclesiastical control; (*b*) the whole scheme of wage-merit and works of supererogation; (*c*) mechanically conceived purgatorial penalties, and indulgences therefrom. The emphasis was laid upon: (*a*) private judgment; (*b*) justification by faith independently of good works; (*c*) human depravity and arbitrary predestination. The consequences

[1] See P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, ch. xvii; T. C. Hall, *op. cit.*, ch. viii; Thos. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics*, Lec. vii.

of this revolt, or rather of its excessive thoroughness, were: (*a*) a loss of vital elements of the Christian covenant and a serious reduction of the divinely appointed machinery of grace; (*b*) ethics was gradually divorced from religion and reverted to a naturalistic form, somewhat akin to pagan ethics; and this paved the way for modern utilitarianism. Among the particular developments should be mentioned: (*a*) the monastic life was barred out entirely; (*b*) legalism revived in what was at a later date called Puritanism, with its man-made precepts and reproduction of Judaic requirements under Christian conditions. It represents partly a reaction from sixteenth century antinomianism and partly a protest against wickedness in high Anglican life; (*c*) Casuistry was at first retained on the basis of Scripture and private judgment in interpretation; but it soon gave way to the naturalistic point of view, which makes the unaided reason or common sense a sufficient guide in morality.

III. *Modern Ethics* [1]

§ 11. From Hobbes dates a revival of interest in ethical studies, stimulated in part by the reaction to his theories, which Deism strongly tended to keep alive. He was the founder of the modern non-

[1] On modern Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, ch. iv; Jas. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v.* "Ethics," II. 3ff.

theological ethics and approximated the position of Epicurus.[1]

Thomas Hobbes,[2] 1588–1679 A.D., maintained that man is by nature selfish and egoistic. The result is, that, to prevent moral clash, the state must regulate personal life, and the authority of the state must be absolute in the determination of right and wrong.[3] This is a reversion to pagan political ethic. He was assailed on two lines: (*a*) in behalf of the absoluteness of the principles of right and wrong, as intuitively discerned, as against all wills, governments, etc., by the Cambridge Platonists, e.g., Ralph Cudworth[4]

[1] Thos. Whittaker, *The Theory of Abstract Ethics*, pp. 40–54, regards him as the founder of abstract ethics.

[2] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–143; T. C. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 445–447.

[3] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 136, "Thus the primitive egoism, with which Hobbes starts, ends in the opposite extreme of Political Absolutism;" that is, he shows the impossibility of maintaining the thesis with which he begins. W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 56, "For Hobbes the natural moral law consists in a correct weighing of the beneficial or harmful consequences of an act. A breach of the law is therefore an error of the understanding merely; it can proceed only from false deduction, since nobody intentionally acts contrary to his own advantage. It is impossible that divine law, which is contained in the moral teachings of Holy Scripture, should have any other contents than that of natural law." Hobbes says, *On Human Nature*, ch. vii, § 3, "Even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty is His goodness to us." With the *Leviathan*, his chief ethical work (pub. 1651), we may compare Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, and Rochefoucauld's *Maxims*. R. B. Perry, *Approach to Philosophy*, p. 261, says his "unblushing materialism and egoism stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics."

[4] *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, published posthumously, 1731.

(1617–1688), Henry Moore, and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729); (*b*) in behalf of common good, regarded as secured by divine sanctions and laws, prior to human law, e.g., by Richard Cumberland (1632–1719). Hobbes was the precursor of modern utilitarianism,[1] and emphasized the greatest benefit to all as the *summum bonum*.

In the meantime René Descartes (1596–1650) had propounded, on the continent, the doctrine of innate ideas, or self-evident truths.[2] This raised the question as to moral truth being of this nature. Malebranche and Leibnitz viewed moral truths as absolute. Spinoza[3] (1632–1677), the pantheist, reduced morality to an inevitable play of love and hate, expressive of a universal law of substance. Rationally perceived law is sovereign and explains moral conduct. The will is an illusion.

John Locke (1632–1704), rejected innate ideas, especially moral,[4] and founded modern empiricism.

[1] The title was first used by Jeremy Bentham.

[2] See W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 87–92. Descartes made doubt a means for testing truth; laying aside all that could be doubted he fell back upon innate ideas.

[3] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–146; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 92–97.

[4] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ch. iii, § 6, "Virtue is generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable." Self-love is the ultimate motive for all moral acts. W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 62, says his labours "were less distinguished by the novelty of his ideas than by the circumspection of his judgment, and his careful avoidance of such extreme views as might seem paradoxical to healthy human reason. . . . He is especially anxious to steer clear of Hobbes' radicalism," *Ibid.*, p. 65, "All judgments on

All knowledge is obtained through sensation and reflection, and it is thus that we arrive at the knowledge of moral law. This law is independent of pleasure, although supported by the Christian belief in happiness or misery hereafter.

Joseph Butler [1] (1692–1752), the greatest writer of this age, vindicated the authority of conscience in judging what is right and what is wrong. He speaks of conscience as a "faculty," but really makes it equivalent to the true self.

David Hume [2] (1711–1776) formulated the skepticism that was involved in the philosophies of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, and reduced the mind to a mere stream of impressions possessing no real unity. All our knowledge is derived from experience, we have no knowledge of law, whether moral or other, and the will is an illusion. For practical purposes he was, however, a utilitarian.[3]

§ 12. After Hume four issues came to the front:

moral values are the results of rational insight and intellectual deliberation." But this intellectualism is distinguished from that of earlier schools by the increased weight he gives to empiricism. See also T. C. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 447–450.

[1] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 163–176. See his *Sermons on Human Nature.*

[2] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–190; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 74–79; T. C. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 460–465. His chief ethical work, the *Treatise on Human Nature*, was published in 1739.

[3] H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*, p. 28, "Utility, according to Hume, is the true criterion of morality just so far as utility actually pleases. But real utility does not always please. The public does not always know its own interests; and what is useful to one circle is pernicious to others."

(*a*) between the intuitional and the empirical view of the knowledge of moral distinctions; (*b*) between belief in the absoluteness of moral distinctions and the utilitarian interpretation of morality; (*c*) between the acceptance of freedom as a fact and its denial by necessitarianism; (*d*) between intellectualism and sensationalism or æstheticism.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) fought for the superiority of innate knowledge over empirical, and the self-evident and intuitive nature of fundamental and moral ideas. He was followed in the same line by Dugald Stewart and Victor Cousin. A long series of later writers have also taken the intuitionalist point of view, including Henry Calderwood.[1]

Immanuel Kant,[2] 1724–1804 A.D., reduced knowledge to impressionism, in which forms and categories and transcendental ideas are postulated, but not themselves known. Modern empiricism owes much to him. As a counter-poise to his skepticism concerning knowledge, he set forth the "categorical imperative," or rule of duty, and the necessity of living in accordance with its requirements. He summarized all duty in the proposition, "Act on a maxim which thou canst will to be a universal law."[3] His

[1] His *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*. Pt. I. His contention that conscience can not be educated is characteristic of his position. Cf. H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 ff.

[2] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–210; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 106–119; T. Whittaker, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–65; F. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.*, § 123. For a criticism of his theory of the "Good Will," see Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–246.

[3] The moral quality of an action is wholly dependent upon its

moral position agrees with Butler's assertion of the authority of conscience; but he may be criticized as undermining the intellectual validity of moral judgments, as making morality too much a matter of law, and as leaving too little place for the emotions.

Meanwhile, the intuitionalists contended for the absoluteness of moral truth, while the empiricists became avowedly utilitarian, making moral distinctions either equivalent to, or at least wholly determined by, happiness. Happiness was further defined as permanent and of the greatest number.

William Paley (1743–1805) made benevolence the characteristic principle of morality and the mark of divine government, which provides everlasting happiness as the reward and motive for righteousness.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) [1] said that the greatest happiness of the greatest number determined the moral quality of actions.

being done in fulfilment of what is conceived as duty, the ideal man morally is one whose acts are entirely independent of inclination or desire. For a criticism of this view, see quotation from H. Rashdall, p. 19, note, above.

[1] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 235–237; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 142–146. The securing of pleasure and avoiding of pain "point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do." The personal value of pleasure depends upon: (*a*) its intensity; (*b*) its duration; (*c*) its certainty; (*d*) its propinquity; (*e*) its fecundity, i.e., its ability to beget other pleasures; (*f*) its purity, i.e., its freedom from accompanying pain; and (*g*) its value for the community depends upon its extent, i.e., upon the number of persons who may share it. It may be described as an algebraic system, pleasure standing for positive quantities, pain for negative.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)[1] was utilitarian, while maintaining that the love for virtues as such, without reference to utility, is to be cultivated. This is because utility is thus promoted. Universal benevolence, with discrimination between higher and lower forms of happiness, should determine conduct.

The publication of the *Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) in 1859 originated a line of thought which has had profound effect upon recent ethical theories. The moral sense came to be regarded as a product as well as a factor in the evolution of the species; its foundations were treated as biological and social, and utilitarianism was modified by the thought that the happiness of the species is to be sought because it makes for the preservation and development of the species. Theologians criticize Darwin for interpreting nature as cruel, and for giving to brute power to survive the higher place; but it must be acknowledged that Darwin did not regard the process of survival by the extinction of the weak as a moral process. Evolutionary thought also raised the question as to whether moral judgments have any larger validity than that of passing phases of evolution.

In the hands of naturalistic thinkers[2] evolutionary

[1] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–240; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 151–153.

[2] Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) especially. His fundamental ethical principles are found in the *Data of Ethics* and in *Justice*. See R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–279. Evolutionary ethics sees bad only as good in the making, and reacts against personal respon-

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ethics have become "scientific," by which is meant that all our ethical undertakings should be guided by the law of evolution. The propagation of the species, e.g., should be regulated by eugenics so as to produce offspring fit to survive. There is a tendency also to deprecate hospitals and all forms of philanthropy calculated to preserve the unfit. The Christian reply is that moral distinctions are what they are, and possess absolute validity, independently

sibility and moral effort. As Aubrey L. Moore says, *Lux Mundi*, p. 47, "Moral evil is 'sin' only to those who believe in God." Bp. D'Arcy, *A Short Study of Ethics*, Pt. III, ch. iv, has a good criticism. *Ibid.*, p. xxvi, "Consciousness and will erect an eternal barrier against the attempt to explain the spiritual activities of man by the processes of nature." See also Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, pp. 371–375; W. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II. pp. 153–159; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. II. ch. viii. Ernst Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*, ch. xix, sets forth the theory in terms of crassest materialism; also H. A. Taine, who says, in *History of English Literature*, Introd., "Whether facts be moral or physical, it makes no matter. They always have their causes. There are causes for ambition, courage, veracity, just as there are for digestion, muscular movement, animal heat. Vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar." We acknowledge that there is no uncaused action, but we still allow for freedom of choice. The method of evolutionary ethics is to explain the present condition by tracing the past history and stages of development. This is shown especially in E. Westermarck, *op. cit.;* and in W. R. Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism.* One result is to evolve conscience out of existence, and to lead us on to Nietzsche's "superman," who becomes "super," in part, because he has no conscience and is swayed only by the "will to power." See the very able refutation of Nietzschean ethics and philosophy by J. N. Figgis, *The Will to Freedom.* For a full historical account and defence of evolutionary Ethics, see C. M. Williams, *Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution.*

of the manner in which the human capacity to perceive them originated. If this capacity is of evolutionary origin it is not less trustworthy on that account, nor are the judgments of conscience reduced in authority by the nature of the origin of the conscience.

What is called "Transcendental Ethics" was first evolved by G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831),[1] to whom thought was the fundamental reality. This actualizes itself in society, regarded as the sphere of personal self-realization.

Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882)[2] translated this into terms of English thought. He said man's chief end is to be a person, i.e., to realize himself in a society of persons. The Christian idea is to grow like God, who is the only complete person. Green touched on important matter but he did not complete it. The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him.

§ 13. Little attention has been paid in these outlines to separate definitions of the ethical systems that have been developed. It will be convenient to classify them as objective and subjective.[3] The

[1] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–230; Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, vol. II. pp. 124–127. It is impossible to give his ethical ideas apart from a study of his whole system of philosophy, which would require too much space. It may be criticized as too abstract to admit of general practical application. It also abounds in contradictions.

[2] R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. II. ch. ix. Green's system is set forth in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, which is of an extremely metaphysical character.

[3] J. H. Hyslop, *Elements of Ethics*, ch. viii, is followed in this section. W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*, ch. i., divides

objective theories are further classified as ontological and nomological. The *ontological* ground morality in the nature of God, or of the universe, or of both. The *nomological* ground it in will, either the divine will, as found in the law of God, or human law and convention. The *subjective* theories are either teleological or gnosiological; the *teleological* relate morality to the end sought, whether utilitarian, hedonistic, or properly moral. The *gnosiological* theories are non-teleological and regard moral qualities as unrelated to all else, whether they are perceived intuitively or learned by experience.

The true theory is ontological, in that it grounds morality in the divine nature; and teleological, in that it treats actions as moral with reference to their bearing on the attainment of divine fellowship. The will, both of God and of society, may furnish rules and standards of moral action, but may not be regarded as the ultimate source of moral quality and obligation. Right is right, of course, whether we discern its pertinency to our chief end or not; but the reason for its being right is that it does so pertain.

It is well at this point to define in terse terms the chief specific ethical theories. *Egoism* makes the good of the agent the end of action; while *Altruism* substitutes the good of others. *Intuitionalism* claims

ethical theories into intuitive and utilitarian, the former treating the sense of duty and the fundamental moral ideas as independent of utilitarian considerations and intuitively certain, the latter deriving moral ideas inductively from experience and making the pursuit of happiness the determinative ideal.

that we can see clearly and immediately the contents of duty and their absolute nature. *Hedonism* makes pleasure the aim of conduct. *Utilitarianism* is hedonism universalized by making the aim the happiness or welfare of the greatest number or of society at large—the happiness referred to is earthly. Modern *practical idealism* is utilitarian, as is also *socialistic* ethics. *Evolutionary ethics* in its several forms presupposes that moral distinctions and the moral sense are products of biological development, having their roots in pre-human stages of evolution.[1] From the

[1] In general Bishop D'Arcy says, *op. cit.*, p. 229. "Though the various ethical theories may be described as rivals, the opposition is not so great as it appears. Each theory has contributed some valuable element to the whole of ethical thought." Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 224, "A classification of types of theory is rendered difficult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification almost impossible, by the fact that the problems arrange themselves about separate principles leading to cross divisions." This last work classifies them as (*a*) Teleological and Jural; (*b*) Individual and Institutional; (*c*) Empirical and Intuitional. Egoism and Altruism may be identified by holding that "the *True Good* for every man is a *Common Good* and an *Absolute Good*," Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, p. 102. For "this cosmos will not be good for self if determined with reference to self only; for persons, though each as a person, that is, for himself, is separate and unique, must yet be members of a higher order, combined by the operation of some transcendent principle of unity. They are all one in God. What is good for one is good for all," *ibid.*, p. 104. Bishop D'Arcy develops this at length in Pt. II. ch. iii–v. See also Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–391.

A good description of modern extreme Egoism is found in Geo. Meredith's novel, *The Egoist*. Intuitionalism is excellently described by Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, Pt. III. ch. i. He says, p. 230, "This theory claims conscience as a special faculty, whose office is to give judgment upon conduct. Conscience, it is said, is ultimate. It is

Christian standpoint the battle to-day lies between opposite notions of man's chief end. Christianity makes eternal life with God the goal and organizing

intuitive in its judgments. It is an essential part of human nature. It is therefore supreme. There is no appeal to any higher court." This is the position taken in Jas. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, and criticized by H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, Bk. III, ch. xii.

Hedonism is described by Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, Pt. III. ch. ii. He says, p. 236, "The basis of Hedonism is the assumption that the object of desire is always pleasurable." On p. 237, "In general, the mistake of Hedonism seems to be a confusion of self-satisfaction with pleasure. Self-satisfaction is the true end of all volition. Pleasure, as a rule, accompanies self-satisfaction; but it is not even an index to the value of any particular satisfaction. For some of the objects of desire which, when obtained, yield most pleasure are among the least satisfying."

"Utilitarianism, Bishop D'Arcy says, p. 243, " is Hedonism grown democratic." See the same work, Pt. III, ch. iii; R. A. P. Rogers, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. vii. H. Spencer's criticism, that the "method of universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism, is far more unsatisfactory than egoistic hedonism," *Data of Ethics*, p. 133, seems to be warranted. Germany, e.g., would be justified in all that it did in the late war if it acted on the premise that its dominion was for the greatest good of the greatest number. That is, the end would justify the means. As W. E. H. Lecky says, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 40, "Even if every virtuous act were incontestably useful, it by no means follows that its virtue is derived from its utility." T. C. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 596, "English utilitarianism has had a long and honorable history, but it has been mainly outside of or even in avowed indifference or antagonism to organized Christianity." We may sum up the teaching of this important school by giving its fundamental doctrine "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," the attainment of which supplies the ultimate ethical standard by which conduct is to be judged. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), attempted to form a combination of the Intuitional and Utilitarian positions. Idealism is best set forth in T. H. Green's *Prolegomena*, and finds many adherents in the modern ethical world.

principle of conduct; while current secular idealism makes the earthly welfare of society determinative. The former stresses the other world, while the latter emphasizes the improvement of this world. To the Christian supernatural religion is of central importance, but to the modernist religion is an adjunct only of idealistic aims in this present world-society.[1]

[1] See F. J. Hall, "This Miserable and Naughty World," in *Anglican Theol. Rev.*, Oct., 1920.

CHAPTER III

MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR SYSTEMATIC ETHICS

§ 1. Moral Philosophy deals with the theory or rationale of duty and virtue.[1] It is here treated under the heads of the Agent, the End, and the Act.

We must state at the outset certain specific assumptions upon which our treatment rests, assumptions which do not belong to Moral Science as such, but do affect its treatment.

(*a*) "The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever."[2]

(*b*) To fulfil this end requires the light and practice of true religion.[3] Religion, concretely speaking, is the working system by which men are brought into

[1] Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. xvi. A very brief summary of Moral Philosophy is given by F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 226–248. Among the best manuals are, Jos. Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy;* H. Calderwood, *Handbook of Moral Philosophy;* J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics;* N. K. Davis, *Elements of Ethics;* N. Porter, *Elements of Moral Science.* For larger lists, see J. M. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philosophy*, vol. III, pp. 812–912; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v.* "Ethics."

[2] *Westminster Catechism.* See F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–245.

[3] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–232; M. MacColl, *Christianity in Rel. to Science and Morals*, pp. 292–303.

relation with God, and true religion is nowhere fully exhibited except in the Catholic Church.[1]

(*c*) Holy Scripture, viewed as recording a progressive revelation, and interpreted by the Catholic Faith, affords true and determinative knowledge of the will of God and of human duty.[2]

(*d*) Men are born in a state of moral insufficiency and corruptibility, with more or less blinded consciences, perverted affections, and weakened wills; so that, apart from supernatural revelation and grace, they are naturally prone to sin and vice.[3]

(*e*) The death of Christ is the basis of remedy for this evil; and the means of recovery and perfection are committed by God to the stewardship of the Catholic Church. The entire removal of the taint of evil is not achieved, however, until after death.[4]

(*f*) This life is probationary. Men are responsible agents. An everlasting future is to come after death, determined as to its nature by the judgment of God upon the moral value and tendency of our lives in this world.[5]

[1] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 213–226. Cf. H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, Lec. i.

[2] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, §§ 140–144; J. B. Mozley, *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, passim;* F. J. Hall, *Theol. Outl.*, vol. I, Q. xvii, §§ 3–4.

[3] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, ch. ix, esp. pp. 285–289; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. V; J. J. Elmendorf, *Moral Theology*, I, vi.10.

[4] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, ch. x, §§ 1, 6–7; and *Passion and Exalt. of Christ*, pp. 103–109.

[5] F. J. Hall, *Eschatology*, ch. ii, §§ 4–6, 8.

(*g*) Men will hereafter be judged not only according to the knowledge which they have actually acquired, but also according to their disposition to obtain knowledge of the divine will. It is a part of human righteousness to learn, so far as opportunities permit, wherein righteousness of life and heavenly virtues consist.[1]

I. *The Agent*

§ 2. Men are called moral agents because they possess rational freedom and can distinguish and choose between right and wrong action, having a sense of responsibility for their choice.[2] As moral agents they possess what are called moral faculties, and these correspond to the psychical faculties of intellect, feeling, and will. The moral faculties are neither independent nor separable; but are specific functions and operations of the above-named psychical faculties. Moreover, we may not divide the psychical faculties from each other, for each faculty is conditioned in its exercise by the action of the others; neither pure intellect, nor pure emotion, nor pure will have ever been experienced.[3] The moral faculties of the intellect are the ordinary intellectual faculties, which are called moral in so far as they are given moral direction and are subject to moral conditions; any good

[1] F. J. Hall, *Eschatology*, ch. vi, §§ 6–8.
[2] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, div. I, ch. i, §§ 8–9.
[3] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 190–194.

treatise of psychology is, therefore, a serviceable introduction to their study.

For the purpose of moral science these faculties may be conveniently divided into the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical faculty, called *synderesis* by scholastic writers,[1] has to do with the speculative and scientific appropriation and consideration of moral truths and principles. It calls into play external perception, intuition, memory, imagination, generalization, and discursive thought generally. Its exercise furnishes the mind with axioms,[2] facts, and generalizations which make possible and guide moral judgment. The moral judgment, as its name indicates, is the practical faculty by which we apply moral principles to determine the moral quality of immediate lines of action and of habits. The *conscience* is this faculty of moral judgment as exercised with reference to one's own actions and habits. By it the individual determines whether his actions are right or wrong.[3] The rational faculties do

[1] The scholastic writers define it "as a habit by which the soul perceives the general principles of right conduct," Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 188. See Jos. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–138; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 499. J. M. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, *s.v.* "Conscience," gives the full history of the meaning of the two terms and the change of the meaning of conscience.

[2] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, I. I. iii, shows that the fundamental intuitions of morality cannot rationally be contradicted, nor can they be proved. They do not result from induction. Cf. ch. iv, as criticized below.

[3] Of the immense literature on the subject we mention only certain works which are representative of different points of view.

not become either more or less trustworthy merely by being exercised in a moral direction. It may there-

See in general H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, I, I, ii, §§ 9–12; I, I, iv; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 499; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, § 36; Bishop Butler, *Sermons on Human Nature*, serm. ii; J. Locke, *Essays on the Understanding*, Bk. I, ch. iii, § 8; R. H. Lotze, *Practical Philosophy*, § 3; Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium*, Bk. I, ch. i; Robert Sanderson, *Lectures on Conscience and on Human Law;* H. Rashdall, *Is Conscience an Emotion?;* G. L. Richardson, *Conscience, Its Origin and Authority*. We refer to these authors below by name only.

It may be helpful, first, to see some typical definitions. St. John Damasc., *de Fide Orthod.*, IV, 22, says conscience is the law of the mind, which defines it objectively. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I, lxxix, 13, says conscience is an act; Bp. Sanderson, p. 14, says it is neither an act, nor a form, nor a power; but a habit, partly innate and partly acquired. He defines conscience as "a Faculty or Habit of the Practical Understanding, which enables the Mind of Man, by the use of Reason and Argument, to apply the light which it has to particular Moral Actions." According to the Aristotelean division of the mental faculties,—(*a*) Cognitive Intellect, speculative and practical; (*b*) Appetitive, or Will—conscience belongs to the practical cognitive. So Kant, *Intro. to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, § XII (B), says, "Conscience is man's practical reason, which holds before him his law of duty in every case so as either to acquit or condemn him." Bp. Butler, *Sermon* i, it is "the principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions." J. Martineau, *op. cit.*, it is "the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of action." N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 77, "Conscience is pure reason discerning moral law. This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive object, and its exercise is the primary, original antecedent condition of any moral activity whatever, without which liberty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character." H. Calderwood, I, I. iv. § i, "Conscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual for the guidance of his conduct." All these trace ultimately to Aristotle, and are well summarized by Origen, *In Ep. ad Rom.*, lib. II, ch. ii, who says it is *affectum corrector, atque animæ pædagogus.*

fore be said that the *synderesis* and moral judgment or conscience ought to be educated and rightly informed

As distinguished from other knowledge, Hugo of St. Victor well says, *Inst. Monast.*, III, xi, *Conscientia est cordis scientia;* also, *Cor noscit se et alia. Quando autem se noscit appellatur conscientia, quando præter se alia noscit appellatur scientia.* Jeremy Taylor relates it to God and gives it a wider basis in human nature; he says, "God rules in us by His substitute our conscience." As all are related to God none can be wholly without a conscience, through it God witnesses to Himself, it is a perpetual pulse; passively conceived it is a witness, actively it is a guide in all moral acts, words, thoughts.

As to the mental faculties involved, he says, "although conscience be primarily founded in the understanding, as it is the law-giver and dictator, . . . yet it is also memory, when it accuses or excuses, when it makes joyful and sorrowful; and there is in it some mixture of will; . . . so that conscience is a result of all, of understanding, will, and memory." To the same effect Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 192, "We may roughly define conscience as a habit or capacity of the three faculties of the soul—intellect, will, and feeling,—by which man is bound to the moral order of the universe, i.e., the will of God; or, in other words, the capacity of applying objective laws to subjective conduct or of regulating man's actions in accordance with the law."

Most modern definitions may be criticized as being too one-sided; thus Bp. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, "Conscience is simply the consciousness of obligation," which places it too much upon a basis of feeling. On the other hand, H. Sidgwick, "Conscience is essentially Intellect or Reason applied to Practice," errs in identifying it too thoroughly with the rational faculty. G. L. Richardson attempts to include both sides, "Conscience is the whole personality acting ethically," p. 69; and from a different, practically Christian rather than philosophical, standpoint, "Conscience is not sentiment, but a healthy abhorrence of sin," p. 200. H. Rashdall argues against Edw. Westermarck and Wm. McDougall (in *An Intro. to Social Psychology*) that conscience is not an emotion but a rational faculty, for if it is merely an emotion it can have no more objective value than a liking or disliking for mustard. Emotions fluctuate. It is by no means certain that I

for their best exercise. The necessary and universal intuitions and axioms of the spiritual reason, indeed,

will react emotionally to-morrow as I do to-day. Westermarck's thesis, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 738, is that "the moral concepts which form the predicate of moral judgment are ultimately based on moral emotions,—they are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval." The hollow unreality of his whole scheme is shown by his treatment of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, vol. I, p. 111; and his thesis seems to be defeated by such statements as the following, "Moral ideas are expressed in moral judgments," vol. I, p. 158, for one does not ordinarily think of judgments as being founded upon the emotions, certainly not in a well-regulated mind.

As to the origin of conscience there are two opposed schools, one regarding it as due to intuition (Calderwood), the other to evolution (Spencer). Christianity is committed to neither position, but may be said to furnish a synthesis of the two. The fault of the first position is that it denies the ability of conscience to be educated. "That conscience intuitively recognizes moral law, that it is supreme in its authority, and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions which hang or fall together," H. Calderwood, p. 71. The arguments which he uses do not hold good, for both the eye and the ear may be, and are, educated. His view is considerably modified in the chapter on Moral Sentiments. In opposition we may set the statement of Jeremy Taylor "Conscience is only a good guide when we are truly informed," in which we should mark the adjective "good," for, as we have seen, conscience must in any case be our guide. The error of the evolutionary school is more serious, for it tends to leave God out of consideration and to regard conscience merely as a natural product.

Finally, as to the authority of conscience, this is supreme. "Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world," Bp. Butler. In moral decisions the fundamental standards of judgment are invariable, e.g., truthfulness and honesty. They are not like the standards of æsthetics, or even of measurements, which may vary. H. Calderwood, p. 53, "Truths which are ultimate, . . . are *universal* not particular;

cannot be rationally rejected, for they constitute the basis of all moral conclusions and, for that reason, are beyond either proof or disproof. But moral science can be more soundly developed and the judgments of the conscience can be changed by education, fuller knowledge, and more deliberate reflection. Yet no appeal may be taken from the conscience, for its judgment signifies our existing knowledge or conviction as to right and wrong. To disregard this is culpable. The practical authority of the conscience

necessary not adventitious; *self-evidencing* not demonstrable; *unquestionable* (indubitable and indisputable), incapable of contradiction, whether in thought or practice." G. L. Richardson, p. 96, "As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we are bound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the authority of the one or the other is to distrust the Power in whom physical and moral law have their source. The authority of conscience is thus paramount for the individual; it will be better for me to do what is objectively wrong, but what I conscientiously believe to be right, than to do what is in fact right, but what my conscience disapproves. And the reason is that to distrust and to disobey conscience is an act of disloyalty to my personality; it is a kind of moral suicide. Conscience will work itself clear of error in proportion as it is used and trusted, just as intellectual truth is attained by the exhaustion of error." P. 97, "The essential thing is not the verdict, but the *motive* which underlies it; and the motive must be that we shall allow the Divine Purpose to move freely through the human personality."

As to the relation to other authority, T. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology*, vol. I, p. 57, says: "The voice of the conscience is the authoritative guide of man's moral conduct. Not that the individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute authority of God."

is self-evident and impregnable. Sin has, indeed, clouded the human mind, and made its moral judgments less accurate and trustworthy. But, even in error, one is morally bound to do what he thinks right and to avoid what he thinks wrong, although previous neglect of light may make the error itself blameworthy.

§ 3. Some of the more important emotions of the moral nature are: (*a*) pleasure and pain; (*b*) desire and aversion; (*c*) love and hate; (*d*) hope and fear. Pleasure and pain are impelling and deterring feelings which attend, or result from, action or experience, whether internal or external, mental, emotional, volitional, or physical. Desire and aversion have some thing or event for their object, the former seeking, the latter avoiding, it. Love and hate have persons for their object. Love impels to union with, and, therefore, also to self-sacrificing service in behalf of, persons. Love towards God is the basis and regulative principle of righteous love towards man. Hate is the opposite of love.[1] Hope and fear are concerned with future and contingent events or results supposed to be possible. Hope is based on desire that the possibility may be realized. Fear is anxiety growing out of belief that what is hoped for is uncertain, or that what is undesired is probable. Despair is the entire absence of hope, due to the belief that what is desired has become impossible, or that what is not desired is inevitable. Sin has caused the

[1] F. J. Hall, *Eschatology*, pp. 250–253; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

wounds of concupiscence and malice. By reason of concupiscence the feelings of pleasure, desire, love, and hope are directed upon or controlled by inferior objects and ends, while malice causes a misdirection of pain, aversion, fear, and hate.

The activities of the intellectual and emotional faculties afford the motives by which the will is influenced, but with a difference. Intellectual motives are either directive or prohibitive, while emotional motives either impel or restrain. But the intellect and the feelings are inseparable. The emotions help or hinder the mind in arriving at truth, and to a real extent determine the judgments of conscience. The mind, on the other hand, affords the objects which call forth the emotions.

§ 4. The will[1] is the power of choice, and must be distinguished from the power of executing choice. The acts which are caused or determined by the will are called voluntary. Many human acts are either

[1] A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, ch. v; Wm. James, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, ch. xxvi; R. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, "Appetite is the will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject." A. L. Moore, *Essays Scientif. and Philos.*, p. 134, "Will is a power of control over the other faculties and capacities of our nature, by means of which we are enabled to determine personal activity." Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, p. 177, "What is of the utmost ethical importance is the cultivation of a virtuous will, that is, a will habituated to subordinate desire of every kind to the true good whatever it may be." See further *ibid.*, Pt. I, ch. iii; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. III; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, ii; N. Porter, *op. cit.*, ch. iv; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, §§ 4 ff.

involuntary or non-voluntary. These may often, however, be controlled, modified, or ended by the will.[1] If actions were never really determined by the will, there could be no moral responsibility for them. The will is the pivot of all moral conduct.[2]

The will, as will, is necessarily free.[3] *Voluntas*, will, and voluntary have the same root. The will is a true cause. So far, indeed, as the origination of its activity is concerned—the choosing of something—it is subject to causation; that is, as a rational being man must have a motive which moves him to act or to refrain from action. But so far as the direction of its choice is concerned—its choosing between alternatives—it is itself a cause, and free, within certain limits imposed on human freedom.[4] In other relations than that of choice between courses of action the effects of choice are, of course, subject to

[1] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, ii; N. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[2] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, §§ 70–72.

[3] J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 11 ff. Cf. Ecclus. xxxi. 10. Kant, *Intro. to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, init.*, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will. . . . A good will is good not because of what it performs or accomplishes, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply in virtue of its volition, that is, it is good in itself. . . . Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, . . . it would still shine like a jewel by its own light, as something which has its whole value in itself." On the conflict between free will and determinism, see C. Harris, *op. cit.*, ch. xiii.

[4] N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.

laws of causation which lie beyond the sphere of the human will.[1] The freedom of the human will, and of every creaturely will, is circumscribed, because it is finite and part of a higher will-scheme. Its limitations include: (*a*) occasions and motives, for we cannot simply choose to choose apart from motive or interest;[2] (*b*) power of execution, for what is known or thought to be impossible or unpreventable is not a matter of choice;[3] (*c*) external environment and personal influence, whether of men or of unseen spirits;[4] (*d*) heredity; (*e*) divine determination, and grace, although grace is not irresistible;[5] (*f*) character and habits,[6] which within their sphere tend to become more and more difficult to alter;[7] (*g*) bodily conditions, e.g., need of food and sleep, sexual cravings,

[1] W. G. Ward, *Essays on the Philos. of Theism*, distinguishes between spontaneous impulse and the effort often made to resist such impulse. The fact that we can thus resist, and choose action which is contrary to spontaneous impulse, affords clear proof that the will is free and not merely the register of antecedent causes and motives.

[2] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, parag. 28, §§ 2, 4; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, ii, 3; J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. II, pp. 53–56.

[3] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, ii, 36; R. Hooker, *op. cit.*, I, vii, 5. Compulsion may leave the will unaffected, but relieves of responsibility for the act, when not consented to.

[4] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, ch. xiv. On angels and their influence, see F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, ch. v.

[5] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, ch. i; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, ch. v, div., II; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 20; St. Thomas, I. xxiii. 3 *ad tert.*

[6] Habits are either infused by grace or acquired; and may be good or evil. See Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 275–284.

[7] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, parag. 34, and ch. vi.

disease. These limitations circumscribe or influence the will more or less, but do not determine it absolutely or nullify it.[1]

One is responsible only when free and within the divinely ordered sphere of freedom. But avoidable limitations, such as those imposed by habit and character, or vincible ignorance, wittingly and freely incurred, do not exempt from accountability; which also somewhat depends in degree upon the amount of mental deliberation in choice.

The will never acts apart from the mind and the feelings. Yet these should be carefully distinguished. The mind and the emotions are the sources of motives. Thus desire affords a motive of choice, but the will chooses,[2] sometimes against strong desires and impulses. The mind affords reasons for choice and the judgments of conscience have authority, but the will is free to choose contrary thereto. Yet there is no such thing as non-intelligent choice; and what is so described is really an instinctive act.[3] Choice is an act of will in a given case. Purpose or intention is a state of will with reference either to future action or to an end designed to be subserved by such action.[4]

[1] Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 86–90, gives three chief individual determinants of free will: age, temperament, talent; and, pp. 91–97, three social determinants: sex, education, society. Lombroso exaggerated the strength of this last factor and made it mechanically and absolutely determinative.

[2] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, i, 2.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, ii, 6.

[4] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, §§ 33–34.

The will is momentary or habitual. A habitual will is one which has become more or less disposed to similar choices between similar alternatives, so that it acts with slight deliberation, almost spontaneously.[1] Personal character is constituted by the habitual will.

Liberty means personal success in the sphere of choice, or the power of self-control and of realizing one's purpose in action. License means choice without reference to moral principles and ends. It is fatal to liberty because opposed to the will of God, which cannot really be thwarted. Experience shows also that license gradually subjects the will to the passions, thus narrowing its freedom.[2]

[1] St. Thos., I, II, lxxvii, 7; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 20, "If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi-deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin. These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect." *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 36, Acts of this sort become sinful only "when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice." They lack the consent of the will which is essential to make an act sinful. Such acts are said by theologians to proceed from antecedent concupiscence or monomania, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 35. The agent, however, is bound to use every precaution, and the means of grace, to prevent their recurrence and especially to avoid occasions. Moreover the responsibility for falling into inveterate evil habits must be reckoned with and emphasized.

[2] See H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, iv, 1; H. P. Liddon, *Univ. Sermons*, 1st Series, iv, pp. 78–81; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 55. The thought is pre-Christian, Seneca said *Parere Deo libertas est;* but the dynamic is found only in the Christian dispensation. Koch-

Sin has weakened and enslaved the human will. Divine grace operates to emancipate it, by impelling towards righteous ends and actions. But the beneficial efficacy of grace depends upon the will's response, and the cure of sin is gradual; for grace does not take the place of practice in self-control or self-discipline, but assists us in such practice. The will's response to, or use of, grace consists in this practice—practice in obeying higher motives, and in thwarting lower impulses and motives, even when these motives do not directly pertain to sinful ends or actions.[1] The essence of self-discipline lies in this thwarting of impulses that are not in the given instances sinful.[2]

Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 8, "true liberty, i.e., 'the liberty of the children of God' (sanctity, 2 Cor. iii. 17–18) is not the beginning but the end and object of morality and religion." It is "victory over sin and passion, the result of a constant and patient coöperation with grace." As St. Anselm points out, if liberty meant the ability to sin or not to sin, neither God nor the angels would possess it. Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 149, "Christian liberty means order in conformity with the law of God, not license."

[1] See Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 102–112, the friends or foes of the will are the instincts, affections, passions. Affections belong to the rational appetite, passions to the sensual. The will is responsible only as it consents and coöperates wittingly. It is not responsible for their origin. They are ours not to annihilate, as the Stoics taught, but to control by the aid of grace and by the training of the understanding. The passions and affections are listed somewhat differently from the list here given: (*a*) love and hate; (*b*) joy and sorrow; (*c*) desire and repugnance; (*d*) hope and despair; (*e*) fear and daring.

[2] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. V, 9, points out that the laws of moral victory are those of (*a*) attention, selecting dispositions and motives with which to concern one's self; (*b*) habit, directed to establishing

§ 5. Man has a composite nature, and his moral faculties are conditioned and influenced in their operation by the bodily organism. The mind is determined in its operation by the condition of the brain and nervous system, which means practically by the condition of the whole body. An unhealthy physical condition tends to induce dulness of mind, and even to pervert the moral judgment. Unnecessary carnal emotions and passions tend to debase the mind and will, and are frequently either caused or increased by bodily disorders. Even the healthy appetites and normal propensities of the body require discipline and self-control, if they are to be kept in line with moral interests. The will itself is often weakened and made inert by physical weakness, excessive weariness, and disease.[1]

Bodily conditions are most apt to influence the moral faculties when they themselves have been caused by moral antecedents, because they then express, crystallize, and perpetuate such antecedents. Thus the physical results of intemperance and lust render these vices more difficult to remedy, and their evil effects may even be perpetuated in offspring. Physical heredity and other native physical conditions have effect upon the moral faculties, and tend to develop corresponding moral habits. For example,

this concern. He adds that philosophy alone cannot solve the problem of enabling the will to persevere along such lines. He refers to an essay on Moral Dynamic in Shairp's *Studies in Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 348.

[1] Cf. F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 190–194.

men have what we call passionate natures, and are impelled to unregulated passions accordingly. Physical environment also has moral influence by calling forth bodily responses which are either favourable or unfavourable to moral interests. Fortunately the mind has some power to combat and even to improve bodily conditions and their effects upon moral interests, and this power is susceptible of enhancement by self-discipline.[1] No bodily conditions can change the material quality of the moral actions resulting from them; although they may reduce the formal guilt to the extent of the individual's lack of responsibility for their presence.

§ 6. Man's moral history is marked by a series of dispensations or covenants established with him by God: (*a*) a primitive dispensation of innocence and grace, nullified by sin; (*b*) the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations, in which, by reason of sin, men had to assume a propitiatory attitude towards God—one which in itself was symbolic, and ineffective for the remedy of sin,—and in which they were placed under revealed laws that could not secure obedience and thus made their sinful inclinations more manifest; (*c*) the Christian dispensation, grounded in the propitiatory death of Christ,[2] and affording means of sanctifying grace, with the assistance of which grad-

[1] This is illustrated by the phenomena of mind healing, Christian Science, etc. The grace of Unction of the Sick assists the mind in exercising this power. See F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 320–324.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 14 (R.V.).

ually the body can be brought under control, the conscience illuminated, the affections purified, and the will strengthened, for the fulfilment of man's chief end through the attainment of everlasting life with God. This cannot be achieved, however, except through life-long discipline and a progress which continues after death.[1]

II. *The End*

§ 7. The end of every act, so far as it is rational and free, is some good, whether higher or lower, real or apparent.[2] By the good is meant the desirable. It is of three kinds: (*a*) the useful; (*b*) the pleasurable; (*c*) the morally desirable. The last mentioned constitutes the true end of moral conduct. The useful and the pleasurable often minister to the moral good, and then take on moral value;[3] but they are not moral goods either in themselves or under all circumstances.

Utilitarianism,[4] which identifies moral good with

[1] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 220–223 and ch. x.

[2] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, ii, 3; St. Thomas, I, II, x, 1.

[3] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, § 130.

[4] Treated historically and critically by H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, div. II, ii, ff. He does not clearly distinguish Hedonism, which is concerned indiscriminately with pleasure, whereas Utilitarianism stresses higher and social well-being and lasting happiness, distinguishing values of pleasures. J. S. Blackie, *Four Phases of Morals*, searchingly criticizes Utilitarianism; also W. E. H. Lecky, *op. cit.*, vol. I, ch. i. Cf. H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 ff. The practical idealism of our day is essentially a species of Utilitarianism in its tremendous emphasis upon efficiency for immediate results and upon the perfecting of human welfare in this world

well-being or happiness, and Hedonism, which identifies it with pleasures of the moment, are absolutely to be rejected. They both substitute inferior for higher good, and this is the distinctive mark of evil aims. It is man's duty to seek the morally good, and, when alternative goods are involved, the highest one. Progress in attaining moral ends is, indeed, attended and to some degree conditioned by present pleasure, and results necessarily in ultimate happiness. If it were not so, we would have reason to suspect our whole philosophy and the justice of the universe. Pleasure and happiness are none the less incidental to moral good, and at times have to be sacrificed in its interest. Moreover, beatitude is not happiness in the abstract, but that form of it which we obtain through making our chief objective end to be life with God.[1]

The moral ends of conduct are immediate and remote. The immediate ends are duties[2] and virtues—present obligations to be discharged, and habits to be cultivated and maintained. The chief end, or *summum bonum*, is "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," that is, perfected divine communion and fellowship.[3] As essential to the realization of this,

[1] See F. J. Hall, "This Miserable and Naughty World," in *Anglican Theol. Rev.*, Oct., 1920.

[2] Duties in the comprehensive sense of what we ought to do under existing conditions—including the promotion of others' present welfare, when legitimate opportunities occur.

[3] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, i; *Westminster Catechism*, 1st answer; R. Hooker, *op. cit.*, I, xi, 1–2; St. Thomas, I, II, i–v.

personal perfection in virtue and character is also a necessary remote end of moral life. This means personal assimilation of character to that of God, the only possible basis of either divine pleasure in us or our enjoyment of God. Such personal perfection is also needed for unqualified and lasting enjoyment of mutual human fellowship. The communion of saints obtains its fruition in common life with God, and is the only communion between human beings which is unattended by disappointment. Thus true brotherly love looks to the future, and seeks mutual sanctification, as the necessary condition of its realization. Personal sanctification is also the road to self-realization, or to what Aristotle described as "perfect activity in a perfect life," attended by perfect happiness. To seek such self-realization is not selfish, for it does not require or permit us to make the attendant happiness of self our aim. Thus Christian love when satisfied is pleasing, but is by nature unselfish. To be pleased with what is righteous makes the pleasure righteous. And the self thus realized is what God created after His own likeness.[1]

Christian Ethics is both individual and social. Men are placed under social conditions by God, and are by nature social beings.[2] A man must realize himself because he is a moral individual, and his per-

[1] Gen. i. 26. Cf. J. Caird, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 56 f.

[2] God places us in the world society as the sphere of our probation; and He gathers those who respond to His call in the Church, which is the inception of that blessed society which in its perfection will enter into the full joy of God in the world to come.

fection is essential to the common good, as well as to a fulfilment of his personal obligation to please God. But his achievement of this is conditioned by the love of others, and by seeking the welfare of others. One is to love his neighbour *as himself*.[1] Altruism and egoism, as usually conceived, are alike inadequate. Both of the ends which these systems severally emphasize exclusively are vital, and neither may be sacrificed to the other.

§ 8. The final causes or ends of moral choice become moving causes, when subjectively considered, and are embraced within the motives of action. The term motive [2] describes whatever immediately moves and consciously influences the will from within. Motives spring either from intellectual or emotional sources. The intellectual motives are reasons for action or non-action. They are either directive or prohibitive, taking the form of practical judgments upon the ends and results of actions, whether in the sphere of utility, of pleasure, or of morality. They have as sources: (*a*) experience;[3] (*b*) reflection on experience; (*c*) intuition and *a priori* considerations. Emotional motives impel or restrain. They may arise from (*a*) immediate excitement; (*b*) subsequent imagination; (*c*) temperament. They take the

[1] God alone may be loved with all one's heart and soul and mind.

[2] See H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. II; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, ii, 4–5.

[3] Conceived of as including the reception of divine revelation and moral education at large.

form of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, love or hate, and of hope or fear.[1]

The motives are always mixed, being both intellectual and emotional; and are often conflicting[2]—making both for and against the pursuit of the highest good. The question sometimes asked, whether the will is inevitably determined by the strongest motives, is ambiguous. If "strongest" means the motives which in fact prevail, the question is idle and has an affirmative answer, of course. If it means the most rational or the most excitingly felt, these do not in fact invariably determine choice. The will really determines, and is no mere register of the inherent strength of the motives involved.

[1] Cf. § 3, *init.*, above. On the last, see T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 37–39.

[2] *Per contra*, Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, p. 33, "A conflict of motives is impossible. What is called a conflict of motives is properly a conflict of desires." The motive is "that which moves to action," *ibid.*, p. 80 (cf. pp. 80–83). The motive is the desire which prevails; it is helpful to remember that motive and motion come from the same root. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 237, "A 'mere' motive which does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine motive at all, and hence it is not a voluntary act." There is a confusion here in terminology between motive and act; but the thought is that the motive can hardly be conceived as a determinative which does not strongly tend to realize itself in act. Hence it is possible to speak disparagingly of the "good" man, that is, the man whose motives are good, but who rarely expresses them in act. *Ibid.*, p. 238, "The man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society." Kant, we may note, in his theory of the "good will" over-emphasizes the motive.

Motives and choices are inseparable although distinct phenomena of personal activity,[1] and the person is simplex. Motives do not determine the will from without, as separate factors, but from within as personal considerations and feelings.[2] The will exhibits personal attitude, while motives exhibit personal conditions of that attitude. The will expresses self-determination, and nothing else is really meant when we say loosely that motives determine the will. We should not confuse determination as thus used with compelling conditions, nor forget that the will can so direct attention and reason as to modify the motives.[3] The will itself is the personal faculty by which the choice of action is made. The will ought to be influenced by the highest motives—i.e., by those which make for holiness of life and character, and for the attainment of the *summum bonum.*

The highest of all motives is the love of God or desire of union with Him—a motive which grows out of true and adequate faith and knowledge, and which is sustained by the hope of realization. This love in its perfection is the result of much moral and spiritual development. Owing to our sins, the sense of guilt, and the expectation of penal consequences, the earliest motive which makes for better things is nor-

[1] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, iii, 5–14, treats of the relation of motives to the will. Cf. R. Hooker, *op. cit.*, I, vii.

[2] J. Caird, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 44–45; R. Hooker, *op. cit.*, I, vii, 3.

[3] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, III, iii, 14–19.

mally the fear of punishment—"servile fear." This fear, in those who seek an escape, leads to aversion to sin and to desire of its opposite; which in turn induces love of Him in whom the opposite is clearly to be found. All this, including the desire to escape, is contingent upon the illumination and prompting of grace. Thus it appears that, while servile fear is not an adequate motive or worthy of heaven, it is a necessary "beginning of wisdom," and the motive of heavenward repentance. Repentance signalizes the birth of "holy fear" or loving anxiety lest we displease God.[1]

The conscience judges with authority, and therefore the motives afforded by its judgments ought to govern the will in every instance. It is true that the divine will is the supreme standard to which the human will should be conformed. But the conscience is the faculty by which we judge whether given acts are in accord with the divine will.[2]

III. *The Act*

§ 9. The moral quality of actions is ultimately determined by their relation to our attainment of the *summum bonum*, and for Christians this makes supernatural religion with knowledge, love and service of God, central.[3] No act is moral which does

[1] F. J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 220–222; F. H. Hallock, in *American Church Monthly*, June, 1921, pp. 346–355.

[2] F. J. Hall, *idem*, p. 185.

[3] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 229–232; J. J. Elmendorf,

not either immediately or remotely pertain to this. The possibility of moral acts depends upon the possession by their agent of a moral nature. Such acts have to be rational and free.[1] Moral actions include the operations of psychical faculties, and the use of language, as well as physical movement—that is, "thought, word, and deed." [2]

The causes which may make materially moral actions to be formally non-moral are: (*a*) invincible ignorance;[3] (*b*) necessity or compulsion.[4] If, however, these conditions are due to previous fault of the agent,[5] they do not have this effect; and in any case actions which under normal conditions have moral quality are likely to be followed by moral consequences. Man is a responsible agent. He will be held to account by the supreme Judge for any witting

op. cit., I, iii; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, §§ 22 ff; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 264–274; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 41–55. Koch-Preuss, vol. I, p. 264, "By the morality of an act is understood its intrinsic relation to the moral order and to reason. Every human act, in concrete, is either good or bad. It is good if it conforms to the moral law; it is bad if it violates that law. The sources of morality, i.e., the factors or principles which determine the relation of an act to the moral law, are: (*i*) the object or matter of the act; (*ii*) its form, intention, or end; and (*iii*) the attending circumstances. Generally speaking, an act is good if all three of these factors coöperate in making it conformable to the right order; it is evil if any one of them is wrong or sinful."

[1] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, div. I, i, 3.

[2] F. J. Hall, *Eschatalogy*, pp. 175–178.

[3] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, vi, 6; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 30–34.

[4] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 40.

[5] E.g., the failure of the priest to obtain the knowledge which he needs for his work, a matter of obvious obligation.

and avoidable failure to use his faculties to their best advantage for attaining the *summum bonum*, that is, within the limits of his providential opportunity and available knowledge.[1]

Duty, in the concrete, is an action or series of actions which ought to be done. In the abstract it is the quality or relation which is common to such actions, and which distinguishes them from all else—their oughtness.[2] The sense of duty is universal and necessary. It teaches every man that he ought to do right, and also to seek his highest end. It implies in every normal mind the distinction between right and wrong, or between what he ought and what he ought not to do. The reality and nature of duty are grounded in the nature of God and of man; and its contents are measured by the standard of the divine will. But we cannot explain why men ought to seek any end. Yet all men know that they ought, however grotesque and mistaken their notion of the particulars of duty may be.[3]

The ultimate source of morality is the divine nature; but it is also grounded in human nature, and is made known to us by the will and law of God.[4] Subor-

[1] On the imputability of human acts see Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 256–263.

[2] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, §§ 2–3.

[3] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, I, i, 5. In ch. vi he shows that duty implies a natural and inherent right to act according to duty in spite of all hindrances. Cf. N. Porter, *op. cit.*, § 5.

[4] H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, div. I, ch. v; J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36; N. Porter, *op. cit.*, §§ 128–129; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*,

dinately and in particulars, the will of God is deducible from the laws of nature, and from humanly created law and social convention. These last two factors we shall consider later. The relation of the sovereignty of God's will to the permission of evil constitutes the most baffling of all problems. We can only maintain that God's will is righteous, and the standard of righteousness; and that somehow, unknown to us, the existence of evil can be reconciled with this.[1]

Many actions are seen to be right without conscious consideration of their ends, but it is always to be assumed that they do in fact pertain to man's chief end. This assumption may arise either from the natural constitution of the mind, or from previous moral culture; and can be brought to light by subsequent reflection. Some actions are normally right or wrong because their effect upon the attainment of the *summum bonum* is normally in the same direction.[2] The moral quality of actions, however, is also dependent upon circumstances; and grave problems may arise, calling for the judgment of learned and trained casuists.[3]

§ 10. Acts are either moral or non-moral, and

pp. 202–204. By the will of God is meant the "will of signs," or what He makes known that we should do and should not do. St. Thomas, I, xix, 11–12; F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 246 f.

[1] F. J. Hall, *Being and Attrib. of God*, pp. 187–193; and *Creation and Man*, ch. iv.

[2] They afford the sphere of moral law.

[3] N. Porter, *op. cit.*, § 148 and ch. xvii.

moral acts are either virtuous or vicious as they conform or fail to conform to the requirements of morality. Non-moral, spontaneous, or reflex acts may be produced by the will without due knowledge or attention; and to this class belong also those acts in which the will has no part, as in sleep, in disease, or under compulsion; also, and more generally, acts which are morally indifferent.[1]

A moral act is a free and rational one, to which moral judgment is applicable, whether in relation to the divine law or to the *summum bonum*. It must proceed from the will with knowledge and deliberation, in which case it is truly voluntary; but, if the knowledge and deliberation are not complete, it is imperfectly voluntary, although still moral. The consent of the will may be implicit or explicit. Virtuous acts agree with the divine will and conduce to our attainment of the *summum bonum*, while vicious acts disagree therewith. Virtues and vices are the habits which issue respectively in virtuous and vicious acts.

A vicious act is called sinful in relation to the divine law. Sin[2] strictly defined, *actual* sin, signifies conscious disobedience of the divine law, but applies practically to any conscious violation of God's will. *Original* sin, a symbolic use of terms, is the sin breeding state of nature when deprived of grace, caused by

[1] Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 113–118.

[2] On sin, J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, vi; H. V. S. Eck, *Sin*, Pts. I–II; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, §§ 143 ff; W. W. Webb, *The Cure of Souls*, pp. 71–90; F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 247, 290–297: Hastings, *Dic. of Bib.*, *s.v.* "Sin." Cf. ch. ix, below.

the first man's disobedience and universally inherited by natural birth. It is called sin because its existence is due to sin and its results are sinful.[1]

Actual sin is distinguished as material and formal. It is *material* in so far as the act, as such, is wrong; and *formal* in so far as the agent acts freely and with knowledge of the sinfulness of his action. By formal sin the agent incurs formal guilt and penal responsibility for the act. Sins of ignorance are material only, but become formal when either persisted in or not repented of after their sinfulness is perceived.[2]

Actual sins are distinguished also as venial and mortal or deadly. They are called *venial* when they have not become so grave as of themselves to be fatal to the spiritual life, being without wilful deliberation and concerned with relatively light matter. They are called *mortal* when of themselves they are fatal to the spiritual life, unless remedied by repentance and pardoning grace; either because due to deliberate wilfulness or because concerned with grave matter.[3] The distinction between venial and mortal sins is

[1] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, ch. ix.

[2] Jas. Skinner, *A Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theology*, p. 11, gives the causes of sin as: (*a*) ignorance; (*b*) weakness; (*c*) wilfulness; (*d*) habit; (*e*) contempt.

[3] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, vi, 11; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 75, "The gravity of sin is the measure of its maliciousness, whether it be more or less offensive to God, and is more or less worthy of punishment." P. 76, "Three things are necessary to make a sin mortal: (*a*) grave matter either in itself or on account of the circumstances; (*b*) Full intention to commit a malicious act; (*c*) A perfect consent of the will.

relative, and no exact boundary line can be drawn between them in practice. No sin, known to be such, can be treated as outside the scope of need of repentance; and to console one's self with the thought that one's sins are venial is most dangerous. By being cherished venial sins become mortal.[1] The divine covenant provides remedies for every form of sin on the basis of Christ's death, and under the condition of sincere repentance; and every sin causes the need of repentance and remedy. But sin may crystallize in habit, and in that form may reach such a climax of obstinacy in conscious rebellion as to become irremediable and unpardonable—the sin against the Holy Ghost.

§ 11. Analysis of righteous conduct in the light of nature and revelation brings to the surface certain fundamental principles of action which lie behind all moral laws. Taken together these constitute an eternal law or order which is grounded in the divine nature. They constitute fundamental premises of a right conscience. So far as they have become dispositions favourable to righteous conduct they are called virtues, as are also the habits of action conforming to them. To define, *virtues* are the regulative principles or habits of conduct which when fully observed produce perfect righteousness of life and character.[2]

[1] On the comparative guilt of sins, see J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, vi, 3; Jeremy Taylor, *Doctrine of Repentance*, III, ii, 5.

[2] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, v; Bishop D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, Pt. II;

Virtues are generalized under the two heads of cardinal and theological virtues. The *cardinal* or earthly virtues pertain to the natural order and to earthly relations, and fall under four heads: wisdom or prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. Wisdom is seated in the intellect, temperance and fortitude in the emotions, justice in the will.[1] The *theological* or heavenly virtues pertain to the supernatural order and are directly and expressly related to the attainment of the *summum bonum*. They are faith, hope and charity.[2] They supplement and

Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 277; A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, ch. xi; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. xix. N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 140, "Virtue is the conformity of the will to the law discerned by practical reason or conscience." W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 91, "Virtue is the habit of doing right." He distinguishes virtues as natural or supernatural; infused or acquired; theological or moral. Virtue is sometimes derived from *vis*, strength; but usually from *vir*, man. Socrates held that it was a kind of knowledge, and that no one does wrong knowingly; but this removes the responsibility for sin and the possibility for blame, and is inadequate as resting upon only one side of man's nature.

[1] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, v, 4, and Pt. III; T. B. Strong, *Christ. Ethics*, Lec. iv.

[2] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, I, v, 5–7; J. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, Lec. iii; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, §§ 185 ff; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–115. Bishop Webb distinguishes faith as (*i*) habitual or actual; (*ii*) explicit or implicit. Explicit faith must extend to the Creed, the doctrine of the Sacraments as taught in the Catechism, the Decalogue, and the Lord's Prayer. Implicit faith may suffice for other truths of revelation; (*iii*) Exterior or interior; exterior involving an open profession of our faith, and duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourselves. Solemn profession is prescribed when certain sacraments are received; (*iv*) Living (bearing fruit in charity and good works) or dead (not joined to sanctifying grace). Koch-Preuss,

transfigure the cardinal virtues, giving them a pertinent relation to the attainment of the *summum bonum* which is otherwise lacking; that is, the cardinal virtues are made to serve supernatural purposes. Faith elevates wisdom, hope elevates justice, and charity elevates temperance and fortitude; but in a complex interaction and mutual dependence.

Vices are principles and habits which produce unrighteousness of life and character. They have been summed up under seven heads, called capital sins; pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and sloth. Every sin can be traced to one or more of them.[1]

op. cit., vol. I, p. 279, "Faith furnishes certain supernatural principles, which the intellect perceives by a divine light. Hope directs man to his supernatural end. Charity unites the will with God." On faith in general see Heb. xi. T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 165–176. P. 165, "It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a proposition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is vouched for by some one who knows and whom we can trust." By it, p. 166, "we believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes to our belief on the authority of God Himself." This faith must extend to all that God has revealed. The detailed treatment of it belongs to dogmatic theology, but it has also a place in moral theology, for it is a necessary means to the attainment of our supernatural end, and without it the divine precepts of the Decalogue could not be accepted, except upon such authority as natural reason supplied. The chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy and apostasy. Material heresy is not necessarily a sin, for one often falls into it through ignorance; but either formal heresy (the knowing and wilful rejection of revealed truth, proposed for our acceptance by the Church) or wilful doubt of such truth is sin. Apostasy is the abandonment of the faith in its entirety. On hope and charity, see T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 177–206.

[1] W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–90. For a more detailed treatment, see ch. ix, § 6, below.

§ 12. It has been assumed in these outlines that, in order to fulfil his chief end, man must practice true religion, and that this can be done normally only in the Catholic Church.[1] True religion brings us into authentic relations with God.[2] Thus it secures a knowledge of the nature of, and means of attaining, the *summum bonum*, without which we may indeed seek after God, but can hardly expect to find Him. The *summum bonum* cannot be won by unassisted human wisdom and power, but is the gift of God. And it is *promised* only to those who seek it in His appointed way, with the use of His ordained means of grace. The Catholic Church is the sphere within which this way and these means are provided; and the death of Christ is the necessary basis and warrant for the bestowal of these benefits upon sinful man.

Justification signifies a state of acceptance by God which makes available the opportunity and means of salvation from sin and of attainment of the *summum bonum*. It signifies that a man is reckoned righteous because he has been put in the way of becoming so with divine help. That is, the child of God is valued at the outset for the fullgrown man of God into which he is to grow—the condition being presupposed, however, that he will achieve this growth with the help of grace. In order thus to be justified we must have a

[1] Cf. F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, ch. vii, esp. § 6.

[2] On religion see H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lec. i; F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, ch. vii, §§ 1–4.

living faith in Christ and be born anew of water and of the Holy Spirit.[1]

For the growth in the righteousness which justification initiates, certain means of sanctifying grace, called sacraments, are provided in the Church, the use of which, in their several applications, is necessary. The result of sanctification is personal merit, or moral fitness to enter upon divine fellowship. Without such merit or fitness of personal character we can neither be pleasing to God nor find pleasure in the personal fellowship with Him, wherein the crowning joy of heaven consists and upon which our future happiness depends. This merit should not be confused with wage-merit. No works of ours can *earn* the *summum bonum*. The value of such works lies in their making us worthy, and in showing that we are worthy, to receive it as a gift. The earning of it was achieved by Christ.[2]

The practice of religion has for its central purpose to bring us into touch with God and to develop our relations with Him. Therefore its central action is worship, and this requires habitual performance. The fundamental element of worship is sacrifice or self-oblation; and this has to be expressed and performed objectively, for what is not thus expressed soon ceases to have vitality within ourselves. The

[1] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 343–345; and *The Church and the Sacramental System*, pp. 259–263.

[2] F. J. Hall, *The Church and the Sacramental System*, pp. 271–278; *Creation and Man*, pp. 348–352.

appointed method of this expression is the formal offering to God of a representative gift of sufficient value to be acceptable to Him. This has been made possible by the death, resurrection, ascension, and perpetual heavenly oblation of Christ; and it is performed by us in the Holy Eucharist. In this service men both express and perpetuate the relations necessary for keeping in touch with God and for making progress towards their chief end.[1]

The chief defect of modern systems of Ethics is their neglect of the central place which religion and its sacraments occupy in true righteousness.

[1] F. J. Hall, *The Incarnation*, pp. 283–293; and *The Sacraments*, ch. v, esp. §§ 11–12.

CHAPTER IV

MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW

I. *The Law of God*

§ 1. Moral Theology Proper is the practical branch of our subject, and treats of specific obligations and duties. Inasmuch as the standard of righteousness is the will of God, it treats of the application of the will of God to human conduct, whether considered at large or in relation to particular estates and conditions.[1] The will of God here meant is technically

[1] On the history and literature of Moral Theol. (cf. p. 20, note 1, above), see *Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v.* "Theology, Moral;" Thos. Slater, *Short Hist. of Moral Theol.;* Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 41–73; *Cath. Encyc. s.v.* "Theology," pp. 604–611.

Anglican works (more frequently contributory than systematic), W. W. Webb, *Cure of Souls;* J. J. Elmendorf, *Elem. of Moral Theol.* (follows St. Thomas); Bp. Sanderson, *Lec's on Conscience and Human Law* (trans. by Wordsworth); Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium;* and *Holy Living;* James Skinner, *Synop. of Moral and Ascetical Theol.* (rare, needs reprinting); V. Staley, *The Practical Religion* (popular); R. L. Ottley, *The Rule of Life and Love;* T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics* (Bamp. Lecs.); Chas. Gore, *Christ. Moral Prin's;* A. J. Humphreys, *Christ. Morals;* K. E. Kirk, *Some Prin's of Moral Theol.*

called the "Will of Signs," or the revealed will of God with regard to our conduct. Its revelation may be either natural or supernatural, but supernatural revelation is primary, in so far as it is more definitive of the manner in which we must fulfil our chief end. In applying the will of God to our individual actions we judge in terms of conscience, therefore conscience has authority from which there is no earthly appeal. In brief, our primary guides are: (*a*) the will of God as objective standard; (*b*) the conscience as subjective interpreter.

in their Applic'n; W. W. Williams, *Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Penance;* F. G. Belton, *A Man. for Confessors;* and *Present Day Problems in Christ. Morals;* Cyril Bickersteth, *The Min. of Absolution;* A. H. Baverstock, *The Priest as Confessor.*

Roman works (more complete and systematic, necessary for consultation but requiring cautious adaptation to Anglican conditions), Thos. Slater, *Manual of Moral Theol.*, 2 vols.; A. Koch (ed. by A. Preuss), *Handbook of Moral Theol.*, 5 vols.; J. P. Gury, *Compend. Theol. Moralis;* Aug. Lehmkuhl, *Theol. Moralis*, 2 vols.; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, Pt. II; A. Tanquerey, *Brev. Synop. Moralis et Past.* St. Alphonsus' *Theol. Moralis*, 4 vols. is historically important, but needs cautious reading.

A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 22 says, "Christian Ethics presupposes the Christian view of life as revealed in Christ, and its definition must be in harmony with the Christian ideal. The prime question of Christian Ethics is, How ought Christians to order their lives? It is therefore the science of morals as conditioned by Christian faith; and the problems it discusses are, the nature, meaning and laws of the moral life as dominated by the supreme good which has been revealed to the world in the Person and teaching of Christ." The Roman distinction between General and Special Moral Theology corresponds roughly to what is here designated as Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology Proper: Koch-Preuss, vol. I, p. 74.

§ 2. The "Will of Signs," as we have seen, includes commands, prohibitions, permissions, counsels and example. These five branches may be conveniently reduced to three: (*a*) Law, including commands and prohibitions; (*b*) Expediency, including permissions and counsels; (*c*) Example, embodying the Christian ideal in concrete form. Commands and prohibitions are included in what is called law, and they are treated as the primary and immediate basis of Moral Theology Proper; but the fundamental principles of love and expediency have also to be reckoned with, and the example of Christ throws needed light upon many problems of duty.

Law signifies that which is fixed or set, but has many forms and applications outside the moral sphere. In Moral Theology it means formal requirement or authoritative definition of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. All law is ultimately grounded in the eternal law of Divine Nature.[1] The various branches of law by which this eternal law gains expression and fulfilment are exhibited in the following table:

[1] Rich. Hooker, *op. cit.*, I, xvi, 8; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 120, "Law is but another name for the divine will recognized as the standard for human conduct." *Ibid.*, p. 141, "The moral law of the New Testament is the purest and most perfect expression of the divine will." Its superiority to the moral law of the Old Testament appears from its character as: (*a*) a new law; (*b*) a law of the spirit; (*c*) a law of grace and liberty; (*d*) a law of love.

- Eternal Law of the divine nature, governing all
  - Of Divine Operations
    - Internal and Essential
      - Of Divine Processions, Relations, and Character.
    - External and Voluntary
      - Of Causation—natural law.
      - Of Progress—supernatural.
  - Of Human Actions
    - Innate—of Reason.
    - Superimposed
      - Revealed—Will of Signs, etc.
      - Human Dispensations
        - Ecclesiastical.
        - Civil.
        - Conventional.[1]

Moral Theology Proper treats of the laws of human actions. These laws may be either (*a*) universal and

[1] Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 156, "Human law is in every respect subordinate to the natural and to positive divine law, and its precepts have binding force only if they agree with both. . . . Christ expressly bestowed legislative power upon His Church (St. Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 17; St. Luke x. 16), and furthermore Himself acknowledged the laws of the State and exhorted His disciples to obey them (St. Luke xx. 25; Acts xv. 28; xx. 28). St. Paul says that all power is from God and that the ordinances of legitimate authority bind in conscience (Rom. xiii. 1 ff.; cf. St. John xix. 11)." Human law is an interpretation and application of the general principles of the natural and revealed divine law. *Ibid.*, p. 157, "Every human law is mediately and by derivation a divine law." J. Skinner, *op. cit.*, p. 7, gives the heads of law: *in genere*, (*a*) Cause; (*b*) Object; (*c*) Subject; (*d*) Promulgation; (*e*) Acceptation; (*f*) Obligation; (*g*) Interpretation; (*h*) Dispensation; (*i*) Cessation; *in specie*, (*a*) Natural and divine; (*b*) Positive and divine; (*c*) Ecclesiastical; (*d*) Civil; (*e*) Penal; (*f*) Ineffective; (*g*) Custom; (*h*) Privilege.

naturally revealed;[1] (*b*) covenantal and positive, made necessary by the fall, and for the attainment of man's supernatural end. Covenantal law may be either immutable or mutable, this distinction being ordinarily indicated by the terms *moral* and *ceremonial*. The ceremonial law is also subject to many exceptions, according to necessity and enlightened discretion.[2] Even moral law has exceptions, although they are rare and of a nature to prove the rule; for it is impossible to define moral obligations in human terms that will accurately describe duty under all possible circumstances.

§ 3. We shall treat of our subject in the following order: (*a*) innate moral obligations, or the law of reason; (*b*) superimposed law,[3] this being subdivided under the heads of the Decalogue, interpreted in the light of our Lord's summary of love, and so treated as to include ecclesiastical, civil and conventional requirements; (*c*) virtues and vices. It will be necessary to supplement these comprehensive divisions by special treatment of (*d*) social and individual aspects of duty, (*e*) economic obligations,

[1] Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 122, "By the moral law of nature is understood the sum-total of those ethical precepts which God has implanted in the rational nature of man." It is fundamental, and no other law can abrogate it.

[2] Cf. St. Matt. xii. 1–8; St. Mark ii. 27.

[3] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 83, "Divine law is either *natural* or *positive*. The natural law is promulgated in the rational nature of man, and is a participation in human reason of the eternal law of God, which bids us observe right order, and forbids its disturbance. Positive divine law is made known by revelation."

(*f*) voluntarily incurred obligations, (*g*) expediency, (*h*) example.

II. *The Law of Reason*

§ 4. The law of natural reason teaches certain obligations which are capable of being ascertained and recognized by all who seek to do right, whether they are Christians or not. They may be divided into individual and social obligations.

Of individual obligations the general law is that we should live according to nature as it comes from the hand of God. To do this means to maintain a perfect activity of our faculties and to preserve them in the fulness of their capacity. The aim of all education, properly conducted, is to lead out, *educere*, all our faculties in just proportion and relation, in order that we may be emancipated from every unnecessary hindrance to do and be what we ought to do and be. (*a*) It is a natural duty to obtain good and nourishing food, and to partake of it in the quantity and manner which available knowledge shows to be conducive to the preservation and development of physical, mental, and moral capacity. (*b*) Sufficient sleep should be taken at regular times and without excessive indulgence, the amount being controlled by the laws of health and efficiency. (*c*) Habitual work is essential to good morals, but also needs to be regulated. We ought to exercise our powers as fully as possible, but without overstraining any of them. This requires

that labor should be systematic, and that hurry as well as worry should be banished as much as possible. Work of high quality is more valuable, morally as well as otherwise, than a large quantity of work poorly done. (*d*) Recreation is a closely related obligation, the form and quantity of which ought to be determined by its value in improving the efficiency of our work, and in facilitating our personal development. The word "recreation" itself signifies the true end of all righteous forms of pleasure—to re-create our faculties. This does not mean that we should take our pleasures solemnly, for that would be to defeat their moral function. The point is that we should determine the manner and duration of play with reference to the general purpose of increasing the value of our lives and characters. (*e*) All other rules of health, such as outdoor exercise, fresh air, reasonable cleanliness, etc., pertain to natural moral obligations.

§ 5. Man is by nature a social animal, and it is part of natural law that he should adjust himself to his social environment. The law of natural evolution teaches that utility depends upon adjustment, and that natural selection works against those who disregard this requirement. This adjustment may be described in moral terms as the duty of recognizing and protecting the rights of others: (*a*) The right to enjoy life and happiness, which includes opportunity to earn one's living, under suitable conditions, and with proportionate results; (*b*) The rights of kinship as between parents and children, brothers

and sisters, husband and wife, and others. Nature teaches that the obligations between husband and wife normally include propagation of the species; (*c*) The rights of strangers, including those whom we meet in public, and especially those who are compelled to depend upon our hospitality; (*d*) The rights of enemies to be treated as human beings; (*e*) The general duty of advancing the greatest good of the greatest number. The fallacy of utilitarian ethics is that it makes this the sum and substance of morality, and in effect repudiates the probationary relation of this life to eternal life. All natural obligations can be reduced to the heads of prudence or wisdom, temperance, fortitude and justice, the so-called cardinal virtues.[1]

III. *Superimposed Moral Law*

§ 6. The revealed law of God is described in Deuteronomy as consisting of statutes and judgments. Statutes define forms of conduct, which are either commanded or forbidden; and judgments determine particular cases and constitute authoritative precedents. In Christian application many of these precedents cease to be valid because of the new dispensation and the change of conditions.[2] Divine statutes

[1] Cf. ch. iii, § 11, above.

[2] R. L. Ottley, *Aspects of the Old Testament*, p. 171, "It would be misleading to speak of Mosaism as if it embraced a formal system of ethics. It did, however, prepare the way for a system by a gradual, but in the long run effectual, elucidation of two great ideas which a

contain two elements: (*a*) moral and permanent; (*b*) ceremonial, pertaining only to the dispensation in connection with which they are given. Some statutes are exclusively moral and some are exclusively ceremonial, but others, such as the fourth commandment of the Decalogue, contain both elements and have to be interpreted accordingly.[1] The ceremonial element may cease to apply either because of counteracting necessity or by reason of a new divine dispensation. But some ceremonial laws, in particular that of tithing, reveal degrees of moral responsibility of abiding validity; and these retain a certain moral value even when the law as law has ceased to bind.

The revealed moral law is found primarily in two documents, the Old Testament Decalogue and our Lord's twofold summary in the Gospels. The former consists of specific rules, the latter defines the determinative principle of righteousness which should control their interpretation and the practical application of all rules of conduct. The law of the Old Testament was binding in its letter only upon the Chosen People; whereas the Christian summary, given by Christ, is for all men, and is permanently binding upon all who have learned of it.[2] The older must be Christianized by the newer. The provisions

religious system of morals seems to presuppose: first, the idea of holiness; secondly, the idea of the worth and dignity of personality."

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 215, The Decalogue "defines in broad outlines the conditions of a right relation to God and to all that He has made." Cf. St. Iren., *adv. Haer.*, IV, 15, i; IV, 16, iii; St. Thos. *op. cit.*, I, II, c. 3.

[2] St. Matt. xxii. 36–40; xxviii. 19–20.

of the older are rightly criticized as largely negative and external, regulating outward conduct; but Christianized they stand for positive principles regulating thought as well as word and act.[1] The Decalogue is not exhaustive, although it gives leading and representative examples of how we ought to conform to the divine will. Its requirements presuppose the binding force of the laws of human dispensations, whether ecclesiastical, civil or conventional, and afford guidance in their fulfilment. They will here be treated in this light and as including (*a*) ecclesiastical application (growing out of the sacraments, canon law and ecclesiastical precepts); (*b*) civil law; (*c*) social customs and institutions.

The several commandments constitute so many methods by which the principle of love ought to be applied Godward and manward. This is also true of all special statutes and judgments of God.[2] The Decalogue is divided into two tables, concerned respectively with duties to God and duties to man. The division between these is usually drawn between the first four and the last six; but it is more scientific to include the fifth in the first table, because it has to do with obedience to authority, and every legiti-

[1] Chas. Gore, *Christian Moral Prin's*, Serm. ii–iii, and pp. 110 ff.

[2] On the Commandments in general, see W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. v; R. L. Ottley, *The Rule of Life and Love;* T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 207–473; Hastings, *Dic. of Bib., s.v.* "Decalogue"; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 257–472. Gury says, "Sicut Symbolum epitome est credendorum, sic decalogus agendorum."

mate authority represents, in ultimate analysis, the authority of God.[1]

§ 7. The general principle embodied in *the First Commandment* is that of entire and exclusive *allegiance* to the one and only true God.[2] In practice this allegiance ought to be shown in four directions: (*a*) The profession of a true faith, not only in God Himself, but in all that He has revealed concerning our relations to Him, His purpose for us, and what He has done and is doing in and for us. The truths which we ought to believe consist of those which are known to have been revealed, and we may not make exceptions because some of the truths do not appear to us to be vitally important. Our allegiance to God is violated by rejecting even the slightest authentic revelation from Him. Moreover, the acceptance

[1] In Roman use, the first two are counted together as the first; and the tenth is broken into two, the ninth being, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife."

[2] The first commandment may be summed up as defining the duty of worship and prayer, faith being presupposed. The opposed vices are: (*a*) superstition, magic and divination; (the last including telling of fortunes by palmistry, cards, etc., reliance upon dreams, the use of the Ouija board, consulting of mediums). These need not be thought of as sins when the motive is light, but become such when they are taken seriously; (*b*) Irreligion; (*c*) Tempting God by our failure to use ordinary means to secure an end, as neglect of remedies in sickness (Christian Science); seeking a miracle for the support of one's faith; the ordeals of the Middle Ages, which the Church condemned as superstitious; (*d*) Sacrilege, the irreverent treatment of sacred persons, places, and things dedicated to the service of God. Under this head is included receiving or administering sacraments in a state of mortal sin. A more common offence is that of joking or light speaking in religion.

of revelation carries with it the duty of professing our faith, so far as our circumstances afford suitable occasions for such profession, and whenever the Church of God requires.

(*b*) The practice of religion is necessary to this allegiance, for in its practical aspects religion is all one with a conformity of our lives to the relations in which we stand to God. The duty of taking part in public, especially Eucharistic, worship rests upon the individual as a member of the group from which corporate worship is due. The form which this worship takes is determined by the authority of the Church; and public or common prayer may be conducted only according to the forms provided by ecclesiastical authority, whether by canon law or by bishops in the exercise of such *jus liturgicum* as is consistent therewith. Private prayer and the other "notable duties" of religion are considered below.[1]

(*c*) This allegiance also involves the fulfilment of all the conditions of the covenant which God has given us. The duties involved may be summed up by saying that we ought to be faithful members of the Church and obedient to all ecclesiastical precepts.[2]

(*d*) Observance of the covenant carries with it certain specific obligations pertaining to the sacraments.[3]

§ 8. *The Second Commandment* has reference to worship in the sense of *latreia*, and requires that it should

[1] In ch. vi, §§ 1–3.
[2] Treated of in § 11, below.
[3] Treated of in ch. v, below.

be paid exclusively to God and in the manner appointed by Him. The use of images, as external aids, must be determined and controlled not by our device but by divine revelation. And this last principle applies not only to sensible images but to mental ones. Two leading classes of sin are, therefore, forbidden, external idolatry and false doctrine, so far as embodied in worship. Incidentally all superstitious observances, such as we have already referred to under the first commandment, are forbidden here also, as is participation in schismatic worship. The latter is forbidden because it violates Christian unity and substitutes for divinely appointed worship a modified and human substitute. The divinely appointed worship is the Holy Eucharist, and around this should be gathered and subordinated all our approaches to God. The lawfulness of any form of worship, therefore, can be tested by its agreement with, and capacity of ministering to, the Holy Eucharist. Material art may be used to make worship more effectual, but not in such wise as to alter its object or divinely appointed method. This commandment also implies and regulates the duty of prayer in all its branches. Fasting and almsgiving are usually grouped with prayer, because these three constitute what are called the "notable duties" of religion. These will be considered below.[1]

§ 9. *The Third Commandment* inculcates *reverential piety*, or that loving loyalty to God which moves one

[1] In ch. vi, §§ 1–3.

to avoid treating anything divine or sacred in a thoughtless or careless manner. Among the obvious branches of its violation are: (*a*) irreverent use of the divine Name as an expletive, oath, or common exclamation, and of sacred things; (*b*) Tempting God by challenging His particular providence; (*c*) Sacrilege, or the handling of sacred things for secular purposes; (*d*) Blasphemy, or the use of God's name for purposes of sin. (*e*) Simony, or buying spiritual advantages;[1] (*f*) The facetious use of Holy Scripture and other sacred language; (*g*) Trifling in sacred places; (*h*) Careless ceremony in participating in religious services.

One of the problems which arise under this commandment is, what constitutes a lawful oath or vow?[2]

[1] Acts. viii. 18.

[2] On oaths and vows, see W. W. Webb, pp. 131–137; J. J. Elmendorf, pp. 343–353. An oath is "the calling on God to witness to the truth of what we say," T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 240. It may be either solemn, when attended by the ceremonies prescribed by law, as holding up the right hand, kissing the Bible, or simple, when these ceremonies are omitted. Such oaths are not only permissible, but are public professions of our belief in God, His omniscience, truth, etc. They are not forbidden by St. Matt. v. 34; cf. Jerem. iv. 2. A promissory oath is not binding when a change of circumstances makes it unlawful, useless, or an obstacle to a greater obligation. The obligation to fulfilment may be annulled, dispensed, commuted or relaxed, in the same way as a vow; but private judgment alone is not competent except in obvious necessity.

A vow "is a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one's self of a new obligation which binds the conscience," T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 246. It differs from a mere promise of amendment. To constitute a vow there must be full knowledge, complete use of reason, freedom from force, and physical and moral possibility of fulfilment. It may be either absolute or conditional.

The answer in brief is, that we ought to have a sufficiently grave reason, and should have in view the interests of truth and righteousness. A reverent manner and careful fulfilment are also necessary. The legal name for false oaths is perjury; and this is a double sin because including both the sinful use of God's name and lying. A vow which cannot be fulfilled without sin is sinful and does not bind. In every Christian vow there is a qualifying assumption that competent authority may, for sufficient and lawful reasons, either dispense from vows or overrule them.

The spirit of this commandment cannot be fulfilled except by those who cultivate the moral and spiritual tone which lies behind reverence for holy things. High tone is of Christian obligation, and flippant vulgarity is a hindrance to the fulfilment of this commandment.

§ 10. *The Fourth Commandment* requires the consecration or appointing of regularly recurring times, sanctioned by religious authority, for the public worship of God and for the fulfilment of other religious responsibilities.[1] In form it is ceremonial, because the selection of the seventh day and abstaining from all labour do not constitute morally necessary and permanent conditions of the fulfilment of its spirit. The Lord's day has displaced the Sabbath,

[1] See Vernon Staley, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. xi; F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems*, ch. vi; J. A. Hessey, *Sunday* (Bamp. Lec.); H. R. Gamble, *Sunday and the Sabbath;* W. B. Trevelyan, *Sunday.*

Christian festivals have displaced the Jewish Calendar, and the question of labour on Sunday is not determined by definite divine precept.

Various problems arise under this commandment. They are determined by a very simple principle, that Sunday has its own proper business to be fulfilled. If under normal conditions that business is adequately and sincerely attended to, freedom remains as to what else is done or is indulged in, similar to that which we enjoy on other days of the week. In application, however, questions of expediency arise, as distinguished from law; and it is our duty to show reasonable regard for other people's consciences and for our own moral and spiritual reputation. Public association of ideas causes a natural sense of incongruity between the appointed Sunday business and certain forms of self-indulgence. This limitation, however, is wholly extrinsic; and we may not raise to the level of legal requirement matters which pertain to variable expediency.[1]

The business of Sunday, or its positive obligations, include: (*a*) public worship, especially the Holy Eucharist; (*b*) the practice of religion in any and all of those elements for which other days of the week do not afford sufficient opportunity, reading of the Bible, spiritual books, etc.,—in short, making religion the day's specialty; (*c*) works of mercy, both corporal and spiritual; (*d*) the religious instruction of the young. The sum of the matter is that to observe

[1] See H. R. Gamble, *Sunday and the Sabbath*, passim.

Sunday is to fulfil its positive business, in so far as it pertains to each individual; and in other respects to control Sunday occupations in such wise as not to reduce either the external fulfilment or the spiritual value of what pertains to Sunday duties, regard being had also to the effect of our example upon others.

As we have said, questions of expediency come sharply to the front. We have, therefore, to consider in this connection what is permitted, on the one hand, and what is to be advised, on the other. Taking permissions first, it is intrinsically lawful to do and to enjoy any and everything that it is lawful to do and to enjoy on other days of the week, provided nothing is done that interferes with a reasonably adequate and habitual fulfilment of Sunday's proper business. On the other hand, from the point of view of counsel, it is often inexpedient and may, in effect, become sinful under some conditions to take part in: (*a*) boisterous and strenuous occupations of secular nature; (*b*) occupations which our neighbours consider sinful on that day; (*c*) amusements that offend weak consciences at all times. Like all positive precepts, this commandment may cease for the moment to bind when real necessity interferes with its fulfilment, *e.g.*, (*a*) in sickness; (*b*) when one's subsistence depends upon continuing work on Sunday; (*c*) when a Sunday's outing is the only possible way of obtaining sufficient recreation. It is to be observed, however, that we are responsible for planning our life

work, as far as possible, in ways that permit an adequate discharge of religious obligations.

As regards absorbing occupation, ordinary servile work is forbidden except under unusual circumstances; but agricultural labor is allowable under necessity, as in harvest time, when grave loss might be occasioned if it were neglected; and the same liberty applies to foundry labour customarily, to transportation of all sorts, especially at sea, to preparing food and, in general, to any form of occupation which could not be interrupted for a day without grave loss or inconvenience. Admitting this liberty, there is in various directions much room for doubt as to whether what is customarily termed necessary is really so. It is plainly sinful for employers to require labour on Sunday without real necessity.[1] The broad principle is involved that every duty should have provided its appropriate time for attention, and that a life which is without plan or system is one that makes many sins inevitable.

§ 11. *The Fifth Commandment* requires obedience

[1] This applies to such unnecessary recreations as involve the labour of others. Encyclical Letter of the Lambeth Conference, 1888, "The due observance of Sunday as a day of rest, of worship, and of religious teaching, has a direct bearing on the moral well-being of the Christian community. We have observed of late a growing laxity which threatens to impair its sacred character. We strongly deprecate this tendency. We call upon the leisurely classes not selfishly to withdraw from others the opportunities of rest and of religion. We call upon master and employer jealously to guard the privileges of the servant and the workman. In 'The Lord's Day' we have a priceless heritage. Whoever misuses it incurs a terrible responsibility."

to all divinely sanctioned authority, whether involved in providential circumstances at large or based upon specific divine appointments. Speaking broadly, its sphere is threefold: the family, the Church and the State. In each sphere the duties are twofold: of inferiors to superiors, and of superiors to inferiors. To-day the second class of duties is apt to receive a false emphasis because of reaction, inasmuch as the rights of inferiors were formerly insufficiently acknowledged. But emphasis upon rights gradually becomes forgetfulness of duties; and a crying need is a general revival of unselfish emphasis upon duties to others.

(*a*) In *the family* [1] children owe obedience, love, and reverence to parents in all things lawful;[2] and the younger owe deference to their elders. On the other hand, parents and elders owe to the young teaching, both secular and religious, example, guidance, and discipline, along with physical support. The fulfilment of these obligations ought to be governed

[1] A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–229; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. ii; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, ch. xxvi; F. G. Peabody, *The Christian Life in the Modern World*, ch. ii; W. F. Lofthouse, *Ethics and the Family;* Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig., s.v.* "Family (Biblical and Christian)."

[2] St. Bernard, *Ep.* cxi, "There is only one circumstance in which it would be wrong to obey parents, and that is when God forbids it." Cf. St. Matt. x. 37. Obedience only ceases to be obligatory when children attain their majority; and then arises the duty of supporting parents if needful. Parental authority during minority is supreme if rightly exercised. When abused the State may interfere; but the Church may not do so, e.g., if parents refuse to permit their children to receive one of the sacraments. Parental responsibilities towards illegitimate children are the same as towards legitimate offspring.

by a love which is neither backboneless amiability nor careless disregard of the rights of the young. Related to family obligations are those between teacher and pupil at school, and these relations are determined by parental consent and by the necessities of real education. Within their recognized limits they involve parallel duties of authority and of obedience.

(*b*) In *the Church*[1] the relationship which determines duty is that between mother and mistress of souls and individual children of God. It is a relation, however, which is limited, on the one hand, by the authority of parents over minors, and on the other hand, by the authority of the State over temporals. In brief, it is a spiritual relation based upon the persuasion of free agents and to be enforced only by spiritual penalties. Its branches are usually formulated in what are called the precepts of the Church. These precepts are either ecumenical or provincial. The word "precept" is here applied to every form of obligation known to be imposed by the Church, whether by canon, by liturgical, rubrical, or sacramental prescription, or by recognized custom. These precepts may not be dispensed by mere private caprice, and judicial decisions and decrees have authority in their interpretation. An individual Christian is bound both by ecumenical precepts and by those of his own portion of the Church.

[1] T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, Lec. viii; V. Staley, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, chh. x–xi; A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 236–244; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. v.

The ecumenical precepts are reduced by moral writers to five or six heads, of which the following is a general summary:[1] (1) To observe the canon law and ecclesiastical judgments wherever applicable; (2) To take habitual part in the public services of the Church in the manner ecclesiastically and provincially prescribed, and to avoid schismatical worship; (3) To observe the holy days appointed, whether festivals or fasts, in the manner directed;[2] (4) To give habitually and in proportion to our means for the support of the Church and her interests, whether parochial, diocesan, institutional, or missionary.[3] (5) To receive the sacraments in their appointed order and manner, and to promote their reception by others.[4] (6) To repent habitually of sin, using the sacrament of Penance when ecclesiastical rules require, and at least as often as needed for rightly quieting the conscience. Underlying all these is the obligation of faith, of belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and in all the other chief articles of the Christian Faith as set forth by the Church.

[1] Bp. Cosin, *Works*, vol. II, p. 121; vol. V, p. 523; Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–202; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 473–516; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 564–581.

[2] Fasting, we may note, has the psychological value of aiding discipline, keeping under the body and bringing it into subjection, and the moral value of aiding penitence.

[3] 1 Cor. ix. 13–14.

[4] St. John vi. 53–58 establishes the general obligation of communion, the details of its application being left to the regulation of the Church.

(*c*) The authority of *the State*[1] pertains to the regulation of those temporal concerns which require public control. Within that sphere and under the limitations of human constitution and law, the officers of the state are entitled to obedience; being themselves under obligation to avoid either tyranny, laxity or partiality. Men also owe loyalty to the State as an institution, and the virtue of patriotism is a Christian virtue.[2]

Somewhat related to this sphere of authority is that of employer or master, over employee and servant.[3] Like civil constitutions, these relations are subject to alteration and reformation; but existing laws and customs determine for the time being the

[1] A. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–236; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. iii–iv; Wm. McDougall, *An Introd. to Social Psychology, passim.*

[2] Rom. xiii. 1–7. We treat of civil obligations in ch. vi, §§ 4–5, below. *Encyc. Letter* of Pope Leo XIII, Jan. 10, 1890, "Law is of its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a properly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceeds from God, the supreme Ruler and Lord of all." Some recent writers, *e.g.*, Durkheim, Royce and Ames, have found the basis of all religion in social obligation.

[3] Of employees is required a faithful discharge of their appointed duties and a proper care for the interests of their employers. Morally they are bound to make restitution if they waste time or cause damage by their neglect. Of employers a fair wage, considerate treatment and good working conditions are required. Obviously the moral standard is higher than the legal. In the present confusion of social conditions Moral Theology must deal with broad and unquestionable principles, rather than enter into details concerning which practical sociology is still uncertain or perplexed. Reason is to be used and an undue intrusion of partisan emotion is to be guarded against.

nature of the obligations involved. The reason is, that to disregard existing institutions which have the sanction, whether formal or informal, of the community, is to introduce disorder and to cause greater wrongs than the particular disobedient course can remedy. The right of revolution lies, not with private individuals, but with society as a whole.

§ 12. *The second table* has reference to the manner in which love should control conduct towards our neighbours. Interpreted from the Christian standpoint, the love with which this table is concerned is determined primarily in form and reference by the prospective congenialities of a heavenly communion of saints, these congenialities being perceived to be already potential in our neighbours because of redemption and grace. The fruition of love requires personal friendship and contact, but to snatch at this, here and now, is often to violate love and to sin most grievously. The sum of the matter is that the second table requires such lines of conduct as will promote and ultimately secure the future fellowship which constitutes the joy of eternal life. Therefore no works of charity are really Christian unless they are religious in standpoint and quality; for although Christian love presupposes and exercises natural affection, the standpoint or aim is supernatural, and is determined in its reference and intended effect by consciousness of a supernatural destiny—one in which the highest welfare of all men alike is involved.

The Sixth Commandment requires display of love

with reference to our neighbour's person, in the popular and physical sense of that term. Murder is the most conspicuous form of its violation, and murder is to be defined as malicous or unlawful killing. But the principle involved obviously applies to all forms of physical injury, and to the malice which affords motives for such conduct. Suicide is self-murder.[1] Among the special forms of sin which come under this commandment are duelling,[2] unlawful warfare, abortion,[3] bullying, hazing and every form of inhumanity, as well as anything which causes danger to the persons of others, *e.g.*, reckless automobile driving, which the English law treats as manslaughter.

Capital punishment is not forbidden by this com-

[1] See E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, ch. xxxv. For pagan views, W. E. H. Lecky, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 212–222; Virgil, *Aeneid*, vi, 434, mildly censures suicide. For the related modern problem of Euthanasia, see F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems*, ch. xi. An interesting problem in casuistry is afforded in W. R. Thayer's *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 393. In the Brazilian forest Mr. Roosevelt, sick and injured so that his condition retards the progress of the rest of the party towards safety, determines to shoot himself if his condition does not speedily improve. Sir Thomas Browne in his *Religio Medici* has an expression worth noting. "When life is more terrible than death it is the truer courage to dare to live." One is not, however, bound to use extreme and difficult measures for the preservation of one's life, as resort to a surgical operation when the outcome is uncertain, or to remove to a distant climate; but he is bound to use available and ordinary precautions for the preservation of life and health. A physician, or any one in care of the sick, may not omit anything that would prolong life, in order that the period of suffering may be shortened.

[2] See E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, ch. xxi; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Duel."

[3] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 312–315; *Cath. Encyc.*, *q.v.*; C. Coppens, *Moral Principles and Medical Practice.*

mandment; Holy Scripture allows it,[1] and the Church has never legislated against it. It belongs to the State by natural reason, for the State must have liberty to act so as to secure and preserve its well-being and safety.[2] The right of inflicting such punishment belongs to the properly constituted authority and cannot be exercised by any private individual or unofficial group of individuals. Therefore lynching is a violation of this commandment. "Justifiable" homicide, likewise, is not forbidden. It may be defined as the killing of an assailant in order to protect one's own life, limb, chastity, or property, including that of another; but it is not justifiable when less extreme measures will secure the end, nor is it warranted for insult or contumely. Lawful warfare is not forbidden, the legality of any particular war being dependent upon its being undertaken by the state to which obedience is due.[3]

§ 13. *The Seventh Commandment* requires us to have regard for the holiness of our neighbour's body, in

[1] Rom. xiii. 4.

[2] E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 490–496.

[3] G. L. Richardson, *Conscience, Its Origin and Authority*, ch. xix; and the various works on the Thirty-nine Articles under Art. xxxvi. *E.g.*, E. J. Bicknell, *Theol. Introd. to the Thirty-nine Articles*, pp. 548–549, "As civilization advances the use of force is abated. Conduct becomes moralized. Higher motives for obedience tend to supplant the lower. But at the bottom there must always be the appeal to force to put down disorder. . . . War is simply the result of human sin and self-seeking. It is a symptom of the depravity of the human heart. Christianity sets itself not to abolish the symptom only but to root out the cause of the evil."

the older sense of its consecration to God. It implies the obligation of preserving the same holiness of our own bodies.[1]

The text of the commandment names a most obvious external violation of its principle, but there are at least five principal lines of external sin involved: (*a*) with the married, adultery; (*b*) with the unmarried, fornication;[2] of these two the most aggravated form being incest,[3] in which relationship either of blood or of marriage is involved; (*c*) Intemperate and unnatural use of marital privileges; (*d*) Unnatural sexual actions between members of the same sex,[4] or between human beings and the lower animals; (*e*) Sins against one's own body.[5]

The principle of the commandment covers purity of thought and speech, as well as of physical action, and every sphere of conduct which is connected with the preservation of purity. The following lines of conduct are therefore sinful, although in varying degrees: (*a*) immodest dress, including any form of dress which because of its violation of convention obtrudes immoral suggestion; (*b*) any departure in

[1] W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 169–176. A full treatment of the whole subject will be found in St. Thomas, II, II, cliii ff.; A. Vermeersch, *De Castitate.* See also Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 73–77; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 324–339.

[2] Ephes. v. 5.

[3] St. Aug., *de Bono Matr.* 8, expresses in strongest terms the evil of incest, "Adultery will be good because incest is worse."

[4] See Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 88; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, ch. xliii.

[5] 1 Cor. vi. 9–10, 15–20; cf. Gal. v. 19.

conduct from social conventions that involves such suggestion; (*c*) undue intimacies, whether between the sexes or between those of the same sex; (*d*) loose conversation, especially scandalous gossip, suggestive witticisms and dubious stories; (*e*) giving rein to the imagination in relation to sexual indulgence;[1] listening to foul conversation and looking at pictures which are either obscene or suggestive; (*g*) reading trashy stories, or attending plays which exploit sexual problems and affect realism in the alleged interest of more perfect information concerning human life; (*h*) high living, that is, a life of habitual self-indulgence in the comforts and luxuries which wealth and modern invention place at our disposal; (*i*) taking part in, or sanctioning in any way, dances which are suggestive or tend to give rise to impure thoughts and desires; (*j*) slothful physical habits; (*k*) unnecessary meddling with one's own body; (*l*) marriage contrary to the law of God.[2]

There are four lines, among others, along which antecedent protection against the sins of which we have spoken is to be sought: (*a*) preoccupation, both of body and of mind; (*b*) cultivation of a wholesome atmosphere, both in relation to companionship and to reading and thought;[3] (*c*) the main-

[1] This includes the custody of the eyes; St. Matt. v. 28. "For it is all one with what part of the body we commit adultery, and if a man lets his eye loose and enjoys the lust of that, he is an adulterer;" Jeremy Taylor, *Holy Living*.

[2] Cf. ch. v. § 7, below.

[3] Philip. iv. 8.

tenance of good health and the avoidance of nervous exhaustion; (*d*) in some instances marriage.[1] The one immediate way of resisting temptation when it comes is flight.[2] This may be either interior, by change of attention, or exterior, by physical removal. The effectiveness of this flight will depend upon immediate resort to prayer. If one undertakes to reason with this kind of temptation he is almost certain to yield to it, because the temptation does not pertain to reason but appeals to the imagination, and to argue is to keep the imagination fixed upon the subject. Diversion of mind is what is needed.

§ 14. *The Eighth Commandment* inculcates love in reference to care of our neighbour's possessions.[3] It forbids three principal things: (*a*) unjust appropriation of another's goods, *e.g.*, by secret theft, open robbery, fraud, or embezzling;[4] (*b*) failure to give to each his dues, *e.g.*, defaulting in matters of debt, legal injustice, personal extravagance to the injury of dependents and the poor, delaying the payment of debts, mutual injustice between capital and labour,

[1] As indicated by St. Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 9.

[2] St. Aug. *Serm.* 350, "If you want to win a victory against the temptation of lust, flee."

[3] W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–187; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, § 436, "prohibet omnem injustitiam *externam* in bonis fortuna proximi. . . . Decimum vero peccata etiam *interna* seu concupiscentiae, i.e., desiderii bonorum proximi et actiones injustæ vetat."

[4] J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 605–625, treats of the species of theft: (*a*) furtum; (*b*) rapina (with violence); (*c*) fraus et dolus; (*d*) sacrilegium; (*e*) peculatus. For the causes excusing from theft, see §§ 615–625; and on restitution, §§ 626 ff.

and violation of contracts; (*c*) all private practices and habits which create a personal disposition unfavourable to keeping this commandment.[1] This last-mentioned head includes: (*a*) undue wealth, which stimulates avarice and disregards the interests of employees and smaller capitalists; (*b*) substitution of the maintenance of rights for the Christian ideal of doing justice to others; (*c*) extravagant habits, which preclude just administration of wealth, whether this wealth is one's own or is administered in behalf of another; (*d*) living beyond one's means, which induces temptation to secure greater means by illegitimate methods; (*e*) waste and needless destruction of what might be useful to others; (*f*) overcharging for services, commodities, etc., that is, profiteering; (*g*) all forms of failure of employees adequately to render the services for which they are paid.

In offences of this sort the mark of genuine repentance is effort, whenever possible, to make sufficient reparation. So far as is possible restitution must be made for whatever damage has been caused.[2] The same applies to one who either assists in or sinfully

[1] T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 339, "Directly and explicitly it forbids theft, but implicitly it commands us to observe justice in our dealings with others;" *i.e.*, to give to every one his due or right. Moral theologians in speaking of one's right to do as he will with his own, *e.g.*, to throw away his money, disregard the important principle of stewardship, which is a corrective of the plea, "Shall I not do what I will with mine own?"

[2] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 398–453, gives a fuller treatment. See St. Thomas, II, II, lxii.

benefits by an act of injustice. The offender is released either if the offended does not wish restitution, or if there is either physical or other legitimate incapacity to make it; but this release ceases when the incapacity ceases, even though there be no legal obligation, as, *e.g.*, in bankruptcy cases.[1]

Questions of title to property, etc., are legal rather than moral. Presumably the pertinent civil laws are in harmony with sound morality; and, inasmuch as these laws are complex and differ in various states, it is not to be supposed that any one except a legal specialist can make expert determinations concerning them.

§ 15. *The Ninth Commandment* requires love in relation to our neighbour's name and mind. The common forms of its violation are evil speaking, lying, and slandering. In the sphere of thought we may include rash judgments, which arise from malice and violate Christian charity.[2] Reporting evil of another, except when required by duty, is always sinful. Its most frequent form is ill-natured gossip. A lie[3]

[1] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 438–451, gives authorities *pro* and *con* and concludes to the contrary.

[2] St. Matt. vii. 1–3; Rom. ii. 1. On this commandment, see W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–192; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 456–473.

[3] Col. iii. 9; Eph. iv. 25. Durant Drake, *Problems of Conduct*, ch. xix, Truthfulness and its Problems. St. Augustine says it is never under any circumstances permitted to falsify. This is not universally accepted; but Roman casuists and Jeremy Taylor allow too many exceptions to the general principle, *e.g.*, in the form of mental reservations. A lie may be told by either gestures, other signs, tone of voice, or silence, as well as by word of mouth. St. Augustine,

means an unjust falsehood, but falsehood is so rarely just that in normal practice the qualification should be left out. Yet there are cases in which duty requires falsehood, *e.g.*, to the insane in dangerous emergencies.[1] The burden of proof always lies on him who would falsify, and it is almost always the case that the element of doubt is practically absent. The reason why truth-telling must be observed, even when its necessity is not apparent, is that the general welfare of mankind, as well as the virtue of the individual speakers, depends upon the ability of one man to trust another. A justifiable falsehood will not occur often in any normal lifetime, and in many cases never.[2]

de Mendac. 3, "He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says something else by word or by any sign whatever."

[1] W. Hermann, *op. cit.*, p. 128, "We must not conceal from ourselves that under certain definite circumstances the use of untrue speech is not only permitted but may be our duty." He instances an actor in case of a fire in a theatre telling an untruth to prevent mad flight from the building, and a man meeting a criminal on his way to commit a crime; St. Augustine used the last illustration and drew the opposite conclusion. The Jesuit Cathrein charged the German philosophers, Paulsen, Wundt, and Ziegler, and the theologians Martensen and Harless, with making lies permissible (which Hermann concedes), and rejected the permission *in toto*—a curious reversal of tradition. Kant, in his *Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen*, strongly opposed all justification of falsehood.

[2] Expressions are often used which have two senses, true in one, untrue in the others; *e.g.*, a servant may reply that her mistress is not at home, meaning not that she is away from home, but that she does not wish to see callers—a conventionl usage. A physician, lawyer or priest, questioned about professional secrets, may reply that he does not know, meaning that he has no knowledge which he may either communicate or betray his possession of. These instances

Slander consists in evil-speaking falsely. It has double guilt, and is the worst form of sin under this commandment.

We should include under the above heads all forms of action or inaction by which we knowingly convey a false impression. And, apart from the leading forms of sin against this commandment, certain incidental and connected kinds of wrong-doing are involved: (*a*) unnecessary judging, because predisposing to evil speaking; (*b*) suspicion, when based upon lack of charity, or nourished in violation of it; (*c*) violation of secrets, which puts the party concerned in the wrong light; because we cannot hope to reproduce first-hand information in a form that will produce a correct impression. In any case the secret is our neighbour's, and we have no right to betray it; (*d*) flattery, as involving deceit and fostering conceit; (*e*) perjury, or false oaths; (*f*) self-deceit, as depriving one's self of the knowledge of himself which he ought to acquire; (*g*) false representation of one's self, which is either hypocritical or the cause of self-deceit and pride; (*h*) exaggeration; (*i*) rash and unconsidered assertions.

§ 16. *The Tenth Commandment* requires love in relation to our neighbour's estate, especially as com-

hardly fall in the class of "mental reservations." Clerical vows cannot be reduced in effect by such reservations, for these vows register obligations which in any case are binding on those ordained, and are also violations of veracity. Cf. J. N. Figgis, *Fellowship of the Mystery*, pp. 263–271; H. Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, pp. 142–177.

pared with our own. In a sense it also recapitulates the second table in interior aspects, since it largely determines our whole moral attitude, and when properly kept, is likely to insure the keeping of the four previous commandments.

Covetousness involves setting up our own welfare as an idol in the place of God, and constitutes rebellion against the conditions of our state of probation. For this reason it is called idolatry, because it substitutes inferior good for God.[1] This commandment does not prohibit temperate desire for earthly good, but requires that it shall be a branch of our desire to attain our chief end, and that its forms shall be capable of ministering to that end.[2] The principal sins are (*a*) covetousness; (*b*) envy; (*c*) discontent with one's earthly estate, or such ambition as is inconsistent with acceptance of providential conditions and with hearty recognition of the rights and welfare of others; (*d*) idleness, especially when caused by envy and discontent. The most prominent and characteristic form of sin under this commandment to-day is the race to get rich, and the inevitably resulting war between capital and labour, which cannot be effectually remedied by mere external adjustments of industrial relations. The problem is primarily moral, and should be so regarded by the clergy and other Christian workers. This is not to deny either the need of industrial adjustments or

[1] Ephes. v. 5; Col. iii. 5.
[2] St. Matt. vi. 19–21; xvi. 26; 1 Tim. vi. 9–11.

their value in correcting certain forms of current injustice; but it presupposes that without a reformation of selfishness and covetousness this value will be seriously limited and temporary.

CHAPTER V

SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS

§ 1. The sacraments, in so far as they are divinely instituted for our use, involve obligations connected with our employment of them in their proper place and connections. The duty to use them involves the duty of observing the rubrics and other canon laws which regulate the manner, occasion and frequency of their use. The Prayer Book constitutes the chief source of information on the subject for Anglicans, but regard is to be had for the force of catholic tradition in details not there covered.

The sacraments are efficacious *ex opere operato*, because their efficacy depends solely upon the pledged operation of God. Therefore we cannot receive them without spiritual results of some kind. This is *de fide*. If we receive them worthily, with faith and penitence, we obtain their intended benefits. Otherwise, and until the proper subjective conditions are present, their effects are injurious.[1] All that is required for their administration is a proper minister, possessing jurisdiction, using the proper matter and form, with the ostensible intention of doing what the

[1] F. J. Hall, *The Church*, etc., pp. 321–323.

Church does.[1] Attention, however desirable, is not essential to validity, although carelessness is irreverent. It is a grave sin for one not in a state of grace to administer any sacrament. Accordingly, in view of the fact that sacramental ministrations pertain regularly to his God-given duties, and may have to be fulfilled suddenly and unexpectedly, a priest is under peculiar obligation to live habitually in a state of sanctifying grace.

It is sinful for a minister unnecessarily to refuse the administration of a sacrament, when he is lawfully and reasonably called upon for such administration by one who is qualified to ask for it. Peril to health or, in case of grave necessity, even to life itself does not exempt him, *e.g.*, in the case of one dying of contagious disease. This responsibility normally belongs only to one having actual pastoral jurisdiction over the person concerned; but in grave emergencies it extends to any competent minister who is available. On the other hand, a priest sins gravely in administering a sacrament to one who is known to be unworthy of its reception and impenitent. Such administration is forbidden for two reasons: (*a*) our Lord's prohibition to give that which is holy to dogs or to cast pearls before swine;[2] (*b*) resulting scandal to the faithful. If the knowledge by which the priest is here guided has been obtained in the con-

[1] *Idem*, pp. 319–320.

[2] St. Matt. vii. 6; 1 Tim. v. 22. First rubric of the Communion Office, American Prayer Book.

fessional, it may not be used for *public* refusal of sacraments, because this would violate the seal. But he may use such knowledge in private refusal of the sacrament.[1] As regards matter and form, a strict obligation to use those prescribed by the Church rests upon the minister; but a slight accidental variation in language does not affect the validity of the sacrament unless it occurs in a vital part, *e.g.*, in the words of consecration in the Eucharist.

§ 2. By *Baptism* the soul is cleansed from all the stains and guilt of sin, original and actual, sanctifying grace is imparted, and character is imprinted. Although of universal obligation,[2] Baptism requires for its safe and righteous reception, the removal of existing barriers to its beneficial effects. Therefore adults should not be baptized without sufficient evidence of real faith and of repentance; and the sponsors for infants should be neither incompetent nor careless. Parents are bound to have their children baptized as soon as may be after birth. When private Baptism has been administered it should be followed,

[1] See Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 108–114; and especially T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 27–40. These references apply to the minister. On the obligations of recipients, see Koch-Preuss, pp. 115–117; Slater, pp. 41–45.

[2] The "*necessitas medii*" is found in St. John iii. 5, the "*necessitas præcepti*" in St. Matt. xxviii. 19. Baptism must be received either actually, *in re*, or, at least, by intention, *in voto;* but nothing can release from the necessity of reception *in re* except the positive inability thus to receive it. On baptismal requirements, see F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 323–327; D. Stone, *Holy Baptism*, ch. ii, ix–x; St. Thomas, III, lxvi–lxviii; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Baptism," *passim.*

whenever possible, by public reception in the Church. It is a mortal sin avoidably to allow an infant to die unbaptized, although ignorance may qualify this conclusion. Moralists generally hold that it is a mortal sin to postpone Baptism for more than a month.

As the rubrics give dipping the preference over pouring, a priest may not refuse to baptize by immersion without sufficiently grave reason in the particular instance; but any application of water to the head is valid. Any person may administer Baptism in case of necessity; and some one should do so immediately after birth, if there appears to be reasonable doubt as to whether the child will live until a priest, the proper minister, can arrive. Those apparently stillborn, and abnormally formed infants (*monstra*) should be baptized *sub conditione*, "If thou art able to receive baptism," etc. Certain abnormal cases may be briefly referred to. Uterine Baptisms should be administered when any part of the child appears in process of delivery and there is grave doubt of the delivery of a living child being completed.[1] In the case of an unknown and unconscious person, *in extremis*, Baptism under a double condition [2] may be administered, the supposition being that one who has omitted the reception of the sacrament would ask to receive it

[1] Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 119–120; A. E. Sanford, *Pastoral Medicine*, p. 93.

[2] "If thou art not already baptized" (if there be uncertainty as to the fact) "and art capable of receiving Baptism." In such cases, it may be noted, the giving of a name is no essential part of the service.

in extremis if he were capable of expressing his desire. Baptism may also be administered to those apparently dead under the same condition.[1] We say "apparently dead" for there is considerable uncertainty as to the moment of death, the beginning of putrefaction often being the only certain sign of its occurrence.

After the Baptism of children the parents, godparents, or guardians are bound to provide Christian education for the child, and to prepare him for his later sacramental privileges.

§ 3. *Confirmation*,[2] in the West, is required to be received when the baptized child reaches the age of discretion, which means the age at which the child can distinguish between right and wrong and can perceive the broad lines of Christian obligation. It does not mean that he should be a theologian, a philosopher, or a scientist, or even that he should be able rightly to control his future life without the guidance of his elders. Incidentally, parents and sponsors are under obligation to bring children to

[1] A. E. Sanford, *op. cit.*, pp. 223–235. The Roman Church allows twenty-four hours to elapse before death is to be taken as certain. This seems an extreme period; and an hour would, probably, be quite sufficient under normal circumstances to determine whether death has occurred. But abnormal cases, especially those of coma and drowning, have to be reckoned with.

[2] See Acts viii. 17–18; xix. 6. On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 327–330 and *The Sacraments*, pp. 45–48, 61–68; A. C. A. Hall, *Confirmation*, ch. iii–iv; A. T. Wirgman, *Doctr. of Conf.*, ch. v. Their history: Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *s.v.* "Confirmation."

Confirmation unless impediments emerge, and in that case the obligation of hastening their removal is incurred. The following impediments have to be reckoned with: (*a*) the authority of parents or guardians over minors, which may not, in ultimate issue, be overruled;[1] (*b*) a state of impenitence; (*c*) unbelief; (*d*) insanity;[2] (*e*) the Church's rule that none shall be confirmed but such as can say the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and are sufficiently instructed in the other parts of the Church Catechism." As this is a positive rather than an intrinsic impediment, cases may occur in which failure to exact full literal obedience would violate in no way the real mind of the Church; (*f*) Unwillingness of the child. The authority of the parents extends to bringing their children to be baptized and confirmed, but it is the duty both of parents and of pastors, not to press the matter in the face of continued unwillingness. All who are able to receive this sacrament are in duty bound to do so; but if neglect on the part of one instructed is inspired by known contempt of the sacrament, its adminis-

[1] The Roman Church has determined (T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 56, giving the decree) that children of seven years and upwards may determine for themselves and receive Baptism in spite of the opposition of their parents. If we are sound in our interpretation of the Fifth Commandment this is not true—certainly not under Anglican conditions.

[2] This prohibition, including also cases of imbecility and idiocy, does not extend to Baptism; the latter sacrament is "*necessitas medii*," of receiving supernatural life, extending to every living soul; whereas Confirmation is "*necessitas præcepti*."

tration becomes plainly sinful. Bishops are bound to give those within their jurisdiction opportunity at reasonable intervals of receiving the sacrament.[1]

There is no obligation, on the part of either minister or recipient, to receive either Baptism or Confirmation fasting; but St. Thomas says "where it can conveniently be done, it is more becoming."[2] Nor may sacramental confession be required canonically as a normal condition of Confirmation. It is often, however, highly desirable; and the circumstances of a given case may make the need of it so obvious that the pastor will be justified in demanding the evidence of readiness for Confirmation which such confession in the given instance can alone afford. A pastor is also entitled, if the general condition of his cure appears to justify it, to urge upon his classes for Confirmation the desirability of the use of confession.

§ 4. *Holy Communion*,[3] being generally necessary for salvation, is obligatory upon all who can fulfil its conditions,[4] viz.: (*a*) previous Baptism; (*b*) Confir-

[1] The new Roman *Codex Juris Can.*, can. 785, §§ 3 ff., says at least once every five years; but within our own communion the canon law requires once in three years: Engl. Canons of 1603, lx; American Digest, Canon 17, § II.

[2] *Summa Theol.*, III, lxxii, 12 *ad* 2.

[3] On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, *The Church*, etc., pp. 330–333, and *The Sacraments*, pp. 182–188; D. Stone, *Holy Communion*, ch. xii–xiv; St. Thomas, III, lxxiv, lxxviii, lxxxii.

[4] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 101, "The sacramental reception of the Eucharist is not a necessary means of salvation, for it is a sacrament of the living and supposes the grace of God in the soul, and a soul in the state of grace has everything which is necessary for salva-

mation, or at least readiness and desire to be confirmed. In case of serious illness some latitude may be wisely used in the interpretation of this condition; (*c*) faith and repentance; (*d*) lawful opportunity; (*e*) fasting, when no law of necessity interferes. As fasting is a ceremonial precept, it cannot be rightly applied in such wise as to excommunicate people who are sincerely desirous of obeying the law of the Church. It is an act of devotion.[1] As to frequency of reception, one of the fundamental desires of the Anglican Reformers was that communions should be made more frequently, and an English Prayer Book rubric requires parishioners to communicate "at least three times in the year, of which Easter is to be one." [2]

tion." We hold, however, that, while reception is not possible for all and is not invariably necessary absolutely, it is so in normal cases for those having the use of reason and the opportunity of reception. Our Lord's words, St. John vi. 53–58, make reception *necessitas præcepti*, and, under the conditions noted above, *necessitas medii*. The priest is morally bound to do all he can to provide that the qualified shall receive the *viaticum;* see First Council of Nicea, Can. xiii.

[1] It is, of course, a very important one, and should be treated normally as a serious obligation. Cf. ch. vi. § 2 *fin.*, below.

[2] There is much to be said for daily reception, as was customary in the early Church. See, *e.g.*, St. Aug., *Ep.* 54. 4. The Roman Church (Conc. Lat., IV, can. 21; Conc. Trent, Sess. xiii. can. 9. Cf. J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, §§ 218 ff.) requires reception at least in Eastertide, or, if this is physically impossible, as soon after as it may be possible, anticipating the time, if that can be done, when it is known that Easter reception will be impossible. In America this is now construed to mean between the First Sunday in Lent and Trinity Sunday. It is presupposed (see proposition condemned by Innocent IX, Denzinger, *Enchirid*, § 1205) that this means worthy reception. In recent days the Roman Church has sought to increase the frequency of communion, cf. Decree promulgated by Pius X, Dec. 20, 1905.

Preparation is usually divided into two parts, that of the soul and that of the body. That communion may be received worthily the soul must be free from mortal sin;[1] to insure which the sacrament of Penance may be used, or an act of perfect contrition made. There should be also such use of prayer, meditation, etc., as will predispose one towards a beneficial reception. The preparation of the body lies mainly in observance of the precept of fasting, which forbids the taking of food or drink after midnight.[2] It is expedient, although not commanded, that the married should abstain from the marital privilege immediately before and after receiving.[3] As to intention, the recipient should have the purpose of pleasing God, of becoming more closely united to Him, and should seek this heavenly provision as food for his soul and as medicine for its weaknesses.

The priest is the minister of the consecration; deacons may assist in the administration to the people, and in case of necessity administer the reserved sacrament. In the early Church the latter privilege was sometimes exercised by laymen, and would probably be lawful now; but occasions would practically never arise.

§ 5. As to *Penance*, the American Church directs sinners to come to the priest whenever they cannot by

[1] 1 Cor. xi. 27 ff.

[2] And for at least six hours previous to communion. See St. Aug. *Ep.* 54, 8; St. Thomas, III, lxxx, 8 ad 5. This obligation does not in the Roman Church bind invalids, *Cod. Jur. Can.*, can. 858, § 2.

[3] Cf. Exod. xix. 14–15.

private methods of repentance quiet their consciences, but require further comfort and counsel.[1] As the English exhortation makes clear, the comfort referred to includes priestly absolution.[2] The vagueness of this language, a concession to Protestant prejudice, ought not to lead us to anti-catholic inferences. Nothing is more certain than that an appeal to antiquity was the ostensible and formal principle of the Anglican reformation. Therefore we ought to interpret the Prayer Book references to this subject, in spite of their shunning certain technical expressions of mediæval origin, and abandoning the rule requiring an annual Confession, as intended to preserve unaltered the ancient catholic doctrine and precept concerning Confession. There were variations in the rigour and method of discipline in the ancient Churches; but all were agreed as to the necessity and obligation of confession to a priest for Christians who had become guilty of the graver forms of sin. Accordingly, although Anglican discipline leaves the sinner free to judge for himself whether he has sinned gravely enough to need this remedy, he is still under precept to confess to a priest when such need arises, that is,

[1] See the first of the longer Exhortations in the Communion Office. On the requirements of this sacrament, see F. J. Hall, *The Church*, etc., pp. 333–336, and *The Sacraments*, pp. 235–245; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. ii; W. W. Williams, *Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Penance, passim;* F. G. Belton, *Manual for Confessors, passim.*

[2] Cf. The denial in the Preface of the American Prayer Book of intention "to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of doctrine, discipline, or worship."

when in Prayer Book language he cannot otherwise "quiet his conscience." Obviously to "quiet" here means to secure assured pardon of God by really effectual repentance. The duty of Confession is not left wholly optional. What is left to private judgment is, whether the conditions which make it one's own duty have actually arisen.

In technical terms it is said by catholic theologians that "mortal" sin makes sacramental Confession necessary and obligatory.[1] But we ought to remember that the distinction between "mortal" and "venial" sin is less precisely determinative of particular cases than it is often thought to be. Mortal sin means fatal sin, a question of degree that calls for discriminating judgment in each case; and to say that mortal sin makes confession necessary ought to be understood as a technical way of punctuating the broad proposition that one may fall into a degree of guilt which will in all probability prove spiritually fatal, unless the sinner resorts to the sacramental aid of Penance, provided for this very emergency.[2] The

[1] F. G. Belton, *Manual for Confessors*, pp. 8–9; A. H. Baverstock, *The Priest as Confessor*, ch. i; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 135. The Council of Trent, Sess. xiv, ch. v, can. 6, describes this sacrament as a *necessitas medii*.

[2] To teach an ordinary congregation in a baldly technical way that "mortal sin" makes the sacrament of Penance a necessity, coupled with equally bald assertions that certain sins are "mortal" (no intimation being given that the sins called "venial" may be "mortal" in their malicious deliberateness, and that the so-called "mortal" sins may be venial because of ignorance and lack of deliberation), is to impart a mechanical aspect to the whole subject; and is to run

further proposition follows that the perceived possibility that one has sinned thus gravely makes it imprudent and unsafe to neglect the use of this sacrament.

The American Office for the Visitation of Prisoners authorizes the use of the form of absolution in the Communion Office. On the other hand, we Americans inherit the form still found in the English Office for the Visitation of the Sick; and this form is not only better suited for private absolution, but is also widely used in the Catholic Church at large and for that reason strongly recommended to our use.

Inasmuch as repentance includes what is technically called "satisfaction" and this includes acts of penance to God, both custom and the nature of things require that a priest should impose some form of penance, readiness to fulfil which should be a condition of granting absolution. But the penance should not be so severe as to challenge resistance or to suggest the notion that it is in any sense an offset to sin. Its sole value lies in its function of expressing and completing repentance; and this value depends upon the dutiful spirit of its performance rather than upon its quantitative and intrinsic importance. The customary

a grave risk of causing misconception and revolt. It is usually safer to use untechnical language that will be understood, and that will not soothe people's consciences with regard to their smaller sins—as if they required no repentance. Orthodoxy does not lie in rigid technicalities, but in the truths which catholic technicalities are designed to preserve among teachers and pastors, presumably capable of rightly understanding them.

penance is a brief prayer or meditation, chosen with reference to the ascertained moral state of the penitent, with a time assigned for its fulfilment.[1] Both priest and penitent are bound by the so-called seal; that is, what is said in the confessional is official and privileged, and may not be revealed even on the witness stand without mutual consent.[2]

The matter of the sacrament, or the things to be confessed, includes all post-baptismal sins not previously brought to sacramental Confession, so far as they can be recalled by dutiful and careful self-examination.[3] For the integrity of Confession it is especially necessary that every species of mortal sin as above defined should be confessed, with reasonably intelligent indication of the gravity and frequency of each. And, since repentance is not sufficient unless it has reference to all forms of sin of whatever degree of gravity, no species of sin which can be recalled should be concealed; although a complete catalogue of venial sins is practically impossible, and is unnecessary provided one's besetting sins and their frequency are acknowledged. In brief, a good confession means one in which the penitent sincerely makes a "clean breast" of his wrong-doings. An incidental reason

[1] On suitable penances, see E. B. Pusey, *Advice . . . Abbé Gaume's Manual of Confessors*, ch. v. art. ix; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. vi; A. H. Baverstock, *op. cit.*, ch. vi.

[2] On the seal, W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–125; F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 240–243.

[3] See F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 239 f.; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–18. Technically it is called *quasi* matter.

for this requirement is that the priest's part in judging, instructing and comforting the penitent is thereby made more intelligent and effective for the soul's guidance and help in attaining his appointed goal of entire sanctification. Moreover, dutiful faithfulness of the penitent in doing his part will remove the danger of mechanical and unprofitable use of the sacrament. In order to receive it beneficially, one must fulfil the several parts of repentance as adequately as he can. To this end he must cultivate genuine contrition, a firmly fixed purpose of amendment, and readiness to accept and perform whatever penance may be imposed.[1]

On the part of the priest there is need here for greater preparatory study than in the case of any other sacrament. He forgives or retains not according to his pleasure, but according to the moral conditions which he perceives in the person making, Confession. He cannot hope to judge these rightly, to give wise counsel, and to assign penance justly, without the knowledge which the study of Moral Theology and Casuistry affords.[2]

§ 6. In *Holy Orders*,[3] the obligations involved per-

[1] These matters are treated of more fully in ch. ix, below.

[2] K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, ch. i; F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems in Christian Morals*, ch. i; E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, ch. ii–iii.

[3] Samuel Wilberforce, *Addresses to Candidates for Holy Orders* (covering the Ordination vows); John Gott, *The Parish Priest in the Town;* P. V. Smith, *The Legal Position of the Clergy* (in England); H. P. Liddon, *Clerical Life and Work;* W. C. E. Newbolt, *Speculum Sacerdotum;* Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 197–200; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 241–250.

tain respectively to candidates, to ordained ministers and to laymen.

It is the duty of *candidates* to acquaint themselves with the canon law touching ordination, and to fulfil its requirements at the stated times and in the stated manners. The candidate should have pure motives, i.e., a desire to promote the glory of God in loyal conformity to the faith and discipline of His Church, and to coöperate in the salvation of souls and in the extension of the Kingdom of heaven. He should be wholly free from carnal ambition and from disturbing desire for worldly position or gain. A twofold preparation is required for the state to which he believes himself called, intellectual and spiritual. This preparation he is morally bound to use every effort to secure as thoroughly as he can;[1] and the responsibility of enlarging this equipment continues, of course, throughout his life.

Ordained ministers come under the specific obligations which are defined in the so-called ordination vows of the Ordinal,[2] and under those canons which

[1] St. Thomas, III, suppl. xxxvi, 1–2.

[2] Current arguments of "Liberalism" justify calling specific attention to the "material" dishonesty of disregarding the contract and vow before God and the congregation "always so to minister the doctrine . . . of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this Church hath received the same." The minister is ordained to take official part in a propaganda defined by the Church. His pledge is unambiguous, and his obligation either to fulfil the pledge or to renounce his office is too clear rationally to be combated. What "this Church hath received" is obviously determined by its formularies, understood substantially in the sense in which they

describe the content and limitations of their duties and privileges. In addition to these canonically defined obligations are those which obviously inhere in the relations in which they stand to superior ministers, on the one hand, and to those to whom they are sent, on the other hand. Among the latter should be mentioned, as liable to be overlooked by those who have had no previous business experience, the contract obligations involved in their acceptance of a call or appointment and their obligation to maintain visible financial integrity in all their relations.

Lay officials, of course, have official obligations beside those which pertain to the lay estate in general. The office of *lay-reader* carries with it no other privileges and powers, and no other permanency, than are defined in the canons and are explicitly given by the bishops. *Deaconesses* are subject to the same limitations and, officially speaking, are entirely under the authority of the ministers under whom they are licensed to work. Their office is a lay office and is not to be compared with the diaconate. Allowing for differences of conditions, the same holds true of the members of *religious orders*, whether male or female. Such members are not ministers unless they have been ordained to be such in the appointed manner. Official positions in a parish do not abrogate or qualify ministerial authority over the services and their music, and over the teaching and spiritual discipline within

were originally imposed. It is not at all determined by current unofficial opinion and speculation.

the parish. *The vestry* has authority as a body over the temporal concerns of the parish; but the rector is *ex officio* chairman of the vestry, and cannot canonically be excluded. Organists, choir officers, Sunday School helpers, masters of ceremony, etc., are all subject in the manner of their discharge of duties to the rector or priest-in-charge.[1]

Every layman is under obligation to be canonically connected, when possible, with some recognized parish or mission, preferably where it is most natural for him to attend public worship. If he moves from one parish to another, he ought to secure a formal letter of transfer; and it is the duty of the minister not only to furnish this letter, but to use legitimate influence to have it presented. No layman may disregard excommunication by his pastor, unless it has been reversed by competent episcopal authority. A layman should contribute to the support of the parish to which he belongs, and may not in this particular assume a seditious attitude towards his canonical pastor. His relations to his pastor are not nullified by clerical folly, but either by his removal into another parish or by canonical removal of the pastor.

To the laity also belongs the duty, often neglected, of providing for a supply of clergy: (*a*) by prayer, especially at Ember seasons, that God will "send forth labourers" into His harvest; (*b*) by contributions towards the support of seminaries or theological

[1] We follow here the American canon law. On English conditions, see P. V. Smith, *op. cit.*, ch. iv.

schools and of those colleges in which candidates are especially trained for admission to them; (*c*) by suggesting the vocation to their sons and others for consideration, not placing any obstacle in the way of those who have felt themselves called; (*d*) by upholding the dignity of the priesthood, not making it a subject of captious criticism, but loyally supporting the priesthood in general, in spite of the imperfections of individual priests.

§ 7. *Holy Matrimony.*[1] A formal engagement to marry constitutes a contract, subject to the limitations in general of human contracts, and to such as are involved in established social custom. If it is due to compelling fear, or if either of the parties is a minor, it is not valid. Circumstances may arise which will nullify either explicit or tacit conditions of the contract; and if nullifying impediments are discovered or created, the contract ceases to bind. If others are aware of nullifying impediments, it is their duty to declare them before the intended marriage is attempted. The obligations connected with the duration and conditions of an engagement may be determined by: (*a*) prior obligations, such as the support

[1] On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, *The Church*, etc., pp. 339–342, and *The Sacraments*, ch. ix; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–236; O. D. Watkins, *Holy Matrimony, passim;* W. J. Knox Little, *Holy Matrimony* (popular). Also, with allowance for considerable differences in Roman Canon law, prohibitory degrees, etc., Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 201–211; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, §§ 569 ff; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, Bk. viii; H. A. Ayrinhac, *Marriage Legislation in the New Code of Canon Law.*

of parents; (*b*) temporal estate, or ability to support a family in a manner suited to the social rank of the parties concerned; (*c*) charity, when a protracted engagement is prejudicial to one of the parties; (*d*) preservation of purity; (*e*) convention. A betrothal does not constitute a nullifying impediment if one of the parties contracts a marriage with a third party, although such marriage is sinful unless the betrothal referred to has been justifiably terminated. The publishing of banns, while regulated as to its form, is not required in the American Church; but a revival of the practice would help to discourage hasty and ill-considered marriages.

The spiritual benefits of the sacrament depend upon faith and repentance in those who participate in it; and careful spiritual preparation for Matrimony is obviously needed. This may necessitate use of the sacrament of Penance; and reception of the Holy Eucharist is plainly a desirable accompaniment of marriage. To be sacramental, Matrimony must be lawfully complete and have baptized persons for its subjects; and no nullifying impediments [1] must exist. Non-sacramental unions become sacramental by subsequent Baptism of both parties.

Matrimonial impediments [2] are of two kinds: (*a*)

[1] Impediments which are declared to be nullifying by the express law of God or by the Church are here included as well as those of civil law.

[2] On impediments, see F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 294–306; O. D. Watkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–107, 336 f. *et passim;* J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 629–640; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–251. The

impedimentia impedientia, those which without nullifying make marriage unlawful or undesirable; (*b*) *impedimentia dirimentia*, those which nullify it *ab initio*. No lists of impediments have ecumenical authority in all their particulars, and the Roman list of nullifying impediments is from our standpoint excessive.[1] We therefore give a list more in accord with Anglican conditions. The nullifying impediments include: (*a*) error as to identity of one or other of the parties to the marriage; (*b*) compulsion, or fear equivalent thereto; (*c*) consanguinity and affinity, or mutual relationship, whether by blood or by marriage, within degrees prohibited either by the law of God, by the Church or by the state. The list of prohibited degrees given in the English Prayer Book has force in the American Church so long as this Church enacts no substitutionary legislation; (*d*) physical impotence of either party, if it be initial and irremediable; (*e*) immaturity of age, prior to puberty; (*f*) in the case of minors, the withholding of consent by parents or legal guardians; (*g*) previous valid marriage while both parties thereto are living.

Among impediments which make a marriage either irregular or inexpedient are: (*a*) disparity of social status or culture; (*b*) elopement; (*c*) clandestinity, even where the law does not make this a nullifying impediment; (*d*) previous vow of chastity, without a

Roman Church has a larger list: St. Thomas, III, suppl. l–lxii; *Cath. Encyc.*, *q.v.* It does not bind Anglicans.

[1] In particular, in including certain species of spiritual affinity.

proper dispensation therefrom; (*e*) disparity of cult or religious divergence; (*f*) the solemn seasons within which the Church discourages marriage except in necessity.[1]

The nullifying impediments (*a*) and (*b*) obviously cease to be nullifying if both parties to the marriage subsequently and with sufficient knowledge freely consent to the union. But the impediment of previous marriage can be removed, while both parties thereto are living, only by pronouncement from legally competent authority that the said previous marriage was null and void *ab initio*. To Christians, divorce, as distinguished from a decree of nullity, affords no moral liberty to remarry while the other party lives. Even when a nullifying impediment to the previous union has been discovered, the right to remarry does not arise until a lawful decree of nullity has been pronounced. But, of course, such discovery makes the continued exercise of marital privileges sinful.

The obligations of the marriage estate include: (*a*) the procreation of offspring—an obligation which obvious necessity alone can abrogate; (*b*) temperance in marital intercourse, the health and spiritual interests of both being preserved and brutal tyranny being excluded; (*c*) avoidance of each and every method of interference with the natural consequences of mari-

[1] Bishop Cosin specifies: (*a*) from Advent Sunday until eight days after Epiphany; (*b*) from Septuagesima until eight days after Easter; (*c*) from Rogation Sunday until Trinity Sunday. All these days are inclusive.

tal intercourse, whether by preventing conception,[1] by abortion [2] or by any other method such as Onanism,[3] etc.—the only righteous way of avoiding procreation, when such avoidance is legitimate, being the exercise of self-restraint or abstinence at those seasons when conception is liable to occur; (*d*) mutual fidelity, the sins of adultery and fornication being equally grave for both parties; (*e*) cultivation of mutual regard and affection, that the union may agree in its loving quality with that between Christ and His Church; (*f*) the common enjoyment of available earthly goods and advantages, both being equally bound also by the principles of stewardship; (*g*) mutual recognition of, and adherence to, the complementary relations of man and wife—the headship of the man and the glory of the wife and mother being alike protected from degradation and subversion; (*h*) parental obligations, as previously set forth.[4]

§ 8. *Unction of the Sick*, subject to the right of the Church to determine and regulate its administration, is a blessing to which the sick are entitled, on the basis of Scripture and Catholic consent.[5] Circumstances

[1] F. W. Foerster, *Marriage and the Sex Problem*, Pt. I, ch. vii. The whole book is a valuable contribution to sane ideas concerning sex problems.

[2] On abortion, see *Cath. Encyc.*, *q.v.*; Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *s.v.* "Fœticide;" C. Coppens, *Moral Prin's and Medical Practice.*

[3] Gen. xxxviii. 9–10.

[4] In ch. iv, § 11 (*a*), above.

[5] St. James v. 14–15. Cf. St. Mark vi. 13; xvi. 18; St. Matt. x. 8. On its lawfulness and desirability in the Anglican Communion, see F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 315–317, 329 ff; F. W. Puller, *The Anointing of the Sick*, ch. ix. Legislation is in process in the American General

may even make it the duty of the sick to claim the right, but certain conditions qualify it. The Anglican Church makes no definite provision for it; and in many dioceses the oil is not available, and episcopal authority is exercised against its use. Peace and charity may demand self-denial by the sick. The use of ostensible substitutes, however, such as Christian Science treatment, is not justifiable. In view of the rapid growth of modern healing cults the advisability of a general restoration of Unction is obvious. But the use of natural remedies is obligatory, because grace is not designed to displace nature but to supplement and perfect it.

Unction may be administered in any serious illness, before an operation, or in cases of nervous disorder. The authority of the physician in particular cases may not be disregarded without sufficiently grave reason. When all the sacraments suitable for the sick are administered at the same visit the order should be Penance, Communion, Unction. Spiritual as well as physical benefits ought to be expected, for the physical effect is itself a work of grace, and we may not think that any religious instrument appointed of God in His Church can fail of spiritual results when rightly employed. But the habit of confining the use of Unction to the moment of death is an abuse.[1]

Convention which will probably provide in the American Prayer Book an authorized form for Unction.

[1] On the whole subject, F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, ch. x; A. P. Forbes, *XXXIX. Arts.*, pp. 465–474; F. G. Belton, *Manual for Confessors*, Pt. VI, ch. iv; St. Thomas, III, suppl. xxix–xxxiii; F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems*, etc., ch. vii.

CHAPTER VI

OTHER OBLIGATIONS

I. *Notable Duties*

§ 1. The Notable Duties are so-called because they are conspicuous elements of religion under all conditions: They are prayer, fasting and almsgiving.[1] It is sometimes said that Christ did not command them. He did more, for He gave rules for their observance as being too generally acknowledged to require specific command.[2]

Prayer[3] has the two branches of public or corporate and private prayer, giving obligatory expression respectively to our social or ecclesiastical and our personal relations to God. The former has already been considered elsewhere.[4] The obligation of habitual prayer is elementary, among other reasons, be-

[1] Vernon Staley, *The Practical Religion*, Pt. II, ch. ii.

[2] Cf. St. Matt. vi. 2–18.

[3] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 88–90; and *Eschatology*, pp. 110–128; A. J. Worlledge, *Prayer;* H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lec. v; A. C. A. Hall, *Christ. Doctr. of Prayer;* W. J. Carey, *The Life in Grace*, pp. 113–127; and *Prayer and some of its Difficulties.*

[4] In ch. iv. § 7 (*b*), above.

cause unless we habitually express our dependent relations to God we soon cease to realize their central importance and fall away from God. Eucharistic worship affords the proper background and controlling principles of private prayer, which may be either oral or mental.

Oral prayer, or prayer expressed in words, is possible for all and is of universal obligation. It contains several distinct elements, no one of which should be habitually neglected; although the proportions in which they are present in individual acts of devotion will necessarily vary widely. In its fulness it consists of acts of homage, self-oblation, penitence, praise, thanksgiving, petition for oneself and intercession for others. The minimum of private oral prayer, according to enlightened consent, should be every morning and evening.

Mental prayer or meditation, although not required of all by specific precept, emerges as an inevitable and necessary step in Christian advance towards perfection.[1] A mistaken impression exists that it is wholly out of the reach of ordinary Christians. The truth is that meditation is an act which can be practised by all, but which has many degrees of perfection. Only those who practice it systematically can rise to

[1] A. G. Mortimer, *Helps to Meditation*, vol. I, pp. xiii–xix; P. B. Bull, *The Threefold Way*, pp. 1–13; W. H. Hutchings, *The Life of Prayer*, Lec. v; A. Poulain, *The Graces of Interior Prayer*, ch. i–ii. Strictly speaking, meditation is only one of the forms of mental prayer; but it is practically the only one generally available. We are not in this treatise concerned with contemplative prayer.

its heights; but even in forms which lie within general capacity it constitutes the salt of religious life. This can be seen in its definition. Meditation is the application severally of all our mental faculties to the sacred lessons of our religion for the purpose of making them more effectual factors in our lives. Thus it may be either a rough and ready affair or a highly developed practice. Its parallel in everyday life may be signified by the word *brooding*. When a man broods over anything that he feels inclined to dwell upon, he is meditating; and since every man broods, every man can meditate if he is vitally inclined to do so. In its developing form meditation employs rules and divisions just as any other practice does; and it is by means of these rules that practice is made perfect and more highly effectual for its purpose. But the rules are merely the grammar of meditation and cease to be felt restrictively after they have perfected one in the practice.

§ 2. *Fasting*[1] is sufficiently universal among truly religious people, whether Christian or pagan, to be regarded as a natural mark of religion. Its present neglect is not the fruit of enlightenment, but of the great stress and luxury of modern life. The necessary connection between some measure of fasting and consistent religious practice remains unaltered. For the Christian its obligation is: (*a*) assumed

[1] V. Staley, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. vi; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 292 ff.; Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig., q.v.;* St. Thomas, II, II, xlvi–xlvii; *Cath. Encyc., s.v.* "Fast."

in our Lord's teaching; (*b*) required by universal ecclesiastical precept; (*c*) recognized to be a chief instrument of self-discipline; (*d*) having devotional significance in itself, and therefore invariably associated with any extraordinary act of religion.

Ecclesiastical language is governed by the distinction between fasting and abstinence. A day of fasting means a day of total refusal of nourishment until evening. A day of abstinence means one in which flesh-meat and luxurious diet will be abandoned. This Church imposes but two fasts, Ash Wednesday and Good Friday. According to the historical connotation of terms, she requires abstinence from flesh-meat on all Fridays except Christmas Day, during the Lenten season, and on Ember and Rogation days. The definitive American formula is, "Such a measure of abstinence as is more especially suited to extraordinary acts and exercises of devotion." Modern conditions make it impossible for many people to fulfil these rules according to their full letter. In such cases, however, the spirit of the law remains in force, and full observance ought to be approximated so far as conditions and circumstances permit. These considerations apply also to the precept of fasting Communion.[1]

§ 3. *Almsgiving*[2] under Christian conditions has

[1] On fasting communion, F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 186–188; F. W. Puller, *Concerning the Fast before Communion;* J. W. Legg, *Papal Faculties Allowing Food before Communion.*

[2] On almsgiving, see G. Uhlhorn, *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church;* E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 548–569; V. Staley,

three ends: (*a*) to express our relation to God; (*b*) to support and extend the Church; (*c*) to express and fulfil brotherly love.

In determining the measure of obligation in almsgiving it is to be noted that the Jewish law of tithes is no longer law, but still affords a revelation of what constituted the minimum of acceptable self-denial under Jewish conditions. It should be added that Christian love cannot normally be thought to express itself adequately or acceptably to God by a less onerous self-denial than God required of the Jews; but the onerousness and spiritual significance of self-denial cannot be measured accurately by the conditions of another race and age, or by unchanging mathematical ratios. The basis of estimate is, broadly speaking, the amount of money, or of any form of wealth, which the man has available for current personal expenditure. Thus the man who receives no revenue within a given period, but who is none the less in a position to spend $3000 a year for purposes of subsistence, is in the position, touching almsgiving, of enjoying a salary of $3000.

It must be acknowledged that many people have no other mode of giving alms than by devoting time and labour to God's service and to that of the poor. It is a subtle temptation to assume this fact without

op. cit., Pt. II, ch. iii; F. G. Peabody, *Christian Life in the Modern World*, pp. 147–163; St. Thomas, II, II, xxx–xxxiii. We are not here concerned with the tithes of English law, which in current conditions belong to legal dues rather than to almsgiving.

due warrant, and to salve one's conscience by contributing fussy activity that is really a form of remedying *ennui* rather than of self-denial.

In the matter of giving to the poor, careful judgment may be needed to avoid hurting instead of helping, and to escape the evil of wasting resources which should be administered to the best advantage. But in doing this we incur the danger, generally overlooked, of forgetting a vital Christian aim in almsgiving, which is to show personal love, and to win persons to God. Accordingly, we always incur a risk when we refuse to give money to persons because we do not feel sure that the gift will be properly used.[1]

II. *Civil Obligations*[2]

§ 4. The civil authority is ordained of God.[3] It is essential for public order and for common welfare, especially in temporal things. These things are not intrinsically the most important for man, but extrinsically they afford conditions which are

[1] Bp. Butler, *Three Sermons on Human Nature*, serm. ii, "Because some are unworthy we cannot excuse ourselves from all giving." Morally the position taken by the man who says "I never give to beggars" is apt to be very questionable. While we should observe the findings of sound sociological science, the requirements of visible Christian love may not give way to them, lest we become mere utilitarians.

[2] The subject of Ecclesiastical Precepts, logically taken up at this stage, has been given such treatment as our space permits in ch. iv, § 11 (*b*), above.

[3] Rom. xiii. 1–7.

normally necessary for fulfilment of the higher spiritual ends. Within the limits already indicated in treating of the Fifth Commandment,[1] Christians are under obligation: (*a*) to obey the civil law and civil authority; (*b*) to defend it against enemies, whether external or internal; (*c*) to serve it when occasions arise, whether officially or by exercising an intelligent suffrage; (*d*) to cultivate *esprit du corps* or patriotism.

§ 5. The limits of obligation in these directions include: (*a*) natural rights, generally acknowledged to belong to individuals; (*b*) constitutional rights; (*c*) international rights and international laws; (*d*) conflict with spiritual jurisdiction; (*e*) violation of conscience.

When a conflict of rights arises in relation to the state, two alternatives present themselves to citizens: (*a*) revolution; (*b*) passive obedience. The right of revolution does not belong to private individuals but to the people at large; although if individuals were not morally permitted certain forms of agitation, calculated to bring about revolution, no revolution would ever be justifiable. In practice, however, revolutionary agitation can never be condoned by the state except when it becomes successful. The distinction between lawful revolution and seditious agitation is often difficult to draw; but the burden of proof lies always with the revolutionist, and his only method of shouldering that burden is to succeed in his agitation. Fortunately the question will rarely arise with a sin-

[1] In ch. iv, § 11 (*c*), above.

cere Christian. Passive obedience means submission to the legal consequences of obeying one's conscience contrary to civil law. In certain instances a man may not only be permitted, but is morally obliged, to refuse to undertake positive acts and to violate prohibitions in defiance of civil law. But this does not exempt him from submitting to the legal consequences, except so far as the law itself provides him with means of resistance.

Civil obligations involve and include so much study of civil institutions and of civil law as is necessary for a reasonably intelligent fulfilment of these obligations.[1]

[1] Our treatment of Civil obligations is necessarily lacking in detail. See, in general, N. Porter, *op. cit.*, chh. xiv–xvi; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, Bk. 3, a good and full treatment; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 81 ff., and on Law and Justice, §§ 517–589; N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. iv; Koch Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 119–181. St. Thomas, I, II, xc, 4, defines law as "a rational institution for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the public." J. P. Gury says, "Lex est regula externa et remota actuum humanorum, sicut conscientia seu dictamen practicum rationis est eorumdem regula interna et proxima." It begets in the subject an obligation, and therefore is of the nature of a precept, concerning that which ought to be done, rather than of a counsel. It is promulgated by a competent authority with the view of imposing an obligation; laws imposed by those who lack competent authority, *e.g.*, the Germans in Belgium, do not bind the conscience. For the well-being and peace of society it is necessary that the power of imposing laws should be vested in some supreme authority, and authority to impose implies the power to secure obedience.

The principle underlying the imposition of law should be that of allowing to the individual as much liberty as is consistent with the well-being of the community as a whole. The common good is

III. *Sociological Obligations*

§ 6. By sociological obligations[1] we mean those which are involved in organized business and industry, in contracts, and in the conventions of social intercourse. In the field of organized business and indus-

always to be had in view. Certain limitations have to be reckoned with: (*a*) Human laws can extend only to acts and words, not to thoughts. This is the greatest point of contrast between human and divine law. (*b*) As human laws are subordinate to the divine law, it follows that they can not bind Christians when contrary to it. If such a law is imposed, the duty of the individual is clearly to obey the higher law at whatever cost. "We ought to obey God rather than men," Acts v. 29; cf. Acts iv. 19; Dan. iii. A law requiring something morally wrong is not valid, but imposes a negative obligation, that of disobeying it. Divine law aims at securing justice, and when any human law clearly disregards this end it fails to bind. St. Aug., *de Lib. Arb.* I, 5, "A law that is not just does not appear to be a law at all." Bp. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 ff., asks the question, What certainty can a man have that a law is unjust? and answers that in case of uncertainty he is to obey as following the safer course, it being presupposed that there would be no uncertainty if the law were clearly in opposition to the higher divine law. Human law may add its explicit support to divine law, and may define and regulate its application. Civil laws have reference in many cases to things which are morally indifferent, *e.g.*, laws regarding expectoration in public places; but when such laws are imposed they become morally binding. This does not militate against the right to construe objectionable sumptuary laws as narrowly as their letter will permit, and to agitate for their repeal or modification. An example is afforded by prohibitionary legislation, which often inflicts injustice and infringes on private right. If it forbade the use of true wine for sacramental purposes, it could not lawfully be obeyed by catholic Christians.

[1] Intelligent consideration of them presupposes some acquaintance with sociological science; on which, Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.* and *Cath. Encyc. q.vv.* (with bibliog.); F. H. Giddings, *Prin's of Sociology.*

try, a multitude of serious problems arise, calling for the attention of expert sociologists and economists, and made difficult by the clash of mutually inconsistent propagandas and by continually changing circumstances. We treat only of the chief moral principles involved and of a few illustrative applications.

The more basic principles are: (*a*) the brotherhood of man and the implied obligation of brotherly love, exhibited in promoting common temporal welfare by all methods consistent with bringing men to God and to their chief end of eternal life; (*b*) the preservation of just balance between the rights of society at large and those of private individuals; (*c*) the adjustment of mutually conflicting claims of different social and industrial classes in such wise as to promote mutual and efficient service on the part of all; (*d*) the protection of private individuals in their right to a fair chance to obtain reasonable subsistence and freedom in the management and enjoyment of their daily life.[1] In an enlightened Christian community the personal emphasis will be placed upon one's own duties and upon the rights of others, rather than upon one's own rights and upon the duties of others.[2]

"Socialism"[3] designates several mutually conflict-

[1] More comprehensively, what are called natural rights. See J. H. Hyslop, *Elem. of Ethics*, pp. 432–440; N. K. Davis, *Elem. of Ethics*, §§ 22–41.

[2] The two are interrelated and in adequate definition imply each other.

[3] On Socialism, Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig., q.v.; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.vv.* "Christian Socialism" and "Socialism;" R. T. Ely,

ing theories, but tends unduly to submerge individual rights in those of society at large; to favour the labouring class, so called, at the expense of other classes; and to emphasize present welfare and comfort, to the exclusion of religion and man's chief end. The effort to develop a "Christian Socialism" which will escape these dangers does not appear to be successful. The reason is that every species of Socialism has for its basic principle an exaggerated emphasis upon the possibilities of ideal social adjustment in this world, accompanied by an inevitable tendency to drive man's chief end into the background.[1] The indisputable obligation involved, one that is independent of all social theories and adjustments, is simply this, that we should seek to promote mutual unselfishness between individuals and classes under all circumstances and social systems that actually prevail. A classic illustration of this can be seen in the primitive Christian treatment of slaves and slavery.[2] The Christian Church and its clergy are not charged with solving the problems of sociological adjustment, but with impelling competent leaders to bring Christian motives and principles to their solution, and with

Socialism: Its Nature, Strength, and Weakness; Thos. Kirkup, *Hist. of Socialism;* J. T. Stoddart, *The New Socialism;* A. V. Woodworth, *Christian Socialism in England;* Robert Flint, *Socialism.*

[1] F. J. Hall, "This Miserable and Naughty World," in *Angl. Theol. Rev.*, Oct., 1920.

[2] Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig., s.v.* "Slavery (Christian)," 3–4; J. B. Lightfoot, *Epp. to Coloss. and Philem.*, pp. 316 ff. Cf. Philem; 1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 28; Col. iii. 11.

teaching all men to be governed by such motives and principles in whatever sociological situation they actually find themselves.[1]

§ 7. Modern industrialism[2] is obviously in need of reform, and in its present form is a hindrance to the realization of Christian brotherhood. It has grown out of the invention of labour-saving machinery, the use of which requires capital and a species of organization of labour which centralizes its control in a few hands; deprives the individual worker of ownership and control of his tools; and reduces the security of his hold on profitable employment. The most evil consequence of all is the reduction of personal relations and values. The individual worker becomes a mere cog of a wheel in vast machinery; and anything approximating personal relations between himself and his employer is rarely possible. They are forced apart, and their interests are more or less mutually antagonistic. The labourers are practically driven into self-defensive organizations, and intermittent warfare prevails between employers and labour-unions.

Some remedy for this situation is plainly needed, and the paternalistic schemes to which just-minded heads of industrial plants occasionally resort do not

[1] F. J. Hall, "The Church and Social Betterment," in *Angl. Theol. Rev.*, Dec., 1920.

[2] See Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *s.vv.* "Industrialism," "Employers," "Employment," and "Economics;" J. A. Hobson, *Evolution of Modern Capitalism.*

meet the real difficulty—the sense of abject dependence and insecurity to which the workers are reduced. The solution will probably come through some system of coöperative ownership and management; but this must be worked out gradually by carefully conducted experiments, conducted by royal hearted leaders. In the meantime, the Church can only supply inspiration and emphasize the principles of righteousness which ought to be observed in all situations and under all systems—not failing to set forth the duty of efficient service in every walk of life.

§ 8. Among the obligations which ought to be emphasized in all situations is that of the fulfilment of contracts,[1] in spirit as well as in letter. Contracts require: (*a*) fit matter, lawful, honest and possible; (*b*) permissible cause; (*c*) legally capable parties; (*d*) legitimate consent. This last constitutes the contract itself; and it must be mutual; must have a recognized external sign; and must be unconstrained, reasonably deliberate, and without deception.

The obligations incurred by a lawfully made contract are determined and limited: (*a*) by its explicit terms; (*b*) by their necessary implications; (*c*) by relevant civil law, the force of which is implied in all contracts.

These obligations are terminated: (*a*) by their complete fulfilment; (*b*) by mutual acceptance of a substitutionary contract; (*c*) by mutual consent to

[1] On Contracts, Thos. Slater, *op. cit.*, Bk. VII; F. Pollock, *First Book of Jurisprudence*, Pt. I, ch. viii.

cancel the contract; (*d*) by allowed compensation; (*e*) by voluntary concession from the other party; (*f*) by such counter obligations as, in lawful effect, fulfil or dissolve it; (*g*) by obligations which legally invalidate the contract; (*h*) by substantial mistake, for then there was no real agreement; (*i*) if the contract was made conditionally, by failure to fulfil the condition; (*j*) by impossibility of fulfilment arising from conditions which did not exist when the contract was executed; (*k*) in many cases, by the death of one of the parties.

§ 9. Economic science [1] exhibits certain laws which control exchanges, whether the things exchanged are commodities, services or money. They cannot be violated when profit is in view, and can be disregarded only by substituting other ends, such as either robbery or charity. When such substitution occurs the consequences are sometimes morally evil and sometimes morally good. We give four illustrations of economic laws.

(*a*) The law of supply and demand is that economic values and prices are the result of an equation between supply and demand. Prices fall with an increase of supply and rise with an increase of demand, invariably expressing the balance of these two influences. Supply means what is available for exchange, and demand means what is sought for in exchange. This law cannot be altered; but either supply or demand can be, and often is altered, either

[1] On economics, Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *q.v.* (with good bibliog.).

in the interest of selfishness, as in a "corner,"[1] or in that of charity, as when the available supply of goods is increased in order to cheapen them for the poor. But the interests of charity are violated when methods of manipulation are employed which upset the general stability of exchange and disturb the legitimate profits of established business or industry.

(*b*) The law of profit in mercantile exchanges is to buy in a relatively cheap market, *e.g.*, a wholesale market, and sell in a relatively dear one, *e.g.*, a retail market. In the example given the profit represents remuneration to a commission merchant for facilitating the exchange of goods between producer and consumer. What are called speculative exchanges, however, aim at profit through buying at one time and selling at another in the same market. This law of profit cannot be broken. In a succession of exchanges profit cannot be obtained in any other way. But a man may, for charity's sake, decline to seek profit. In such case he withdraws from the sphere to which the law of profit applies. Such procedure, however, can only be exceptional; for if men generally refused to engage in economic exchanges a large portion of the community would be deprived of the means of subsistence, and no one could obtain them except either by producing them himself or by becoming an object of charity.

(*c*) The law that every economic exchange involves

[1] On the moral aspects of monopolies in general, see T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 535–538.

mutual service, a *quid pro quo* on both sides, is inviolate. The seller serves the buyer by furnishing him with what he values more than its price. The buyer serves the seller by giving him a price which he values more than what he sells. Similarly the employer gives wages which the employee values more than relief from work, and the employee performs work which the employer values more than what he pays for it. The difference between selfish exchange and Christian exchange lies in what is emphasized. Mutual service is unavoidable; but the selfish man thinks only of the service rendered to himself, while the Christian thinks of the service which he is in a position to render to the other. Justice works out in this way: the Christian derives happiness from service, and the selfish man gains the least satisfaction from his profit.

(*d*) An economic exchange postulates freedom from compulsion and from any other restraints than those which the general conditions of human subsistence require. If, therefore, men are compelled to make disadvantageous exchanges, the difficulty is not due to the laws of political economy but to some one's selfish manipulation of the conditions under which they operate, as in profiteering and speculation. The moral quality of speculation requires discrimination to estimate properly. It consists of exchanges in which ultimate profit is contingent upon future market values. The speculative element is present in much necessary business, busi-

ness which it would be absurd to regard as wrong. The principle by which to distinguish between legitimate and harmful speculation is the law of mutual service. It is true that every exchange constitutes for the moment a mutual service; but the question remains, Can a whole series of transactions of which a given exchange is a factor, afford profit to all parties concerned? If it obviously cannot do so, and profit on one side can only be gained at the cost of loss on the other, the exchange is rightly described as gambling; which includes not only games of chance in which values change hands, but also every form of venture in which it is known beforehand that one party's profit involves the other party's loss.[1]

§ 10. (*a*) *Gambling* offers one of several moral problems which demand attention here. The practice is justified on the plea that when the stakes are moderate the loser is merely paying a price which he can afford, and which he is willing to run the risk of paying, for recreation. As thus defined and limited, gambling cannot be said to be intrinsically wrong. The difficulty is that the practice tends in a large majority of instances to pass beyond defensible limits both of time consumed and of resources put to risk. At best it is a morally dangerous pastime, contrary to Christian expediency. Personal pride, as well as the hope of a turn in the run of luck, prevents the loser from withdrawing when the amusement is

[1] On speculation, see S. J. Chapman, Transactions of the Statistical Society, June, 1906.

becoming too costly, and the other party may be led both by ignorance and eagerness of victory to bring disaster—even ruin—upon him. The principle of stewardship requires that every one shall protect his resources from unnecessary risk of loss, so that he may use them wisely in fulfilment of his responsibilities under God. In brief, while not every form and degree of indulgence in gambling is sinful, the practice is usually unsafe and morally inexpedient.[1]

(*b*) *Usury*[2] means to-day the exacting of excessive

[1] On gambling, Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*; and *Cath. Encyc.*, *q.vv.*; B. S. Rowntree, *Betting and Gambling;* W. D. Mackenzie, *Ethics of Gambling;* Thos. Slater, *op. cit.*, pp. 557 ff. Durant Drake, *op. cit.*, p. 242, says, "Even if a man be rich, he should steward his wealth for purposes useful to society. And he must remember that if he can afford to lose, perhaps his opponent cannot. Moreover, if many cannot afford to lose, no one can afford to win. Insidiously this getting of unearned money promotes laziness, and the desire to acquire more money without work. It makes against loving relations with others, since one always gains at another's expense. It quickly becomes a morbid passion, an unhealthy excitement, which absorbs too much energy and kills more natural enjoyments." Games in which no money is put to risk are, of course, a perfectly righteous form of recreation; but their intemperate pursuit is sinful. The profession of affording amusement to others, whether by games or by the drama, is perfectly lawful if immoral elements are excluded. Cf. F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems*, ch. v.

[2] See T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 512–519. P. V. N. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 155, "The loaning of money in ancient times was in general a very different thing from similar money transactions in this commercial and industrial age. Those seeking loans were the very poor, who were forced to borrow to meet domestic necessities. Under such conditions the taking of interest would naturally be denounced, and those who did so would come to be regarded as extortioners and robbers of the poor." There is an entire disregard of the changed

rates of interest on financial loans, in particular, rates higher than the law permits. Formerly it meant the exacting of any interest whatever on such loans, and the practice was regarded in Christian circles as always wrong. The reason was that money was then regarded exclusively as a *fungible*, a loan of it being not a commercial service *in se* but an act of philanthropy. To require pay for philanthropy rightly seemed sinful. Under modern capitalistic conditions, however, the use of money has value in the production of wealth, and to lend is not only to postpone its use for oneself but to reduce one's resources for the increase of wealth. We lend at cost to ourselves—a cost not remedied by repayment merely of the sum lent. The exacting of interest is therefore a lawful form of securing remuneration for productive service. The fact remains, of course, that excessive interest—the present meaning of "usury"—may not be exacted without sin. It is a species of robbery.

(*c*) Business *combinations and trusts* [1] are inevitable and to a degree necessary means for effectively organizing and cheapening production, marketing and other forms of economic service. They cannot rightly be considered as wrong in themselves. Rightly built

circumstances by those who insist upon literal interpretation of Old Testament passages, *e.g.*, Deut. xxiii. 19–20; and to regard the language of the Fathers in this matter as binding us is wholly to mistake their application. Cf. Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *s.v.* "Usury (Christian)."

[1] On which, R. T. Ely, *Monopolies and Trusts; Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Monopoly"; Thos. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 535–538.

up and used, they are beneficial to the public and are to be welcomed. But they afford opportunities and temptations to wrong-doing on a large scale; and therefore require watchfulness on the part of all concerned, along with regulative legislation. The wrongs that are apt to appear are those of driving smaller concerns out of business, of monopolistic manipulation of prices and profiteering. Incidentally the wrongs inflicted by capitalists on labour are apt to be intensified, and made more difficult to remedy. Of course, the labouring classes have also the right to combine for self-protection, and labour unions are perfectly lawful. But they too are susceptible of abuse. They may inflict irreparable damage on industry and, by increasing the cost and difficulty of production, on the consuming public as well. Not being legally incorporated, they cannot be effectively restrained by suits for damages. These evils cannot be permanently remedied except by the development of social unselfishness in the community at large. Without this, the most reasonable laws and external adjustments fall short of adequate and abiding results.

(*d*) Poverty [1] is not invariably due to the fault of others, or to the existing conditions of productive service. A certain amount of it and of pauperism arises from incompetence and inability of adjustment having natural and unescapable causes. After every effort to improve general conditions, poverty, while

[1] *Cath. Encyc.* and Hastings, *op. cit., q.vv.;* B. S. Rowntree, *Poverty;* R. Hunter, *Poverty.*

it may be lessened in extent, cannot be wholly abolished. So it is that, after all has been done in obedience to Christian principles to reduce the reducible causes of poverty, the duty of philanthropic charity and almsgiving remains, whether to meet special emergencies or to help the incurably inefficient.

IV. *Obligations Voluntarily Incurred*

§ 11. Moral obligations are incurred not only by contracts, as above indicated, but also by vows and by choice of vocation in life.

Vows [1] are promises made to God, and are distinguished as (*a*) solemn and simple, the former being such as are made with the formal sanction of religious authority, *e.g.*, monastic vows; (*b*) personal and real, according to whether they affect personal conduct only, or property; (*c*) temporary and permanent, in no case exempting from prior moral obligations.

In order to be valid, a vow (*a*) must have true intention, voluntary, deliberate, with understanding of the matter, and seriously expressed; and such expression is not nullified or reduced in effect by mental reservations; (*b*) must have in view something morally lawful and morally possible. An invalid vow, if followed by evil consequences to others, creates the obligation to do what is possible to remedy

[1] Hastings, *op. cit.*, and *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, *q.vv.*; St. Thomas, II, II, lxxxviii, clxxxiv, 4; Thos. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 246–256; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 319–336; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–143.

the evil. A "personal" vow binds only its maker; but a "real" vow binds one's heirs, that is, within the limits of the inherited estate.

A vow may be nullified (*a*) by certain intrinsic causes such as fulfilment when permanent action is not required; expiration of the time in case of temporary vows; failure of the conditions expressed; and physical or moral impossiblity of fulfilment; (*b*) by prohibition of competent authority, as in the case of minors; (*c*) by ecclesiastical dispensation, which is possible in the case of any vow that has not obtained legal and civil force.

It is sinful to make vows of trivial nature and to make any vows whatever for light reasons, impulsively and without serious deliberation. The reason is that they have a religious nature, and enlarge our moral responsibilities—a consequence which may not be invited without earnest forethought and prayer.

§ 12. The obligations connected with personal vocation or life-work come under the head of obligations voluntarily incurred, because normally each one chooses or voluntarily accepts his or her own vocation. In any case, each vocation involves distinctive obligations pertaining to its proper fulfilment, falling mainly under the following heads: (*a*) The choice of vocation should be governed not only by personal bent and natural gifts, but also by spiritual and moral expediency, especially if a proposed occupation will involve loss of religious privileges and exposure to temptations to which the person concerned is pecu-

liarly liable to yield; (*b*) Preparation and training for one's life-work, especially if it is of highly specialized nature, is plainly of obligation, for vocational duty is not concerned with getting a living merely, but also with efficient service; (*c*) Regular and painstaking attention to one's several vocational duties, with the limitation that these duties shall not displace the prior and common obligations of Christians; (*d*) Proper relations towards, and coöperation with, those who share in the same vocation or who have to be reckoned with in its fulfilment; (*e*) Cheerful acceptance of, and obedience to, the laws and authorities under which the business of one's vocation is organized and carried on.

CHAPTER VII

EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE

§ 1. We have been considering thus far those branches of Christian obligation which are contained or implied in the first two parts of the divine "will of signs," commands and prohibitions of laws and precepts. For the purpose of avoiding actual sin, and for dealing with penitents, we have therefore covered the necessary ground. But to stop here would be to encourage legalism and to neglect in considerable measure those higher Christian obligations which have to do with attaining spiritual character and fitness for the eternal life that constitutes our appointed destiny and the organizing principle of all our obligations. It is true that the attainment of perfection belongs in Moral Science to Ascetic Theology, rather than to Moral Theology Proper; but the danger of a legalistic conception of human obligations, on the part of the clergy as well as of the laity, is grave and ever present.[1] We are therefore con-

[1] In the confessional a priest is immediately concerned with sin, and must be governed in judging by laws and precepts. But both for the penitent and for himself he is finally concerned with acquisition of positive holiness; and his success in dealing with sin will be conditioned by remembering this. Mere freedom from sin is also a

strained, before taking up the subjects immediately connected with a priest's work as confessor, to deal with the other and more inspiring parts of the "will of signs," viz., permissions, counsels and example. These are best understood in the light of a preliminary consideration of virtues, and of the external graces of a Christian gentleman.

§ 2. Personal character, wherein worth and merit in God's sight primarily consist, determines whether one is fit for, and capable of enjoying, heavenly beatitude. The acquisition of perfect character, therefore, is the organizing subjective end of all enlightened Christian conduct and effort. Perfection is indeed rarely attained even approximately in this world, that is, in the strict and ultimately required sense. In another sense, however, that of whole-hearted devotion to progress in virtue and spiritual congeniality to God, it is both practicable and obligatory in this life; and the completion of our progress after death is dependent upon our having initiated this progress on earth—at least by sincere repentance, and by such practice of holy virtue as our present opportunities permit. Our progress consists in our advance in the several virtues which constitute the character that is pleasing to God.

These virtues [1] are all summarized under the four

mere preliminary of such holiness. Cf. F. J. Hall, *Eschatology*, pp. 82–83, 178–180.

[1] On virtues, W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. iv; J. R. Illingworth, *Christian Character*, chh. iv–vi; J. B. Scaramelli, *Directorium Asceticum*, vols. III–IV.

"cardinal" virtues of prudence or wisdom, temperance, fortitude and justice; and the three heavenly virtues of faith, hope and love—the last-named being the crown and glorifying element in all perfect virtue whatsoever. The cardinal virtues emerge in the natural order of this world, and include those dispositions and habits which perfect our natural manhood for all the responsibilities, individual and social, of this natural life. They pertain to the moral life as that is understood in secular thought, a life which has many creditable illustrations even in non-Christian circles.

But the natural man is not, even in the noblest examples, fit for God, unless elevated by grace to the supernatural order of sainthood, and brought by the practice of true religion into transforming contact with God. The heavenly virtues are those which emerge in true religion, which pertain specifically to man's heavenly destiny, and which differentiate the saint from the natural man, however perfect in his native order. They both elevate the cardinal or natural virtues by giving them a higher organizing principle and supernatural dynamic, and supplement them with direct reference to equipment for life with God and for the communion of saints. The difference can well be illustrated by indicating the distinctive meaning of love, considered as a heavenly virtue. There is a natural virtue of love, but if purely natural it is also purely utilitarian in its fruit, concerned with the extension of welfare in this world's sense of that:

term. But heavenly or Christian love is centred in God. It indeed shines forth in manward manifestation; but the organizing principle and transfiguring aspect of it even in manward demonstration is the conscious and patient effort which it inspires to bring men to God for the blessed joy of mutual fellowship in the communion of saints.

§ 3. There is a certain finish and external grace in the social life of a truly virtuous man or woman which we have in mind when, without regard to ancestry or social rank, we designate one as a "gentleman" or a "lady." Such an one practices good manners, and does so without effort by reason of a species of culture which goes along with good breeding, but which has its roots in kindness and considerateness for others. That is, it is a fruit of virtue and a practically important branch of virtuous conduct. Like spiritual unction, good manners are sometimes put on for occasions, but then betray their artificiality and do not please. Only when practised for the sake of kindness and true courtesy are they truly virtuous.

Good manners have conventional standards or rules of etiquette, rules that vary in different social circles and ranks, but which ought to be normally conformed to as being the accepted methods of kindly and courteous intercourse. This is the legalistic aspect of the matter and may not be disregarded without boorishness, that is, lack of kindness. But a true gentleman or lady, while not forgetful of rules, is not enslaved by them, but seeks to fulfil their pur-

pose even more than their letter. Accordingly, such an one exercises discretion, and adjusts his or her conduct to each and every one and to every occasion. And the final test of good breeding—of kindness—is seen in the manners practised towards those of another social rank, whether inferior or superior. It is seen in considerate and kind regard for the manners of other circles than our own, however uncouth, on the one hand, or artificial, on the other, they may seem to be when we estimate them unkindly. Truly Christian gentlemen and ladies, in the sense above indicated, constitute the highest nobility on earth, although belonging to every social rank. Their nobility is supernatural—made possible by grace.

§ 4. To a Christian who has an adequate sense of his vocation and implied responsibilities, we have seen, the observance of laws and precepts, vital as it is, is only an initial stage of duty, Over and above all legalistic obligations is the principle of spiritual *expediency*, of always aiming to conduct oneself, whether in action or in avoidance of action, in the manner that best expedites Christian aims for oneself and for others alike.[1] It is in this light that he interprets the "will of signs" [2] in its branches of permissions and counsels—in all matters not specifically either commanded or prohibited.

[1] 1. Cor. vi. 12; x. 23–33. On various meanings and bearings of "expediency," see Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig., q.v.* Cf. H. L. Goudge, *First Ep. to Cor.*, on ch. vi. 12.

[2] Cf. ch. iv, § 2 *init.*, above.

Permissions consist of things which are neither commanded nor advised, but which are not prohibited. Permission does not in this connection mean positive sanction or license. Permissions come to the front especially in relation to practices which are liable to abuse. The fundamental principle involved is that we are given discretion, accompanied by responsibility for doing what is expedient from the moral and spiritual point of view.[1] Christians are released from the slavery of legalism, but not from the obligation to apply the principles which lie behind the law of God to the pursuit of Christian perfection both in themselves and in others.[2] In final effect, the so-called permissions are provisional, the proviso being that no liberty be taken which is inconsistent with the pursuit of our chief end. The following branches may be mentioned: (*a*) Christians are released from every legal or ceremonial obligation which was originally imposed in a dispensation and under conditions no longer existing.[3] (*b*) The privileges which enlightenment of conscience bring, inevitably have to be exercised in a society containing many who are unenlightened and cannot rightly enjoy these privileges.

[1] Puritanism, found in promoters of reformatory legislation who in many instances would repudiate the theory in terms, tend to place practices liable to abuse among things prohibited. In this they revert to Judaic legalism and tamper with Christian liberty.

[2] Christian liberty does not signify a lowering or lessening of obligation, but the substitution of mature judgment for the external rules of immaturity.

[3] *E.g.*, legalistic sabbatarianism.

Thus age emancipates from parental authority and from many obligations pertaining to the young. Education frees from many restraints imposed by narrow-minded consciences. Illness removes many obligations. Dispensations by competent authority release those who receive them, while others remain bound. In any case, the duty remains to avoid as far as practicable any obtrusive exhibitions of privilege which are likely to make it more difficult for the unprivileged to obey their consciences. (*c*) The development of science and invention, and changes in social life, bring new practices into vogue which are not covered by any existing precepts, and concerning which differences of moral judgment emerge, *e.g.*, smoking. In relation to such practices we have to apply the principles of discretion above described.

§ 5. Along with permissions we have to consider *counsels*. These may be either divine or human, and may have reference either to heavenly perfection or to earthly conduct. Technically speaking, it is not sin to reject any particular counsel, but the habit of rejecting counsel is certainly sinful, and in many cases the rejection of a particular counsel will breed sin. In brief, counsels afford needed help in moral judgment, but do not extend the scope of moral law. The obligation which they presuppose, and with reference to which they should be considered, is that we should endeavour to advance towards the perfection of Christ, and enlist prudent judgment in doing so.

The so-called *counsels of perfection* really pertain to one among other methods of advancing towards perfection. They are given only to those who are called to initiate in this life certain extrinsic conditions of the future life of heaven, viz., poverty, chastity, and obedience. To follow these counsels is said to pertain to a higher life, but this is true only in an external and relative sense, as just explained. The call to interior perfection, or the full development of spiritual character, is of obligation upon all; and is within the reach of every truly Christian type of vocation.[1]

It is to be noticed: (*a*) The counsels of perfection, technically so-called, are not to be confused with canonical discipline. Roman priests are under invariable obligation, except in Uniat Churches, to be celibates, not because all priests have received counsel to that effect, but because the canon law so requires. A call to the priesthood is one thing, and the counsel

[1] On counsels of perfection, St. Matt. xix. 16–29 and parallels; St. Thomas, I, II, cviii; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Counsels"; Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, *s.v.* "Counsels and Precepts." Many writers treat these Counsels as offering a short road to perfection, but this needs to be accepted with great caution. *To those who are called* to a "religious" vocation, the acceptance and practice of such vocation certainly carries them upward; but to others the "religious" life is likely to be a hindrance. It is needful to remember also in this connection that Christianity offers but one standard of final attainment for all. Those who are backward, especially those handicapped by ignorance, have indeed to be given "milk for babes"—not because they are exempt, but because they are at an early stage of progress. No one, however, can *remain* at the legalistic stage and enjoy Christian beatitude.

to celibacy in that connection is another thing. (*b*) Vows in this connection create the obligations of vows generally, whether justified by genuine counsel from God or not. Therefore the greatest caution needs to be exercised in making them. (*c*) The religious life, so-called, has no intrinsic superiority over any other life which has a divine call behind it. No conditions in this world afford intrinsic superiority in Christian character except the sacraments of salvation. (*d*) The life of a religious does not bring escape from carnal temptation in its coarser forms. To resort to it, therefore, as a safeguard against lust is a frightful blunder. The divinely appointed safeguard against lust is marriage. (*e*) Those who are married may receive counsel to practice temporary approximations to the celibate life, but that the married life should be or normally can be permanently lived after the manner of celibacy is a very dubious proposition.

The principle of counsels is of much wider application than that which we have been considering. Counsels pertain generally to the choice of methods and practices which are favourable to spiritual advance, although not specifically required by precept. The general obligation of seeking and weighing the best advice available is certain, whether its supposed excellence is based upon the official or upon the intellectual superiority of the adviser. Thus the advice of priests, of parents, of teachers, and of moral and spiritual writers, may become of the greatest impor-

tance. The terms of advice, as such, however, do not constitute law, and their disregard is not of itself sin. But we are verily bound by our convictions of what is best to do, and advice may constitute an important factor in attaining to intelligent convictions. The need of advice is especially apparent when we perceive that if we fail to seek and follow it we are likely to fall into material sin. Probability is often the only rule by which we can guide our moral conduct, and knowingly to do what appears probably either sinful in itself, or inevitably tending to sin, is sinful. We should distinguish between the obligation of seeking our chief end and that of employing means and methods of doing so. In so far as these means and methods are imposed by law, whether divine or human, our conscience is bound; but in other directions we have to depend upon fallible judgment, and there is not the same strict and technical basis of responsibility. The emphasis to be placed upon counsel is of course increased when there is a divinely recognized relationship of superiority in the position of him who gives advice.

Many individual Christians are troubled by "scrupulous" consciences, that is, they are unable to arrive at a determinate judgment, even when sufficient data are available to warrant decision.[1] More often than not the cause is that most difficult of diseases to cure, spiritual pride. Such persons ought to be governed implicitly by the best advice that they

[1] On scrupulous consciences, see ch. viii, § 7 (*b*), below.

can obtain. The reason is that determinate conduct is necessarily more safe than vacillation.

§ 6. *Example* exhibits in the concrete, whether in its fulness or in its process of formation, the character which God wills that we should assimilate and into which we should grow. This character is the character of God.[1] (*a*) It is partly exhibited in creative and providential operations of the natural order. Really to live according to nature is, to some degree, to imitate God. (*b*) It is given the most articulate exhibition, and is translated into the terms of human conduct, by the life and character of Christ. Therefore the ideal of Christian life is to imitate Christ. This cannot be done indiscriminately, for many of His actions were justified only by His mediatorial office and by conditions which are not repeated in our lives. The imitation of Christ means growth in the character which was exhibited in His life, the manner of this growth being determined by our own providential circumstances. His character represents the goal of our development, and His life transcends our immediate possibilities; but His example is effective because of the power which He communicates to us in His Body, which enables us both to imitate His character and to persevere in develop-

[1] "Be ye therefore imitators of God," Ephes. v. 1. Cf. St. Matt. v. 48. No example binds us by its own right except that of God—of Christ because He is God. F. J. Hall, *Incarnation*, p. 126. If no example of moral perfection, recognizable as such, were available, we should be deprived of a most powerful incentive and of final proof of the reality of right.

ment after His likeness.[1] (*c*) The example of Christ has to be supplemented by examples of progress out of sin into righteousness. Christ could not afford such example. Therefore the example of the saints constitutes a factor in our imitation of God. The value of saintly lives is due to their exhibiting illustrations of the practical possiblity of growth of sinners in the perfection of Christ.[2]

§ 7. Summarizing the distinctive marks and obligations of truly Christian conduct, as set forth and implied in all that has been said in this manual: (*a*) Its controlling end and organizing principle is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever. (*b*) Its fundamental law is love toward God, a love abounding also because of its nature and object toward man, and determined in its specific branches by the Decalogue and by the terms of the Christian covenant; (*c*) Its expediency requires an exercise of enlightened discretion, both in interpreting the letter of the law and in meeting the problems of conduct not determined by the law—resort to the best available counsel in doubtful cases being gladly adopted; (*d*) Its liberty is an emancipation from servile legalism and scrupulosity;—not license or the lowering of moral requirement, but the outcome of Spirit-guided insight,

[1] F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–267 (gives further refs. on p. 260). Some of the more important texts are St. Matt. xi. 29–30; St. John xiv. 6, 12; Rom. viii. 29; xv. 2, 3, 5; Ephes. v. 1–2; Phil. ii. 5–11; 1 St. Pet. ii. 20–21; 1 St. John iii. 3.

[2] Hugh F. Blunt, *Great Penitents, passim;* F. J. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–263.

enlightened judgment and an aim that is both adequate and sincere. (*e*) Its distinctive earthly mark is the habitual practice of repentance—"the Way of Purgation." (*f*) Its concrete example and objective standard is the human life and character of God-incarnate, Jesus Christ, the imitation of whom completely summarizes what a Christian should endeavour to become; (*g*) Its supplementary examples are the lives of Christian saints, as illustrating manners and possibilities for sinners in the imitation of Christ on earth; (*h*) Its indispensable conditions and aids are the sacramental means of regenerating, sanctifying and enabling grace, and the established methods of spiritual culture—"the Way of Illumination." (*i*) Its ultimate result is a realization of personality by attainment of perfection and by union with God—"the Way of Union"—this introducing us to the communion of saints, and bringing that form of abiding happiness wherein true beatitude consists.

The rest of this volume is concerned with matters related to a priest's responsibilities in dealing with penitent sinners, that is, with the problem of administering the dispensation of *divine mercy*. If this is kept in mind by the reader, he will not make the blunder of treating its distinctions and allowances as in any way modifying the standard of Christian responsibility above set forth. They have to do with the oft experienced emergencies arising from human ignorance and weakness—not with the aims to which reconciled penitents need to be recalled. We may

not forget that escape from sin, on the one hand, is an essential preliminary of Christian progress in which mercy to penitents is prominent; but, on the other hand, is merely a beginning. Sinlessness is not Christian perfection, although essential to it.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

§ 1. Casuistry is literally the science of cases.[1] More largely, it may be made to deal also with the methods, principles and rules to be observed in dealing with moral and spiritual problems, such as are brought to priests for solution, whether in the confessional or elsewhere. It is preëminently designed to assist the conscience in its judgments and to equip those to whom pertains the guidance of souls in difficulty. Its scope may easily be, and here is, extended also to include treatment of the qualifications needed by one who hears confessions, and of the principles and methods to be observed in hearing them.

The value of casuistry for a priest depends upon no theory as to the degree of necessity of confession, or

[1] J. M. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos., q.v.* Casuistry is "(1) The systematic discussion of the application of moral law to particular cases (called 'cases of conscience') in which such application is not clear and certain. (2) The over-subtle or verbal discussion of the moral quality of particular acts or sentiments, especially when tending toward greater moral laxity than is permitted by the dominant moral opinion of the time or by the unsophisticated individual conscience."

as to its desirable frequency. It arises from the simple fact that, whether in or out of the confessional, priests are called upon to give help in solving moral and spiritual difficulties which cannot be solved by mere common sense, even when sound knowledge of the general laws of Christian conduct is possessed. Their solution often demands much skill, and that kind of knowledge which comes from the study of precedents and of well-tested and matured results of the experience of casuists of past ages. Casuistry seeks to present these results in logical order for convenient mastery.

Two causes have brought casuistry into discredit: (*a*) the abuse of the principle of probabilism; (*b*) the minimizing of sin associated with such abuse.[1]

[1] Bp. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, p. 79, Casuistry is "a complicated system of laws for the breaking of laws, a system which, whatever its value, could never be a complete system on account of the indefinite variety of circumstances"; also *ibid.*, p. 218. This is typical of innumerable sweeping condemnations which fail entirely to notice the first definition given above by J. M. Baldwin, and to allow for the inevitable necessity of casuistry of some sort whenever men attempt to put into practice the laws of moral life. All sound moralists would agree with Bp. D'Arcy that casuistry "can never be a complete system"; for if it became such it would be a dead system, out of relation to ever-changing conditions of life. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, pp. 327–329, enumerate the dangers of casuistry; "(*a*) It tends to magnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit. (*b*) This ethical system also tends in practice to a legal view of conduct. (*c*) Probably the worst evil of this moral system is that it tends to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity"; but, as they continue, "All fixed rules have the same tendencies," and to go on without rules reduces us to a state of pure individualism, intuitionalism in its extreme form, where every man does that which seems right in his

But there is a sound casuistry, and perverted science should not be the ground for condemning science.

We make no attempt here to deal comprehensively with the subject of Casuistry. But after a résumé of the parts of the sacrament of Penance, our treatment will cover—in brief outline—(*a*) The duty and profit of Confession; (*b*) The priest's qualifications and methods; (*c*) Types of consciences to be reckoned with; (*d*) The sick and dying; and, in a concluding chapter, (*e*) Sin, and its distinctions.

§ 2. As to the "matter" of the sacrament, the Thomistic and generally accepted view regards it as: (*a*) Proximate, or the confession itself with all necessarily involved in it, *i.e.*, contrition and satisfaction; and (*b*) Remote, or the sins committed, necessarily including every mortal sin, with mention of any aggravating circumstances—the "free" remote matter being venial sin.[1] Scotists hold that the "matter" is the absolution.

own eyes. We must remember that casuistry, though quite differently applied, is as firmly implanted in the Puritan system as in the Jesuistic, and ultimately goes back in its evil form to the Pharisaic. H. Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, p. 17, "the odium which in the seventeenth century overwhelmed the systematic discussion by theologians of difficult and doubtful cases of morals—though undeniably in part deserved—went to an unreasonable length, and obscured the real importance of the study against which it was directed."

[1] See T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 148–153. Mortal sin already confessed may be confessed again when sorrow for it is renewed; such confession and the absolution received confirms the older and infuses fresh grace into the soul. Besetting sins, even though venial *in specie*, ought to be confessed *in genere*.

(*a*) Four essential parts are found in the sacrament: Contrition, Confession, Absolution and Satisfaction.[1] *Contrition* is a hearty sorrow for one's sins as such, and because by them the love of God has been outraged. It involves the will and the intellect as well as the emotions. In fact it must originate in the will, because sin itself originated there. It includes as necessary elements a thorough detestation of the sins committed and a firm resolution, by God's help, to sin no more. All is summed up in the Ash Wednesday Collect, "Create and make in us," etc. Whether or no the sacrament of Penance is used, contrition is a necessary stage in the salvation of all who have fallen into grievous sin. Contrition may be either perfect or imperfect. Perfect contrition springs from a profound hatred of sin and has for its motive the love of God. Imperfect contrition, or "attrition," springs also from a hatred of sin, but is dominated by some other motive than love of God, such as either the fear of hell, or the desire for heaven.[2] The distinction between attrition and imperfect contrition is not easily made, but rests upon the fact that attrition is mere remorse, having its source in motives which are purely natural.[3] In any case, it is

[1] See W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. ii; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, § 414.

[2] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 156, "The sinner in the Sacrament of Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural, founded on revelation and on faith."

[3] Attrition is often so defined as to include cases of real but imper-

not based upon the degree of sorrow felt, but upon the motive which inspires the sorrow. The motive of fear of hell, leaving unaltered the affection for sin and the desire to commit it except for the fear, is insufficient, even with the help of the sacrament, to reconcile the sinner with God.

Contrition properly contains certain essential qualities.[1] It must be (*a*) internal, of the heart and soul; (*b*) supernatural, owing its origin to grace and based upon enlightened reason or motives supplied by supernatural faith; (*c*) sovereign, or supreme, including a hatred of sin as the worst of evils, a willingness to

fect contrition, *e.g.*, Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 142; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 28. On the conflict between Contritionism and Attritionism see Pohle-Preuss, *The Sacraments*, vol. III, pp. 170–180. Neither is *de fide;* but there is a strong and widely spread feeling against the sufficiency of attrition to secure absolution. F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 235–238: "Attrition, or feeling caused by anticipated consequences of sin, is not sufficient until converted by love into sorrow for sin itself. But the act of confession frequently causes true contrition when it is otherwise wanting, and this is one of the arguments for resort to auricular confession." In general, *The Catechism of Nicholas Bulgaris*, p. 14, gives a helpful distinction: "Contrition is when a man repents for his sins, not out of fear of punishment or other penalties, simply because he did not do the will of the all-good God, which he regards as the greatest evil of all that he could meet with. . . . Attrition is when a man repents for his sins, since he fears that for them eternal punishment will overtake him."

[1] See Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–31; F. G. Belton, *Manual for Conf.*, Pt. II, ch. i; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–32; Schieler-Heuser, *Theory and Practice of the Confessional*, pp. 98–111. *Ibid.*, p. 98, "If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with fruit, the contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, supreme, and sacramental." Adequate self-examination is obviously a necessary prerequisite.

suffer all things rather than to sin, a thorough conversion and turning to God; (*d*) universal, having reference implicitly at least to all sins; for no sin can be forgiven in isolation from others, if there be such. Because sufficient contrition is the proximate matter of the sacrament, it must precede absolution or be present in the soul when absolution is pronounced.

(*b*) *Confession* is the next step in the sinner's recovery by means of Penance, and is the acknowledgment before a priest of the sins committed, for the purpose of securing absolution.[1] This confession must extend to details, a mere acknowledgment of wrong-doing in general is not sufficient. If the sins are grievous, a mention of the number and species is requisite. Forgotten mortal sins should be confessed at the next confession after they are recalled. Venial sins are "free" matter severally considered and need not be confessed; but besetting sins should not be omitted and confession of venial sins generally is most helpful. Deliberate silence concerning them when they weigh upon the conscience is most dangerous.

[1] See Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. II. ch. ii; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–52; F. J. Hall, *Sacraments*, pp. 238–240; St. Thomas, III, suppl. vi–x; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 163–170; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 348–401; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 151–162; Schieler-Heuser, *op. cit.*, p. 137, "Sacramental confession is the self-accusation of sins committed after Baptism and not yet remitted in the Sacrament, and it is made by the penitent to a priest having the necessary faculties" (which means with us any priest in good standing) "and with the object of obtaining absolution." We should dwell on the last phrase, for confession is not a confidence given a priest as a friend.

The needed qualities of confession are variously listed,[1] but include the following elements: (1) entire, embracing all remembered mortal and besetting sins not yet confessed, with mention of at least the approximate number and specific circumstances which change or affect their nature. In case of doubt as to the nature or quality of a sin, the penitent for safety should confess it; (2) clear, not mixed up with irrelevant things, but a bare declaration of sins committed, with as much brevity as is consistent with clarity; (3) humble, in heart and body, the latter including posture; (4) prudent, honest, discreet, of one's own faults and not of those of others; and the name of any one implicated should neither be asked for nor be allowed to be mentioned in any case; (5) sincere and faithful, not attempting to misrepresent or mitigate, without dissimulation, especially in grave matters, lest there be added the sin of sacrilege; (6) vocal, not by writing or by signs, except in case of necessity; and the penitent must be present. Confession may not be made by letter;[2] (7) sorrowful, which might be combined with humble. Confession

[1] These are variously reckoned by different writers; St. Thomas Aquinas lists sixteen; while J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 353, thinks they may be reduced to two, entire and sincere; but to these Koch-Preuss adds clearness. See Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–36; whom we have followed almost verbally.

[2] The question arising in modern days as to the validity of absolution given over the telephone has been left open by Roman authorities. See Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 153, note 6; but Pohle-Preuss, *The Sacraments*, vol. III, pp. 99–100, conclude against its validity. The safeguarding of the "seal" would be impossible.

is a self-accusation, not an excuse. (8) pure in words, and in intention to obtain true absolution or the grace of the sacrament—not to obtain the compassion of the confessor, etc. It should be made bravely, not as seeking sympathy; (9) with the disposition of amendment, the purpose of abiding by the judgment of the confessor, of avoiding occasions of sin, of making restitution when possible, of performing the penance assigned, and of using the remedies suggested; (10) It is hardly necessary to add that it should be voluntary.

General confessions [1] are never required, except of course in the case of a first confession; but they may be made at any time, will at times be found helpful as acts of spiritual discipline, and should not be discouraged unless too frequent, except in the case of a particular class of scrupulous penitents of whom we speak below.

(*c*) *Amendment* [2] is an indispensable accompaniment of repentance.[3] It must be firmly purposed, efficacious (for avoiding occasions of temptation, so

[1] See Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–44; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. v; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 161; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 169–170.

[2] F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. ii; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–32; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 146–150.

[3] Roman theologians (Trent, Sess. xiv, cap. 4; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 342–345) hold that it may be either explicit (formal) or implicit (virtual), ordinarily it would certainly be the former. Self-examination and contrition have the incidental value of leading to proper recognition of the sins wherein an explicit purpose of amendment is needed.

far as is possible), and universal in extending to one's life as a whole.[1] In short, it is a fixed determination of coöperating with divine grace in resisting temptation for the future. Its hope of success is grounded in our trust in God, and rests upon the theological virtues. Failures should not bring discouragement and despondency;[2] but moral effort is indispensable. It implies readiness on the part of the penitent to employ all means necessary or useful for the avoidance of sin, especially to shun all voluntary proximate occasions, and to repair, so far as possible, whatever injury has been done to others.

(*d*) *Absolution*[3] must be given by the priest to all who confess their sins with a proper disposition, the presumption being always in favour of the penitent. We have already noticed certain cases in which conditional absolution may be given.[4] On the other hand, the priest is bound under pain of mortal sin to deny absolution when there is certainty that the

[1] Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 29, "This purpose of amendment should have three qualities. It should be: 1. Firm, there should be a voluntary determination not to relapse into sin, no matter how great may be the loss, or how much influenced by human fear. 2. It should be effectual for all occasions of sin. 3. Universal, extending to all mortal sins." To the last we may add, at least impliedly, venial sins also. See further, St. Thomas, III, lxxxvii, 1, ad 1.

[2] St. Matt. xxvi. 33–35, 69–75.

[3] Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–57; E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–158; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. IV, ch. vi; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 177–182.

[4] F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–148; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 179.

penitent is not properly disposed. But before sending such a person away the priest should do all in his power to secure a proper disposition. Reservation of the case is a sort of half-way measure between absolution and refusal, when there is doubt as to the reality of the repentance and no danger in delaying absolution for a time. Admittedly, however, it is a modern practice and usually unjustified, particularly in our own circumstances with which we are immediately concerned. Either one alternative or the other had better be followed.[1] As to the form, "I absolve thee" is probably sufficient in emergency as a minimum; but, as in the case of the other sacraments, the full form should be used normally, practically always. That given in the Office for the Visitation of the Sick in the English Prayer Book is most commonly used.

(*e*) Satisfaction normally presupposes the imposition of a penance, which, however, is not necessary to the validity of the sacrament; although as a "faithful steward of the mysteries of God the priest is bound to impose a sacramental penance."[2] It should be proportioned to the sinner's guilt and adapted to the age, sex, condition, abilities, etc. The penitent is strictly bound to perform the penance assigned. If, however, he deems it too severe, he may

[1] But *per contra*, see F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–150, who follows Schieler-Heuser, pp. 411–415.

[2] F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. vi; E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, ch. v, art. 9.

ask to have it commuted or consult another priest. Failure to perform it, apart from weighty cause or the smallness of the matter, becomes a mortal sin. One penance may not be substituted for another by the penitent, but he may in a subsequent confession ask to have it commuted either by the same or by another priest.

The penance should, as far as possible, be contrary to the chief sin confessed, *e.g.*, almsgiving as a remedy for avarice, humiliations for pride, bodily mortifications, fasting, etc., for lust. They should by no means be grave enough to suggest or imply the idea of equivalence. They should be calculated to deepen the loathing of the sins confessed. They should be usually of a devotional nature, *e.g.*, the Lord's Prayer, a Collect or Collects, a Psalm, a hymn of penitential or devotional nature, a meditation. There is danger in physical penances, fasting, etc., that they may induce a sense of merit and equivalence. The penance should be imposed before absolution, but if overlooked it may be validly imposed afterwards, but before the penitent has left the tribunal.

Satisfaction [1] has to do here with the sinner's part in identifying himself with Christ in His passion, by contrite self-mortification and by willing endurance of whatever temporal penalties or penances may be

[1] F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 232–235; E. B. Pusey, *Is Healthful Reunion Impossible?* pp. 69–73; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–70; W. Elwin, *Conf. and Absol'n in the Bible*, pp. 22–26, 410–415; St. Thomas, III, suppl. xii–xv; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 171–174; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 183–187.

imposed upon him, whether by divine justice or by sacramental prescription of a priest. Its value and acceptance by God rest entirely in the satisfaction made by Christ on the Cross, while its essential condition in us is true contrition and purpose of amendment. The sacramental sign of this is the acceptance of the penance given. Restitution should be made wherever it is possible. The validity of the absolution does not, however, depend upon the performance of the satisfaction imposed, and no satisfaction other than the penance need be imposed.[1]

§ 3. The duty and profit of confession is clear; and the obligation to resort to sacramental confession under certain conditions is partly intrinsic and partly of ecclesiastical precept. Intrinsically the institution of the sacrament by the all-seeing Ruler of consciences indicates that it will prove to be necessary in cases for the end which it is designed to fulfil. As the fulfilment of that end, the remedy of sin, is a rudimentary obligation of Christians, resort to confession will evidently be in cases obligatory. Its occasional necessity is grounded in: (*a*) inability in certain cases sufficiently to repent without it; (*b*) the remedial grace involved; (*c*) the claims of ecclesiastical discipline. Extrinsically, ecclesiastical requirements have varied in different ages and in dif-

[1] The moral principle of satisfaction here accepted is ancient, and need not be taken to imply the doctrine of indulgences, which is of mediæval origin, and is by us rejected. Cf. F. J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 88–89; *The Church*, p. 278 (with refs.). To pursue the subject here is foreign to the purpose of this manual.

ferent parts of the Church. Anciently confession was expected after very serious offences, and in time of dangerous illness.[1] It was customary also for the priest to impose upon those guilty of certain offences a public acknowledgment of them and submission to public penance. As this led to scandal the practice was abandoned.

Later Canon Law both in the Eastern and Roman Churches requires private confession once a year, and a confession before each communion is often recommended in the Latin Church. Our own discipline makes confession obligatory only when other means of repentance do not quiet the conscience, the determination being left to individual consciences. This means that it is not "compulsory" by ecclesiastical rule, but that the individual conscience should regard it as obligatory when there is need. It should be noted, moreover, that Holy Scripture implies that those who are dangerously ill and have sins on their consciences should confess them.[2] Such a precept binds in every part of the Church, and a priest is everywhere bound to move one *in extremis* to confession.

The value of confession is not confined to cases of necessary precept, although its use when not indispensable nor expressly required by the Church is of counsel rather than of precept. It is useful: (*a*)

[1] A full history in O. D. Watkins, *Hist. of Penance*, epitomized in F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 214–223.

[2] St. James v. 15–16.

to deepen and perfect repentance, the danger of habitually relying on perfecting contrition without sacramental aid being often very serious; (*b*) to fortify the bands of ecclesiastical discipline; (*c*) to revive and tone up the powers of resistance against temptation; (*d*) as a routine means of humiliation and self-discipline; (*e*) to secure competent counsel and guidance.

The right of private judgment outside the sphere of positive precept is to be maintained. In fact, the value of habitual confession depends partly upon its voluntariness, and upon the sense of its value in the penitent's mind. Yet the private judgment referred to ought to be enlightened judgment. The conscience should be educated to discern the value of confession, and the unlikelihood that any individual can escape spiritual loss altogether or for very long intervals while dispensing with its employment. It is the prerogative and duty of priests to teach their people on this subject, and to encourage and facilitate the use of so valuable an aid to perfection, and to spiritual security. Such teaching should, however, be true. It is quite misleading to say baldly that no mortal sin can be remedied without resort to confession. It is true to teach that great advance towards perfection is as a rule dependent upon the use of this means of grace, so that one who refuses to use it year after year is in all probability suffering spiritual loss, and may be failing altogether in really repenting.

A priest may not exact confession as a prerequisite

of Confirmation or other spiritual privilege, *i.e.*, as making this a general precept. But he may, and in cases ought to, urge such confessions as obviously profitable. Moreover, if he is convinced that in an individual case a candidate will not be duly prepared for the privilege in question without confession, he may refuse to be a party to his presentation until such confession has been made. The priest is entitled to have reasonable assurance, in accordance with his own judgment, that those whom he admits to the privileges of grace are duly prepared therefor—subject, however, to the laws of the Church and the right of appeal to the Ordinary. This prerogative is liable to abuse, but so are many things; and a priest who lacks sound judgment will always hinder the advance of God's kingdom.

The unbaptized are not to be admitted to sacramental absolution, for prior to Baptism there exists no capacity to receive the grace of this sacrament. Baptism itself is a means whereby previous sins are remedied; but the recipient may profitably make a confession in advance, being taught that absolution is received in Baptism. While such a practice may rightly be encouraged, it may not be required. Its value lies in the additional self-knowledge one secures in the preparation, and in the deepening of contrition which is gained thereby.

§ 4. The qualifications of a priest[1] obviously in-

[1] See E. T. Churton, *The Use of Penitence*, chh. vii, viii, x; Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 1, "A confessor ought to have: 1. The love of a

clude appreciation of the value of confession and of his own duty. When it is lacking an attitude of mere sufferance will be inevitable. or even of unwillingness. That a worthy priest will enjoy hearing confessions on any other ground than a love of duty and a desire to help sinners is exceedingly unlikely. The gloating curiosity imputed to priests by sensation mongers is contrary to fact, especially in the case of those who hear many confessions. The sinner's attitude of penitence, the sense of official relation, and the grace of Order, alike hinder such curiosity. A priest is not likely to possess the necessary qualifications unless he has felt the need of confession for himself and practised it. Personal experience is a great opener of the mind.

Father. 2. The skill of a Physician. 3. The wisdom of a Theologian or spiritual Doctor. 4. The acuteness of a Judge." For these qualifications in detail, see *ibid.*, pp. 1–13. Bp. Webb does not clearly make the distinction between a confessor and a spiritual guide, and they need not always be the same. Fenelon's *Spiritual Letters* show that he was guide to many whose confessions he rarely or never heard. Consequently much that is said by Bp. Webb has reference to guides rather than to confessors. But the priest's duty is not done when he has heard the confession and given or refused absolution. T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 216, "In the confessional he holds the place of Christ for the reconciliation of sinners with God; he is also the minister of the sacrament, and as such he is bound to see that it is validly and lawfully received by the penitent." In short, his office is not merely mechanical, to convey absolution or refuse it. All forms of confession in use request "counsel and advice" as well as "absolution." On the four-fold office of the confessor, see further Dr. Pusey's very valuable translation of the Abbé Gaume's *Manual for Confessors*, pp. 3–75; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. IV; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 216–225.

"The priest's lips should keep knowledge."[1] He must be well versed in moral science in all departments, for the variety of moral questions which he will be obliged to answer is practically endless. This knowledge should be kept fresh by frequent reading of moral works, and by the habit of consulting them often on moral problems as they arise. It should not be forgotten that individual experience is limited, and fails to help in many inevitable questions. Moreover, the reading of good moral treatises serves to protect the priest from loss of realization of the central nature of those Godward factors in life which the people about him overlook.

The priest should none the less have experience of human needs, and of the needs peculiar to his time and people. Books will help to articulate the results of such experience and to guide the priest in taking note of the right things. For this reason book-learning is needed even in this connection. But experience itself is indispensable. Such experience begins within. To know oneself is to take a long step in the knowledge of mankind. The common factors of moral life are much larger than the individualistic, and complete knowledge of one soul contains much knowedge of every soul. Moreover, one's own condition lies open always to close study, which is not true of the souls of others. Personal self-examination and repentance is the true primary guide to the real significance of the repentance of others. But experience is

[1] Mal. ii. 7.

not to be sought in abnormal lines not opened up by divine providence. What is called "slumming" is perilous and misleading to the mind. It is our own people that we need to understand, and they are, for the most part, normal. An effective pastoral relation and a reflecting mind will supply what is lacking in the experience of one's own personal conditions and needs. The reading of the Scriptures is not to be overlooked; for they supply us with a moral world divinely presented for our study.

Incidentally: (*a*) we should not confuse the demands of the time with its needs; (*b*) we should study such sciences as sociology, law, and political economy; but as revealing the conditions under which Christian virtues are to be practised, rather than for the purpose of devising social schemes. The true priest is a saver of souls, not a leader in politics.

Fatherly love is essential to success in dealing with penitents. (*a*) This means, first of all, sympathy. To be touched with the feeling of the penitent's infirmities, to the avoidance of unfeeling harshness of judgment and tone. (*b*) It means patience also, both in hearing the tale and in exercising deliberation in speech. Impatient expressions will harden penitents' hearts rather than deepen their contrition. Severity may be necessary, but it should be evidently actuated by thoughtful regard for the penitent's recovery, as the severity of the surgeon who cuts to heal. (*c*) It signifies paternal dignity and a solemn sense of authority to bind and to loose. In relation

to confession the priest may not address his penitent as if on equal terms, whatever may be the case in other connections. Thus, if a priest hears the confession of a bishop, or of a high civil dignitary, he is for the time being the superior, and must assume the dignity belonging to his office. But such dignity, if real, is unaffected. Self-assertiveness and pomposity are hopelessly out of place. (*d*) Finally, it signifies disinterestedness. Personal ties and partialities must be banished wholly from the confessional. The priest's manner must be judicially the same for all.

Self-restraint has often to be exercised in high degree. The priest is engaged in the confessional in an official capacity, and he may be obliged to recall this fact, especially in dealing with females or with those whose cases prove to be especially touching. The personal element must be eliminated severely. This does not mean that we should fail to show sympathy when it is called for, but that this sympathy should be priestly rather than personal—genuine and abundant, but as from Christ and without carnal emotionalism. The lack of personal detachment will often bring the priest into danger and may involve the penitent in the same peril. Sympathy may easily become maudlin, if not controlled by the purpose which ought to be kept in view.

Skill in rapid diagnosis is to be cultivated most earnestly. Hesitation is apt to breed a lack of confidence on the penitent's part; but it will often tax a priest's judgment sorely to give wise counsel with-

out delay. The priest may pause to consider, but not too long, nor with evidence of vacillation. If the case is very grave, he may even reserve his decision to an appointed time in the future; but in doing this he must be able to show satisfactorily the need of delay and the gravity of the question. Such skill is the joint result of the supernatural gift of counsel and of earnest study of human nature, accompanied by mastery of moral science. Not every priest can command the highest skill, but he is under obligation to cultivate his gift in this direction and to exercise prudence in uttering judgments. Promptness does not mean nervous haste, or happy-go-lucky thoughtlessness.

Finally the priest must possess reserve. This is especially necessary in relation to what is heard in the confessional; but a priest who is known to be gossipy and without reserve in his ordinary conversation is not likely to be trusted as to his power of secrecy in official matters.

The seal of the confessional may not be broken without the express and voluntary consent of the penitent;[1] and the limitations expressed or implied in such consent must be rigidly observed. What is learned under this seal is not personal knowledge but official; and the priest possesses it not as a man but

[1] F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 240–243; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. III; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s.v.* "Seal"; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 228, "This obligation is imposed by the natural, the divine, and by positive ecclesiastical law." It is founded in justice and charity.

as a representative of God. Personally the priest is ignorant here, and according to most authorities may honestly deny knowledge. The obligation extends to everything connected with the sacrament, *e.g.*, the penance assigned, whether a certain person has made confession, etc. The right to plead privilege in such connection is recognized in the courts of civilized nations.[1] Not only must all verbal betrayal of these secrets be avoided, but every line of action which may involve betrayal of the knowledge thus acquired. Even in case of crime[2] no testimony may be offered without the free consent of the party involved. The death of the penitent does not release the priest from the obligation. The obligation also extends to the penitent, and obviously he ought normally to avoid all reference to the matter. To violate the seal is regarded universally as a sin of the gravest kind.[3]

§ 5. Confessions may be heard wherever circumstances make it necessary or convenient; but when practicable they ought to be heard in a religious environment, such as an open Church, at a place obviously devoted to that purpose, or in a confessional box. The latter is especially suited to female penitents, and to the avoidance of embarrassing publicity.[4]

[1] See F. G. Belton, *Present Day Problems*, ch. i.

[2] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 232.

[3] Innocent III, "The priest who reveals the sin confessed to him sins more gravely than he who committed it."

[4] A priest who recommends the use of the sacrament should not make it harder or more embarrassing for the penitent than necessary. He will promote the use of the sacrament by publicly announcing a

The preliminary devotions should be brief. Thus, the priest may say the Our Father and "The Lord be in thy heart and on thy lips that thou mayest rightly confess thy sins." If many are waiting the Our Father may be omitted. During the confession the priest will sit, and will wear cassock, surplice, and violet stole. He should not unnecessarily look at the penitent.

The penitent will invoke the Trinity and will begin with some such form as is provided in a book of private devotions or printed on a card provided for the purpose; and after the indication of his sins the penitent will conclude with the appointed form. The priest will then give, without unnecessary prolixity, such advice as may be called for, impose a suitable penance, pronounce the absolution, and dismiss the penitent with a blessing. The penitent will retire at once and complete his devotions elsewhere.

§ 6. Interrogations require caution.[1] The peni-

place and time where and when he may be found for the purpose, thus avoiding the necessity on the part of the one who seeks the sacrament of making a special appointment. It has been found by experience that many who would use the sacrament are kept from it by the necessity of arranging for it in advance. This is one of the reasons why an unusually large number of confessions is often heard at a Mission.

[1] E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, ch. iv; Bp. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–48; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–87; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 162–166; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, §§ 462 ff. Questions will ordinarily concern the number, specific character and attending circumstances, of the sins confessed, occasions, relapses, and the duty of restitution. They will be asked only when necessary for the formation of a right decision, or for the reasons mentioned below.

tent presumably has come to make his own confession as dictated by his conscience. The priest, therefore, in the absence of exceptional reasons, should simply listen, assuming that the penitent is aware of his sins and is giving a faithful account of them. Interruptions and questions are normally to be avoided, and advice is to be deferred ordinarily until the confession has been completed.

But the priest may not neglect to give assistance by question or criticism when evidence appears that it is needed to make the confession what it ought to be. Thus: (*a*) If the penitent is too obscure to be understood, he ought to be questioned sufficiently to remedy the obscurity. (*b*) If there is evidence of an effort to avoid full disclosure or to give a false impression, of unnecessary disclosures of the sins of others, or of any other undesirable element in the confession, the priest should intervene to correct the fault and secure a proper confession. (*c*) If the penitent interrupts himself to ask a question, the answer to which will determine the nature of his confession, the question should be answered at once. (*d*) Ignorance may have prevented the making of a good self-examination, consequently if the penitent, especially a child or an untutored person, betrays important ignorance or mistake as to sin or its opposite, ignorance which will reduce the value of the confession and may be corrected without danger of inducing more serious and formal guilt, the priest should give the needed instruction as briefly as possible. (*e*) In a first confession,

especially of a child or ignorant person, and when the penitent is much embarrassed and unable to express himself adequately, the priest may assist with judicious questioning and direction calculated to secure a good confession. In brief, a wise flexibility of practice may be allowed. But in any case long interruptions, protracted dialogue, and all controversy should be avoided, lest the penitent forget his business, which is simply to make a good confession. Controversy may never be permitted, for it is utterly subversive of the relation to be maintained between priest and penitent.

The utmost caution and circumspection must often be exercised both in questioning and instructing a penitent. The innocent must not ordinarily be given knowledge of evil which their previous experience has not supplied. This is especially the case with sins of impurity.[1] The priest who avoidably supplies a mind with material for subsequent vile imaginations is gravely responsible. This rule is as effectively violated by unnecessary and suggestive questions as by direct explanations of the several forms of impure action. Innocence is always presumptive. A lesson touching impurity should never be illustrated by anecdotes which contain descriptions or suggestions of impure actions. No questions are justifiable the necessity of which is not apparent at the moment.

[1] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 225, "In the matter of chastity it is a maxim that it is better to fail in putting many questions than to put one which is not necessary."

One's private knowledge of the penitent's life may not be used in this matter.

Sex and age determine the limits of safe questioning or definition: (*a*) A female should not be questioned beyond what is necessary to make the nature of what is confessed sufficiently clear. "I have been impure," is not sufficiently specific to enable the confessor to form a judgment, for the penitent may refer either to a passing thought or to an act of the gravest character. (*b*) Neither sex should be questioned concerning the sinful actions or words of the other. (*c*) Questioning should cease, if it has been necessary, as soon as the requirements of a sincere and sufficient confession are being fulfilled. The mind of the penitent should not be allowed to dwell on the circumstances of sin after they have been sufficiently indicated. (*d*) The young ought not to be questioned as to forms of evil that they have not certainly become capable of understanding. Sins which are not possible until the attainment of puberty must be ignored in dealing with those who have not reached that stage of development. (*e*) The private organs or functions should not be unnecessarily named, nor should they be described vividly. Nicknames should be avoided absoutely, and should not be tolerated in confession, because they are used chiefly by the impure, and are directly suggestive of evil. (*f*) The unmarried should not be instructed or questioned in ways that suggest the relations of man and wife, except in view of prospective marriage and sincere enquiry occasioned by such prospect.

Questions should be suited to the penitent's vocation. Thus the "religious," those in business, in professional life, etc., need different lines of questioning, suited to the duties and temptations, and also the desirable ignorances, of each. After advice has been given and penance assigned, and before absolution, it is often helpful to ask, "Is there anything more that you would like to say?" The operation of grace during the confession and subsequent advice may move the penitent to perfect his confession by laying bare some previously concealed sin or difficulty.

§ 7. Different types of penitents [1] require different methods of treatment; and they may be conveniently classified according to their consciences as these are right, erroneous, doubtful, scrupulous, probable, optimistic, despairing or lax. These types emerge in every walk of life, in both sexes, and at every level of mental growth.

(*a*) *A right conscience* is sufficiently enlightened to judge correctly, and is exercised with due care and success, being kept right by careful self-examination and by habitual study of God's will. To have a right judgment in all things is the result of the spiritual gifts of wisdom and counsel, duly cultivated by education and self-discipline. In its perfection such a

[1] See W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, chh. v, vii; Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 194–202; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 58–79; Jeremy Taylor, *Duct. Dubit.*, Bk. I, chh. ii ff., who lists five varieties of conscience: tender, hardened or obdurate, quiet, restless or disturbed and perverse. He treats them at great length. Slater adds, certain and strict consciences.

conscience is attained with difficulty, is easily lost through carelessness and through failure of the will to be guided by its judgments, and is a mark of genuine sanctity. The whole aim of Moral Theology is to exhibit scientifically the principles and rules by which the judgments of a right conscience are determined.

(*b*) *An erroneous conscience* is one that in certain directions gives wrong judgments, whether from blameless or invincible ignorance or from blameworthy and avoidable causes. If due to invincible ignorance, it is not blameworthy so long as it remains really invincible. But when the mind becomes aware of means of obtaining needed enlightenment and fails to make use of them, its ignorance is no longer invincible or excusable. Dulness or hardness of heart is a frequent cause of this refusal of light; and careless or precipitate judgments of the conscience are sinful causes of error. None the less, the conscience is to be obeyed in any case, because its judgment expresses what we think to be right, so that to disobey it is to do what we believe to be wrong—contrary to God's will. But if the conscience is erroneous, we sin materially in obeying it, although not wilfully and formally, if the cause is that of invincible ignorance. If the ignorance is not invincible we sin formally whether we obey or disobey the conscience. Obviously, therefore, an erroneous conscience should be educated and corrected, if possible.

But if it appears reasonably certain that a person

who sins in ignorance, hitherto invincible, will cling to his sin after enlightenment, his priest or adviser will be justified in remaining silent, provided his silence, or refusal to take the matter into official cognizance, does not bring public scandal and spiritual injury to others.[1]

(*c*) *A doubtful conscience* is one that suspends judgment, whether wisely and justifiably, or wilfully and culpably. Such suspense of judgment may be justifiable when no immediate action has to be considered; and it may even be obligatory pending further enquiry and deliberation, inasmuch as moral judgments should be based upon adequate enquiry and sound reasons. The scrupulous conscience, to which we shall come shortly, is a very different matter. When immediate determination of action or non-action is obligatory, a doubtful conscience ought to condemn actions that appear probably to be wrong, and to decide in favour of actions which appear probably to be obligatory. But so long as real doubt continues, the presumption is on the side of refraining from the act under consideration, if it can be avoided without sin, and of

[1] W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 6, says, "If the penitent shows ignorance touching things necessary to salvation, he must be enlightened. In other things, even of precept, if there is danger of turning material into formal sin, he need not be enlightened, except: *i.* where there may be danger of injury to the general welfare. *ii.* where the penitent directly enquires. *iii.* or where he will ultimately be benefited." Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 165, "When a confessor has reason to doubt whether instruction is likely to prove useful, he had better say nothing."

further enquiry. If, however, immediate decision is necessary, what appears to be the safer course ought to be preferred. In further enquiry and deliberation the obtaining of competent advice ought to be included; and official rulings ought to be accepted as determinative, unless perceived certainly to be wrong.

(*d*) *A scrupulous conscience*[1] is an evil form of doubtful conscience which is obstinately and unduly influenced by trifling considerations and motives, to the neglect of proper attention to deeper and more determinative principles. It vacillates when determinate judgment and action is called for. It is a symptom of moral defect in its possessor, and if uncured paralyzes moral effort and spiritual progress. It represents either spiritual pride (its most frequent cause), the disguise of wilful evasion of responsibility, or pathological abnormality. Its diagnosis and treatment require the skill of an experienced guide of souls. Its ordinary demonstrations are (*a*) repeated questioning without decision; (*b*) frequent running

[1] Dr. Pusey, *op. cit.*, p. 376, says that the scrupulous "are like one whose eyes are inflamed, and who perpetually adds to the inflammation by rubbing them; just so, friction of the conscience increases scruple and anxiety of mind." Bp. Taylor says in *op. cit.*, that "a scruple is a great trouble of mind proceeding from a little motive, and a great indisposition, by which the conscience though sufficiently determined by proper arguments dares not proceed to action, or if it do so it cannot rest." Beside the refs. given in the previous note, see E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, ch. v, art. II; F. G. Belton, Pt. V, ch. v; J. Reuter, *Neo-Confessarius*, Pars. III, cap. xiii; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–200.

for advice without result; (*c*) changes of mind for small reasons; (*d*) habitual brooding over petty considerations; (*e*) lack of assurance and recurrence of fears after solemn absolution and comforting advice; (*f*) confusing temptation with sin.

If the explanation is that of wilful evasion of responsibility, serious admonition and present refusal of absolution is needed. If it is pathological, the case will call for merciful regard and pathological treatment.[1] In the more frequent cases, however, the following remedies are recommended: (*a*) to cultivate humility; (*b*) to avoid exciting devotional books; (*c*) to shun the company of scrupulous persons; (*d*) to confine self-examination to the greater and more undeniable sins, and in confession to mention lesser sins only *en bloc;* (*e*) to flee idleness, or opportunities of unnecessary self-inquisition; (*f*) to ask grace to follow advice implicitly, without running about to different advisers.

(*e*) *A probable conscience* is one that does not hesitate to decide on the basis of probabilities, without waiting for certainty. It offers a sharp contrast to the scrupulous conscience. When certainty cannot be had and decision is obligatory—not a rare circumstance—probability, as Bishop Butler says, is a very guide of life, and ought to be followed. But the besetting danger of a probable conscience is careless neglect of enquiry, and of effort to obtain certainty

[1] Cf. K. E. Kirk, pp. 233 ff., 202–4, 160; *Cath. Encyc., s.v.* "Psychoanalysis"; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–5.

or an approximation to it, when it can be acquired. If after due enquiry and deliberation has been resorted to, probabilities alone are available, then and only then do the principles of "probabilism," [1] as it is called, apply. Removable doubt is not a just excuse for deciding upon a purely probable basis.

Probabilism when it applies, that is, after unsuccessful effort to remove doubt, is concerned with two alternatives of conduct, one of which appears to be safer than the other, but neither of which is certainly sinful. In the tribunal of Penance mercy has to rule, and the penitent has to be given the benefit of reasonable doubt, even when he has followed the less safe course. That is, he may not be treated as sinning until either his act itself or his motive therein is clearly shown to be sinful. None the less the priest is bound to cultivate in his penitents not only a sincere purpose of avoiding sin—a purpose inconsistent with habitually choosing the less safe course—but also a sense of Christian vocation to make progress in virtue.

He should therefore inculcate, as occasion affords opportunity, certain general principles in deciding between alternative courses: (1) If both involve probable injury, the least injurious should be preferred; (2) If both bring moral advantage, the more advantageous should be preferred; (3) If one is

[1] On which, see especially C. J. Shebbeare, in *Ch. Q. Rev.*, July, 1912. His account of the various theories is summarized in p. 44, note, above, where other refs. are given.

always desirable and right and the other not always so, the former should be adopted; (4) If one is always likely to be injurious and wrong and the other not so, the latter should be chosen. In general, that good which is most clear and likely to be attained, and that course which is least likely to be injurious or to lead to wrong doing is to be chosen. But the judgment of conscience cannot alter the material quality of the act or refusal to act, although it does determine immediate obligation and the formal guilt or non-guilt of the course adopted. Therefore we ought to gain the fullest light practicable and govern our decisions by rationally ordered principles, deferring to sufficiently authoritative commands.[1]

§ 8. Confessions of the sick and dying[2] should be dealt with in a manner neither apologetic, timid nor perplexed, but authoritative, calm and decisive, although sympathetic, kind, friendly and fatherly, without stiffness and formality. He may well take as his model the sick-room manner of a good physician. He should get quickly to his task, and should insist on being left alone with the patient, for his visit is not merely that of a friendly caller, in which a member of the family may rightly remain present to share in the conversation.

[1] On the whole subject of a probable conscience and its right guidance, see K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–201; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–195; N. Porter, *op. cit.*, ch. xvii (a significant recognition of the need of casuistry).

[2] See E. B. Pusey, *op. cit.*, pp. 324–353; F. G. Belton, *op. cit.*, Pt. VI; E. C. Linton, *Notes on the Absolution of the Sick and Dying.*

E. C. Linton gives three classes of sick people;[1] the well-instructed, the partially instructed, and the ignorant, that is, in the use of the sacrament of Penance. Practically, all may be placed in either the first or third group. With the first there is no difficulty, and they may be particularly exhorted to recall sins that have been omitted in previous confessions, especially if the omission has been deliberate. With the third class it may be well to avoid the technical terms connected with "confession," in order not to rouse invincible prejudice. The following procedure has been found helpful: The priest will ask if the sick person has any sin troubling him. He may, perhaps, speak of the influence of moral and spiritual conditions upon the physical. If he receives the common response "I have committed no sin" showing ignorance as to the nature of sin and failure to practise self-examination, he may question about Church attendance, and ask whether absenting oneself from public worship may not be thought of as sin, and whether there is sorrow for it. He may then follow the same procedure with reference to prayer, going on to sins against God in general. He may then proceed to sins against oneself or against men, taking first those which the world treats lightly, such as profanity. Next he may take up such sins as men are apt most jealously to conceal. The examination may be concluded by some general questions: "Are you sorry for all these?" "Do you want God

[1] *Op. cit.*, chh. iv–vi.

to forgive you?" "Do you forgive all those who have in any way injured you?" The priest will proceed to give instruction concerning absolution, not necessarily using the word, however, but speaking of it as God's assurance, ministering consolation to our doubts. He will then give absolution, conditional or absolute, if there is reason to hope that the man feels any penitence. With the unconscious this may be taken for granted. All can be done in a surprisingly short time, a time not exceeding that to which a priest should be expected to confine himself in visiting the sick; and it will be found in many cases most efficacious in opening the eyes of the soul to the presence of sin and in leading to sincere repentance.

CHAPTER IX

SIN

§ 1. The Old and New Testaments use a number of terms to describe sin in its various phases.[1] It was necessarily dealt with from the beginning in the patristic age, and its nature was brought out with increasing clarity as the Church gained practical experience in dealing with its manifold forms. Much of the theoretical treatment of the subject belongs properly to Dogmatic Theology,[2] and we need not concern ourselves at length with general definitions or distinctions. Perhaps as good a definition as any is that of St. Augustine: "Anything done or said or desired contrary to the eternal law."[3] It is there-

[1] Space is lacking here for detailed treatment; but the Hebrew and Greek terms and their proper meanings can be ascertained in the lexicons, especially Brown-Driver-Briggs, *Hebrew-English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, and J. H. Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*. See also A. B. Davidson, *Theol. of the O. T.*, ch. vii; E. R. Bernard in Hastings, *Dic. of the Bib., q.v.;* S. A. B. Mercer, in *Anglican Theol. Review*, vol. II, No. 3, pp. 234–236.

[2] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 270 ff.; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, Lec. iv; H. V. S. Eck, *Sin;* T. B. Strong, *Christ. Ethics*, Lec. v; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Manual of Cath. Theol.*, Bk. IV, ch. i.

[3] In *c. Faust*, xxii, 27. "The will of admitting or retaining that

fore unnatural; that is, when nature is considered from the standpoint of its Creator.[1] It is a disturbance of right order, and order has been described as heaven's first law.

§ 2. Sin has certain characteristics, the consideration of which will help us to deal with it from the moral side that properly concerns us here: (*a*) It does not inhere in the nature of things, nor proceed from the divine essence or from some other independent principle; but owes its existence entirely to free will. "By the will a man sins or lives a good life." [2] This is the distinctively Christian teaching in contrast to that of Aristotle, who placed sin in a defect of the understanding. It is not, in scholastic terms, a substance, but an accident. It is a privation or corruption of good. (*b*) God is not the Author of sin.[3]

which righteousness forbids, and from which one is free to abstain," *ibid.*, *c. Jul.*, i, 47. St. Ambrose, *de Parad.*, cap. viii, 39, "What is sin but the transgressing of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?" St. Thomas, I, lxxi, 6. T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 133, "A sin is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God," "act" here includes thought and word, of course. Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 3–11; J. P. Gury, *op. cit.*, §§ 143–184. The Westminster *Shorter Catechism*, "Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God."

[1] St. Aug., *c. Ep. Manich. Fund.*, xxxv, 39, "Sin is not nature, but against nature."

[2] *Ibid.*, *Retract*, I, ix, 4. St. Thomas, I, II, lxxvii, 6, "Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a function of the will and of reason." *Ibid.*, II, II, lxxx, 1, "A man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin."

[3] *Ibid.*, I, xix, 9, "God in no wise wills the evil of sin, which is the

The doctrine of the "divine concursus" does not make God the Author of evil, but the accomplice, if we may so speak, of the will's freedom, for without Him nothing can be done; but the will, by virtue of its freedom, has the power of doing good or ill, and is the determining cause.[1] (*c*) Because sin proceeds from opposition of the human will to the will of God, who is the supreme Lawgiver and the benevolent Father of all, it is an act of disobedience and ingratitude. It diverts man also from his own true end. It derives its motives from an inordinate self-love.

As to its origin, according to Scripture, (*a*) the first sin, that of Lucifer and his angels, was purely spiritual. Man's sin differs in that it is not purely spiritual but partly carnal, and therefore, not the result of malice alone but of malice and infirmity combined. Also in human sin the effect of original sin is to be allowed for, because even after its removal the wound of

privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached." *Ibid.*, I, xlix, 2, "God is the Author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault."

[1] *Ibid*, I, II, lxxix, 2, "God is the cause of the act of sin, yet He is not the cause of sin (as such), because He does not cause the act to have a defect." Koch-Preuss, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 8, "God's contribution to a sinful act is in itself good. He merely enables man to employ the faculties which He has given him for a good purpose. It is man who renders the act evil by having a wrong intention." *Ibid.*, p. 9, "Besides, God often employs sin as a means of punishing the sinner and thus indirectly causes good to spring from evil." In brief, although God operates in man's sinning, His end is holy and this ultimately triumphs, overruling the evil. Cf. F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, p. 74; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 355–370.

concupiscence remains. Man, as distinguished from the angels, can consequently be redeemed from sin. (*b*) To understand the origin of sin aright, and to avoid the modern tendency to make little of it, we must remember that whether we take the Eden narrative historically or symbolically, the Holy Spirit teaches us thereby that sin grew out of ingratitude and contempt towards special privileges and gifts. All light views of sin are impossible when we recollect that Christ became Man and died because of it. Its heinousness to-day is aggravated by the fact that it is committed by those whose minds are enlightened by revelation, whose wills are strengthened by grace, and whose emotions are stirred by the love of the Atonement.

§ 3. The distinction between mortal and venial sin is very important both for priests and for penitents, not less so because requiring judgment in application. It helps priests in dealing with penitents to avoid the opposite errors of rigorism, which treats every sin as fatal, and of laxism, which underestimates the gravity of certain sins and treats venial sin as practically negligible. It also helps penitents to avoid these errors in estimating the results of self-examination and in making confessions which are at once sufficiently full and discriminating Mortal sins are those which because of their gravity in matter and formal guilt are fatal to the life of grace. Venial sins are less grave, proceeding largely from weakness rather than from deliberate wilfulness, and not imme-

diately fatal in their results. The unequal gravity and effect of various sins is everywhere taken for granted in Scripture;[1] and St. John tells us expressly that "there is a sin unto death . . . All unrighteousness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death."[2] The ancient exomologesis presupposed this distinction, and emphasized the peculiar gravity of certain sins;[3] and as the Church's experience widened, the difference between mortal and venial sin was clarified and technicalized.[4]

The practical rules for applying this distinction are easy to be understood, whatever may be the uncertainties that in cases attend their use. The comparative gravity of sins depends upon their matter and upon the degree of deliberate wilfulness with which they are committed. If the matter is grave, that is, if the act itself is highly subversive of the divine will, the sin is presumably mortal; and it certainly is so when committed with consciousness of its gravity and with deliberate wilfulness. On the other hand, if the matter is comparatively light, like a momentary loss of patience, the sin is presumably venial; as is also the case when there is no deliberate wilfulness in

[1] Cf. especially St. Matt. v. 22; xii. 31–32; xxiii. 23–24.

[2] 1 St. John v. 16–17.

[3] See O. D. Watkins, *op. cit.*, *passim;* F. H. Hallock in *Anglican Theol. Review*, Oct., 1921.

[4] On the distinction, see pp. 11–13, above; F. J. Hall, *The Sacraments*, pp. 239–240; K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, ch. xi; T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–231; W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–183; J. G. H. Barry, *Holy Eucharist*, pp. 48–58; St. Thomas, I, II, lxii, 5, lxxxviii–lxxxix.

its commission. Clear as these rules appear to be, in practice both the gravity of matter and the deliberate wilfulness are matters of judgment, in many instances of uncertain judgment. To forget this is to make the distinction between mortal and venial sin a source of danger instead of help to priest and penitent. In doubt, the penitent will most safely suspect himself of mortal rather than of venial sin; but, in dealing with penitents, the priest errs most safely for them on the side of merciful judgment, that is, of course, when the sinner appears in practical effect to repent truly of all his sins.

In judging whether a sin is mortal or venial, the following considerations are helpful: (*a*) Even when the matter is light, if the sinner thinks it to be grave and under such impression commits it with formal wilfulness, he sins mortally. In fact, any sinful act, regardless of the sinner's estimate of its material gravity, is mortal when committed with gravely sinful intention and deliberation. (*b*) When a particular species of venial sin becomes habitual and is wilfully cherished, it becomes mortal, especially when perceived to nullify one's purpose of conforming to the will of God. (*c*) A sin which is ordinarily mortal because of the gravity of its matter may be judged to be venial when the sinner is either blamelessly ignorant of its gravity, or does not act deliberately and intentionally in committing it. Marriages permitted by civil law but forbidden by the law of God,[1]

[1] Marriages contrary to the law of God introduce a continuing

and killings either in self-defence or by accident, supply examples.

Absence of certainty in determining whether given sins are mortal or venial will not bring disaster, if priest and penitent observe: (*a*) that all sins, even venial ones, are really sinful and need to be repented of; (*b*) that, if all sins known or thought to be mortal and all besetting faults, so far as they can be recalled, are contritely confessed, along with sincere expression of contrition for sins not remembered, God will not refuse mercy, and His priest may not in final issue refuse sacramental absolution.

§ 4. As we have seen, the will is the cause of sin; for its functioning is the determinative factor in converting moral motives into action. The fact that evil impulses are thus actualized by the will constitutes actual sin, and sin is wilfulness. But the motives—feelings and considerations—by which the will is influenced in sinning, while partly due to inward habitual dispositions and native concupiscence, are also called forth by external factors. Of these are temptations and occasions.

Temptation to sin means putting the will to moral proof, testing it, by affording opportunities and inducements to sin.[1] In this its proper sense to be

state which is materially sinful in grave degree. The question of their treatment by a priest is elsewhere considered. The possibility of converting a sin of ignorance into formal rejection of God's law, and the interest of the children, have to be taken into account. The priest may be justified in certain cases in not taking official cognizance, if no public scandal is involved.

[1] On temptation, F. J. Hall, *Incarnation*, pp. 250–259; Hastings,

tempted involves no sin whatever until we yield and will the evil act or non-action which is suggested. The appeal is to natural cravings and propensities which are lawful in themselves, but which cannot be gratified or obeyed in the specific manner suggested without sin. The fierceness and pain-producing power of temptation are felt in degrees proportioned to the will's resistance. That is, one who remains sinless alone experiences to the full the brunt and agony of temptation; and Christ alone has fully entered into the personal cost of overcoming temptation.[1]

(*a*) We are placed in this world on probation, and inasmuch as without temptation no real probation and establishment of interior virtue is possible, the natural conditions of our lives afford opportunities and inducements to sin, and divine providence brings them to bear on us in manners wisely adapted to our testing and to a fair chance to advance by rightly meeting the test. In this sense alone we are tempted of God.[2]

(*b*) Because of that native lack of the supernatural grace originally given to our first parents and consequent insufficiency of our moral powers which we call original sin, temptations come from within as well as from without, and we are apt to yield to them.

Dic. of Christ, Blunt's *Dic. of Theol.*, and *Cath Encyc.*, *q.vv.*; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, *s.v.* "Tempt, Temptation"; J. B. Mayor, *Ep. of St. James*, on i. 1–15.

[1] F. J. Hall, as cited, and refs. there given.

[2] Cf. St. James i. 12–18.

We cannot invariably avoid actual sin, although in no single instance are we literally obliged to sin, unless previous habits of sin have deprived us of all power to resist. This native tendency is called concupiscence; and is symbolically described as sin, not as really so, but as springing from primitive sin and predisposing us to acts of sin of our own.[1] By divine mercy we have been redeemed; and the grace of baptismal regeneration, while it does not at once eradicate concupiscence and put sinlessness within our power of immediate attainment, imparts the potential principle of progress through life-long discipline towards final and complete victory.[2]

(*c*) Men are social by nature and their development is conditioned by social relations, and by the influence of other persons than themselves. We are also surrounded by personal spirits or angels, and are subject to their influence, under limitations of divine appointment; and among these are evil spirits[3]—the devil and his angels. So it is that we are often tempted from without by evil men and angels, who wilfully offer us suggestions and inducements to sin. These sources of temptation are summarized in the phrase "the world and the devil." To social beings in a world not wholly made up of perfect persons the liability to external personal influence for evil is inevitable—a necessary incident in the probation of a

[1] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, pp. 277–279 and ch. ix.
[2] *Idem*, *The Sacraments*, pp. 15 ff.
[3] *Idem*, *Creation and Man*, ch. v.

race. But even so, we are not in any given instance tempted beyond power of resistance, unless our own previous fault has made us helpless. We may be compelled to perform actions materially sinful, but no one can compel us to will sinfully, that is, to become personally guilty of sin.[1] Moreover, the power to resist all forms of temptation, to outgrow concupiscence, is assured to us by sacramental grace when coöperated with in a life of progressive self-discipline and imitation of Christ.

An occasion is an external circumstance which is apt to afford temptation.[2] It does not always bring temptation, for there are many such occasions the tempting factors of which do not secure our attention; but when attended to they tempt by suggesting evil thoughts and inciting concupiscence. Like temptations, occasions are indispensable tests of virtue. For example, our honesty incurs no actual test, when there is no occasion to steal.[3] Foreseen occasions of sin are to be avoided whenever this is possible without evasion of duty.

Various distinctions in regard to occasions have been made: (*a*) a proximate occasion is one which leads a person to sin more often than not; (*b*) a remote occasion leads to the commission of sin only occasionally. A proximate occasion is either absolute, in that it constitutes a danger for all in all circum-

[1] 1 Cor. x. 13.
[2] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 220 ff.
[3] Eccles. xxxi. 10; 1 Cor. v. 10.

stances; or relative, when the danger involved depends upon individual character or disposition. An occasion of this sort which offers temptation to one may offer none at all to another. Occasions are also distinguished as either (*a*) voluntary, if wilfully sought after when the danger has been discovered; or (*b*) necessary, if they can be avoided only with great difficulty or not at all. In the latter case, they are called physically necessary. An occasion morally necessary is one which cannot be avoided without great injury or inconvenience, because there is involved a conflict of duties, perhaps an evasion of responsibilities in one's providential vocation.

Occasions are never to be sought, for such seeking is foolhardy.[1] To avoid all remote occasions, however, is impossible;[2] but we are morally bound to avoid all proximate and voluntary occasions.[3] To expose oneself wittingly and without necessity to an occasion which is apt to lead to mortal sin is itself a grave sin, being in effect an acquiescence of the will in mortal sin. And so long as one wilfully remains thus exposed, although able to escape, he ought not to receive priestly absolution. In a morally necessary proximate occasion one is bound to do all in his power by fervent prayer, frequent and devout reception of the sacraments, renewal of intention, avoiding perilous

[1] Ecclus. iii. 27.

[2] 1 Cor. v. 9–10; St. John xvii. 15.

[3] Prov. vi. 27–28; xviii. 6–10; St. Matt. v. 29–30; St. Mark ix. 41–46.

company and other methods to convert the proximate into a remote occasion. The dangers of a physically necessary occasion ought to be met by the use of extreme caution and all other available means.

§ 5. Sins are classified in numerous ways, and knowledge of the distinctions involved is helpful in dealing with penitents. Several of them have been indicated, but a comprehensive survey seems desirable at this point.[1]

The first series of distinctions have to do with estimating the several degrees of guilt: (*a*) *Material* sin means any objective violation of God's will, any action or non-action which as such is sinful; but is very commonly restricted to sins which are committed ignorantly or without sinful intention. *Formal* sin is one committed knowingly and wilfully, and therefore culpably. (*b*) *Venial* sin is concerned with a comparatively light matter, and represents momentary weakness or impulsiveness. *Mortal* sin is concerned with a grave matter, and is committed wittingly and with deliberation. It benumbs the soul and, unless remedied by adequate repentance, is fatal to the life of grace.[2] (*c*) Sins *of ignorance*, that is, vincible and culpable ignorance; sins *of infirmity*, due to passion and unconquered evil habits;

[1] On these distinctions at large, W. W. Williams, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. iii; St. Thomas, I, II, lxxii–lxxiii; A. Lehmkuhl, *Theol. Moralis*, vol. I, §§ 220 ff.

[2] Considered in § 3, above, where refs. are given.

and sins *of malice* committed with deliberate forethought; constitute a rising series in the degrees of guilt.[1] (*d*) Sins *that cry aloud* for vengeance; and the sin *against the Holy Ghost*, which is obstinately impenitent defiance of light, are singled out in Scripture as especially grave—the latter not subject to forgiveness.[2] (*e*) *Actual* sins, are distinguished from *habitual*, the latter consisting of such as are cherished and persisted in without repentance, therefore especially grave.

A second series has to do with species of sin considered in the manner of their committal, or their subjective factor. (*a*) *Of commission*, in violation of prohibitive law; and *of omission*, failing to fulfil some positive requirement. The former are usually more grave, but the latter are apt to become dangerous through neglect of repentance. (*b*) Sins are *spiritual* or *carnal* according as they proceed from, or are committed in, the higher or lower part of our nature. The latter are most scandalous, but the former, especially pride, are the deepest and most difficult to remedy, and therefore are often the most serious.[3]

[1] J. J. Elmendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–106; K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 224; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 30–34.

[2] St. Matt. xii. 31 and parallels. Cf. Heb. x. 26–31; 1 St. John v. 16–17 (perhaps not pertinent). See §§ 7–8 below.

[3] St. Thomas, I, II, lxxiii, 5, "Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal."

(*c*) Sins *of thought*, *of word* and *of deed* are distinguishable without the aid of definition. All sins begin in thought, of course, but their classification depends upon whether they are manifested in words or deeds. Thought becomes sin when it amounts to evil consent of the will, as in impure imagination wilfully pursued, and in pride and hatred.

A third series of distinctions is determined by external standards of right and wrong and by the parties other than ourselves who are offended. (*a*) In the category of law, sins may be against the *law of natural reason* or against the commands and prohibitions of *positive law*. (*b*) They may be against the revealed *law of God* or against *human law*, whether ecclesiastical or civil. (*c*) Sins against God's law are chiefly against *the Decalogue*, and are then classified according to its several commandments.[1] (*d*) With reference to the parties involved, sins are aimed either *against God*, *against our neighbours*, or *against self*. In ultimate analysis, however, all sins are against God.

§ 6. *The capital sins* are so called as constituting heads or categories under which all forms of sin can be classified. They are comprehensive categories because they are determined by the instincts in us which make up the possible roots of sinful action; and the list, which is ancient, is found to be substantially in accord with modern psychological investigation. They are sometimes called "deadly sins";

[1] Treated in ch. iv, Pt. III, above.

but this is quite misleading, for each of them may be either venial or mortal according to its comparative degree of malice and gravity of matter. They are seven in number: pride, covetousness, lust, envy, gluttony, anger and sloth.[1] Of these, lust and gluttony are carnal; pride, covetousness, envy and anger are spiritual; and sloth may be either spiritual or carnal.

Pride[2] is inordinate self-esteem, with desire to induce others to accept one's exalted opinion of self. Under this head are to be included: (*a*) vanity, which may be shown either in undue care for one's personal appearance, attainments, talents and repute or in the contemptuous neglect of the same; (*b*) ambition, that is, inordinate as distinguished from that which is fitting; (*c*) arrogance, including bragging and boastfulness; (*d*) hypocrisy or the feigning of virtues or qualities which one does not possess. The danger of pride lies in its turning one's thoughts from God, as the source of all we have and are, and in making one feel self-sufficient and independent, thus making repentance unlikely. It is the sin of the Pharisee.

[1] Thus enumerated in St. Gregory I, *Moralia*, xxxi, 45. On capital sins, see St. Thomas, I, II, lxxxiv, 3–4; T. B. Strong, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–266; K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–270; W. W. Webb, *op. cit.*, ch. iii, C.; H. V. S. Eck, *Sin*, Pt. II, ch. vi; T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 154–164. For treatments of them severally, see in each case *Cath. Encyc.*, Hastings' *Encyc. of Relig.*, and *Dic. of Bible*, *q.vv.*, where further refs. are given.

[2] St. Matt. vi. 1–6; vii. 1–5; St. Luke xviii. 9–14; 1 Cor. x. 12; Phil. ii. 3–8. St. Thomas, II, II, clxii.

It begets contempt of others and kills charity. The opposed virtue is humility, a fundamental Christian virtue.[1] It is the mean between pride and the opposed evil of pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness, which keeps a man from occupying the place for which God created him. Humility keeps him in his place both with reference to God and to his fellowmen.

Covetousness or avarice is an inordinate longing for earthly goods, with an immoderate desire to possess, keep and increase them. It leads to the service of Mammon instead of that of God;[2] and begets a numerous offspring of sins, such as lying, deceit, perjury, theft, treason, lack of charity in the narrow sense of the term, and every form of injustice. Therefore St. Paul terms it "the root of all evils."[3] It leads to insatiability, discontent and fear of poverty, and is often responsible for great unhappiness tending to become fixed.[4]

Lust is that form of inordinate desire which breeds the sins of unchastity. It may be either internal, confined to thoughts and desires, or external, of words or acts. Unless promptly overcome in time of temp-

[1] St. Matt. xi. 29, cf. v. 3; xviii, 3; St. Luke xiv. 1; St. John v. 14; St. Jas. iv. 6. J. B. Scaramelli, *Direct. Asceticum*, vol. III, art. XI.

[2] St. Matt. vi. 21, 24; St. Paul calls it idolatry, Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5.

[3] 1 St. Tim. vi. 10. Cf. St. Thomas, I, II, lxxxiv, 1. Generally, see St. Matt. vi. 31–33; St. John xii. 4–6; Heb. xiii. 5; 1 St. John ii. 15.

[4] T. Slater, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 157 ff. *Ibid.*, p. 158, "It is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess."

tation it is apt quickly to result in mortal sin. The subject has been dealt with elsewhere.[1]

Envy is grief because of another's good. According to one theory, it caused the fall of Satan.[2] Envy seeks another's hurt or loss rather than his good, and is therefore opposed to charity. From it spring hatred, revenge, calumny and slander. A deeply seated vice, it has far-reaching effects and destroys interior peace.[3]

Gluttony is inordinate desire for food and drink on account of the pleasure they give. Of those addicted to it St. Paul says that "their god is their belly."[4] It is opposed to the cardinal virtue of temperance. Excessive eating and drinking are its chief manifestations; but drunkenness is its most common form. Sins committed during drunkenness are morally imputable, unless the state is due either to an accident or to ignorance. Excessive drinking, even when not resulting in intoxication, is sinful, and may become very grave and mortal by reason of foreseen liability to cause injury to health, scandal and neglect of duty, and because practically every man knows that excessive drinking is for him a proximate cause

[1] In ch. iv, § 13, above. Cf. ch. v, § 7.

[2] St. Aug., *Serm.* 254, *alias* 151, *de Temp.;* St. Thomas, II, II, xxxvi, 1–4. Cf. Wisd. ii, 24. But see Isa. xiv. 12–15; 1 Tim. iii. 6.

[3] On envy, 1 Cor. iii. 3; xiii. 4; 2 Cor. xii. 20; St. James iii. 14, 16; v. 9. It is described as cause of the first murder, Gen. iv. 3–8; and of the demand for our Lord's crucifixion, St. Matt. xxvii. 17–18.

[4] Phil. iii. 19; cf. St. Luke xxi. 34; Rom. xiii. 13–14; 1 St. Pet. iv. 3.

of further sin.[1] It is a most common cause of crime, disease, and human misery generally.

Anger is craving for revenge. Abstractly considered it is not always a sin, for there is a "righteous anger" [2] which is praiseworthy and the lack of which may be a sin, as when one is unmoved by evil acts. But even this becomes a sin when it leads a man to lose control of himself and harbour feelings of hatred and enmity. And this is especially true when anger lacks a just cause. It becomes a sin in a way analogous to lust, by failure to control oneself *ad rem*.[3]

Sloth is sluggishness of soul which makes one shirk physical and mental labour in the fulfilment of duty and the practice of virtue. It may take the form either of lukewarm indifference to these things, or of disinclination for them, developing into positive aversion. Its result is spiritual and moral paralysis.[4]

§ 7. Sins that cry to heaven for vengeance, mentioned above, include in usual reckoning wilful murder, sodomy, oppression of the poor, and defrauding labourers of their hire.[5] They are not only moral transgressions positively considered, but they violate

[1] Prov. xx. 1; xxiii, 29–35; St. Luke xxi. 34; 1 Cor. vi. 10; Eph. v. 18.

[2] St. Matt. iii. 7; St. Mark iii, 5; St. Matt. xxi. 12; Rom. xii. 17; Acts v. 3 ff.

[3] Psa. xxxvii. 8; Prov. xiv. 17, 29; xvii, 14; St. Matt. v. 22; Ephes. iv. 31; St. James i. 19–20.

[4] Prov. vi. 6–11; St. Matt. xxv. 26–27; Rom. xii. 11; 2 Thess. iii, 10–12; Revel. iii, 15 ff.

[5] Gen. iv. 10; xviii. 20 ff.; Ex. iii. 7; xxii. 22 ff.; Deut. xxiv. 14 ff.; St. James v. 4.

with peculiar directness the laws of nature, outraging certain generally recognized natural instincts, including those of self-preservation, the sexual and the social. By their nature they are always mortal. Of the first two mentioned we have already treated.[1] Oppression of the poor, especially of widows and orphans, is committed in a variety of ways, *e.g.*, by unjustly administering an estate, by the unjust appropriation of goods, by defrauding one who is unable to defend his right, by oppressive combinations and monopolies of food, fuel, and other necessities of life, by adulteration of such necessities, and by usury. Labourers are defrauded of their hire when compelled by necessity to accept a lower wage than that to which they are justly entitled, as in "sweat shops."[2] The latter forms of these sins require special study at the present time in the light of modern sociology and political economy.

§ 8. In final analysis every wrongdoing is *sin against the Holy Ghost*, for all sins are in ultimate reference against God. In particular, all sin is opposed to sanctity, of which the Holy Ghost is the Author. But, technically speaking, the description applies to a certain kind of sin.[3] It is the most malignant sin of all and the only unforgivable one, for it does not proceed from ignorance or infirmity,

[1] In ch. iv, §§ 12, 13, above.

[2] See T. Slater, *Questions of Moral Theology*, pp. 78 ff.; 176 ff.

[3] St. Matt. xii. 24, 31–32; St. Mark iii. 28–30; St. Luke xii. 10; Heb. x. 26–31.

but is a deliberate and unalterably fixed opposition to the will of God as revealed by the Holy Ghost. St. Augustine and Peter Lombard enumerate six distinct sins of this kind,[1] but all may be reduced to one, deliberate revolt from God with final impenitence. Such sin is necessarily unpardonable, not because in objective form any human sin is beyond the reach of divine mercy, but because the sinner himself deliberately and finally rejects such mercy. He who thus sins against the Holy Ghost cannot obtain forgiveness for the simple reason that with incurable obstinacy he refuses to be forgiven. It is the fixedness of his attitude of rebellion which explains the situation, and all forms of sin are susceptible of final development to this climax of incurable malignity. Previously to such development all are forgivable on repentance.

[1] Presumption against God's mercy, despair, resisting known Christian truth, envy at another's spiritual good and obstinacy in sin, are all steps leading to the last which is alone unpardonable. See H. B. Swete, on *St. Mark, in loc.;* A. Plummer, *St. Matt., in loc.*

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

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